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This dissertation offers a theoretical account of Protestant Christianity in American 
democratic politics that attends to the habits of mind and body religious traditions generate. 
Challenging contemporary political theory’s predominant focus on the epistemological, 
normative, and cognitive dimensions of religious doctrine and belief, I investigate how the 
performative repertoires or cultus supplied by evangelical strains of Christianity combine 
sensibility and practice to constitute political subjects. I develop this alternative account 
through an engagement with recent work in post-secularist religious studies and the politics 
of aesthetic experience. This dissertation furthers these scholarly discussions through the 
theorization of how the practice of religious claims-making both draws from and fuels an 
American democratic imaginary in which entanglements with the divine and the sacred are 
part and parcel of self-governance. My study of the entanglements between Christianity and 
American democracy as lived experiences of collective and agonistic world-making 
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illuminates the irreducible affective and aesthetic dimensions of political life and the cultural 
bases necessary to sustain a democratic order.  
Each chapter focuses on different case studies in order to interrogate the interplay of 
Christian traditions and American democracy. Chapter One studies evangelical abolitionist 
William Lloyd Garrison to argue for a re-conceptualization of American civil religion from a 
relatively static body of consensual beliefs and values to a poetic mode of claims-making that 
facilitates the re-fashioning of democratic ideals and identities rather. Chapter Two examines 
John Brown and Operation Rescue founder Randall Terry as examples of religious zealotry, 
specifically attending to how their fanaticism relates to American democratic structures of 
feeling. Chapter Three expands and refines the concept of the cultus through an analysis of 
the Social Gospel and how its body of aesthetic forms conditions a conversion of thought, 
feeling, and imagination foundational for a politics of social justice. Chapter Four considers 
the performances of George W. Bush, Jerry Falwell and Jeremiah Wright after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks to explore the role of Christian forms and rhetoric in the politics 




“THE FIRST OF THEIR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS”:  
THEORIZING RELIGIOUS CLAIMS-MAKING  
IN AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE 
 
 
“Religion, which, among Americans, never mixes directly 
in the government of society, should therefore be consid-
ered as the first of their political institutions; for if it does 
not give them the taste for freedom, it singularly facilitates 
their use of it.” 
— Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America1 
 
“Religion is more complicated than it sometimes seems.” 
— Nicholas D. Kristof, 
New York Times, October 9, 20102 
 
§ 1. Overtures 
 
In narrating his initial impressions of the United States of the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, Alexis de Tocqueville remarked that he was taken aback by one aspect in particular: the 
intensity and ubiquity of religion. He recounts this first encounter in Democracy in America, 
writing,  
On my arrival in the United States the religious aspect of the country was the first 
thing that struck my attention; and the longer I stayed there, the more I perceived 
the great political consequences resulting from this new state of things. In France I 
had almost always seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom marching in 
opposite directions. But in America I found they were intimately united and that they 
reigned in common over the same country.3 
 
                                                
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated and edited by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 280. 
2 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Test Your Savvy on Religion,” New York Times, October 9, 2010, online at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/opinion/10kristof.html (accessed May 14, 2012). 
3 Tocqueville, 319-20. 
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As he describes it, Tocqueville’s sense of wonder and admiration is inspired both by the pe-
culiar depth and character of American religion. Religion seems to thread throughout the 
entire fabric of the public sphere, becoming entangled in a unique and striking way with the 
political ideas and identities of its citizens. By religion, of course, Tocqueville specifically 
means strains of Christianity. These Christian traditions, Tocqueville observes, not only act 
on Americans as private moral actors but they also inform and shape the social mores—and 
so too, the political forms—in the United States. The “religious aspect” of the American 
polity differs strikingly from that of the confessional nation-states of Europe, wherein relig-
ion was conjoined with the “powers of the earth” and lost its social potency with the dimin-
ishment of those regimes. The sway religion holds in America, Tocqueville suggests, is less a 
matter of institutional authority than it is a constitutive force or facilitating condition within 
the nation’s political culture.  
Above and beyond the pervasiveness of American Christianity, Tocqueville asserts 
the novel—and seemingly counterintuitive—possibility that religion can facilitate a democ-
ratic practice of political freedom. Responding to European thinkers who seek to instill de-
mocratic orders and “sincerely desire to prepare men to be free” but also unreflectively “at-
tack religious opinions,” Tocqueville contends that the American case demonstrates how 
religious traditions need not thwart the practice of democracy.4 Indeed, throughout Democracy 
in America Tocqueville characterizes religion as “the first of [America’s] political institutions” 
that aids the development of a free and democratic polity while providing the ground for 
American political thought, practice, and identity.5 Whatever its secular sound and fury, Toc-
queville implies, American politics operates within (and because of) a grammar drawn from 
                                                
4 Ibid., 307. For an extended analysis of this point, see Hillel Fradkin, “Does Democracy Need Religion?,” in 
World Religions and Democracy, edited by Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Philip J. Costopoulos (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2005), 245-52. 
5 Ibid., 280. 
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the Christian religious tradition. Another foreign observer of nineteenth century America, 
Bohemian publicist Francis Grund, describes the social-political landscape in terms remarka-
bly similar to Tocqueville’s: “The religious habits of the Americans form not only the basis 
of their private and public morals, but have become so interwoven with their whole course 
of legislation, that it would be impossible to change them, without affecting the very essence 
of their government.”6 
If we grant Tocqueville’s and Grund’s claims that religious traditions are interwoven 
with American politics, what is the exact nature and character of these entanglements? 
Moreover, how might these religious traditions be, as Tocqueville and Grund suggest, felici-
tous to a democratic social and cultural order? In Divine Entanglements: Religious Claims-making 
and American Democracy, I propose a richer approach to making sense of religion and politics’ 
curious intertwining in the United States than is presently featured in political science schol-
arship. Specifically, I advance an analysis oriented towards the play of lived evangelical Chris-
tian traditions in the historical practice of American democracy. These religious traditions 
enable and nourish a contestatory politics, on the one hand, through their capacity to gener-
ate and reform habits of mind and body and, on the other, by endowing social actors with 
the commitments and performative materials that facilitate citizen participation. 
Such a re-thinking of religion and democratic politics is particularly necessary be-
cause the closing decades of the twentieth century and opening decade of the twenty-first 
                                                
6 Francis Grund, Impressions of the Americans, Vol. 1, quoted in James E. Wood, Jr., “Public Religion Vis-à-vis the 
Prophetic Role of Religion,” in The Power of Religious Publics: Staking Claims in American Society, edited by William 
H Swatos, Jr., and James K. Wellman, Jr. (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 37. Grund goes on in this 
passage to emphasize the determinative role of social mores and culture in the maintenance of political regimes, 
remarking, “It is to the manners and habits of a nation we must look for the continuance of their government.” 
Tocqueville’s and Grund’s characterizations of religion in American resonates with Eldon Eisenach’s recent 
claim that religion is “so pervasive, so deeply embedded in our culture and practices that to be distinctly Ameri-
can is to be distinctly religious, even those who proclaim to hold only ‘secular’ values.” Eldon J. Eisenach, “Re-
ligion, Politics, and American Identity After September 11: Reflections on Recent Scholarship,” in Religion, Poli-
tics, and American Identity, edited by David S. Gutterman and Andrew R. Murphy (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2006), 273. 
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have featured the vigorous re-assertion—or at least revived publicity and recognition—of 
religions the world over. To only refer to the most dramatic instances of this resurgence, 
consider the increased political pull of the Religious Right in the United States, the public 
role of political Islam in the Middle East and elsewhere, heated debates regarding the de-
mands of laïcité in France, and dramatic acts of religiously-inflected violence such as the at-
tacks of September 11, 2001 and the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013. Though they have 
appeared in varying configurations across time and space, “public religions” (to use sociolo-
gist José Casanova’s term) have mobilized considerable political power and seized the atten-
tion of an academy that had long since presumed religion to be on the wane—either collaps-
ing under the weight of an ever-more rationalized modernity or, at the least, retreating from 
the public sphere into the confines of private life.7 With the apparent empirical and analytical 
insufficiencies of these variations on the secularization thesis, scholars have confronted what 
is called, by turns, the fact of “desecularization,” “the resurgence of religion,” and the “re-
turn of the religious,” where religious traditions are powerful forces within contemporary 
societies and thus due appropriate consideration as objects of study.8  
                                                
7 See José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); and 
José Casanova, “Public Religions Revisited,” in Religion: Beyond a Concept, edited by Hent de Vries (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008), 101-119. 
8 As early as the 1980s Mary Douglas pointed to the lack of global decline in religion saying, “Events have 
taken religious studies by surprise” and that the inclinations of scholars “glued to those conditions of modern 
life identified by Weber as antipathetic to religion” misled them. Mary Douglas, “The Effects of Modernization 
on Religious Change,” in Religion and America: Spirituality in a Secular Age, edited by Mary Douglas and Steven M. 
Tipton (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 25-43. See also Peter Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: a 
Global Overview,” in The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, edited by Peter Berger 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999), 1-18; and Grace Davie, Europe: The Exceptional Case: Parameters of Faith 
in the Modern World (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002). 
 Given its intellectual roots, the tendency of social science to have presumed the end or decline of relig-
ion in the modern world is perhaps understandable. In its sociological formations, the “decline of religion” 
version of the secularization thesis developed mainly in response to evidence drawn from modern Europe (and 
thus taking these dynamics as the norm). Well before these empirical claims came into ascendance, a number of 
normative theorists, including Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche, argued for the social 
and moral good of shedding religious belief.  
 The empirically supported core of the secularization thesis, to be clear, describes the differentiation and 
relative autonomy of secular spheres and religious institutions (i.e. social or functional differentiation). In most 
recent accounts the conception of secularization as a process of functional differentiation of social institutions 
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Yet in a real sense the current moment is not one of religious revival or resurgence—
as if to say religion had vanished and now abruptly returned—but rather a challenge to the 
predominant set of epistemological assumptions that define the conceptual categories of ‘re-
ligion’ and ‘politics’ and how they relate to one another. Faced with the persistence of relig-
ion as a social and political force, Jürgen Habermas christened the turn of the twenty-first 
century a ‘post-secular’ moment and rallied social scientists behind the banner of taking re-
ligion seriously.9 As Birgit Meyer describes, the intellectual project involved in taking religion 
seriously demands scrutinizing its formation and conceptualization as an object of scholarly 
study and governmental regulation. This approach, Meyer explains, is not post-secular (at 
least in the sense Habermas uses the term) but rather post-secularist: 
post-secularist in the sense that, rather than inscribe into our theoretical frameworks 
the opposition between secular and religious that has entered our modern social 
imaginaries, we need to take this opposition as the object of study…[a]nd investigate 
the question of religion with open minds. We need to develop alternative theoretical 
frameworks that do not approach contemporary religion as an anachronism we ex-
pect to vanish or to become politically irrelevant with modernization, but instead 
seek to grasp its appeal, persistence, and power.10 
                                                                                                                                            
and subsystems has been decoupled from problematic and contested claims about the decline, marginalization 
or privatization of religion (and the related anticipation of a disenchantment of the world with the modern de-
velopment and dissemination of reason). 
 Per philosopher Charles Taylor’s definition, secularism involves a transformation of the ecology of faith in 
modern societies. That is, belief in God no longer figures as an axiomatic article of faith and instead becomes 
one optional way of being that can be voluntarily selected by each individual. See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). For various responses to Taylor’s theory, see 
Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age, edited by Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen, and Craig Calhoun 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); and Rethinking Secularism, edited by Craig Calhoun, Mark Juer-
gensmeyer, and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
9 See Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Polity, 2008); Jürgen 
Habermas, “Notes on the Post-Secular Society,” New Perspectives Quarterly 25:4 (2008): 17-29; and Jürgen 
Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age (Cambridge: Polity, 2010). Cf. 
Hans Joas, “Post-Secular Religion? On Jürgen Habermas,” in Do We Need Religion?: On the Experience of Self-
Transcendence, translated by Alex Skinner (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2008), 106-107. In a move that antici-
pates the post-secularist approach I discuss later in this paragraph, Joas argues against Habermas’s claims re-
garding an empirical change, writing that it is “not that the secular state is overcome, but just a secularistic self-
understanding.” 
10 Birgit Meyer, “Religious Sensations: Why Media, Aesthetics, and Power Matter in the Study of Contemporary 
Religion,” in Religion: Beyond a Concept, edited by Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 
705. A similar approach informs the work of international relations scholar Elizabeth Shakman Hurd. See, e.g., 
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “Theorizing Religious Resurgence,” International Politics 44 (2007): 647-665; and 
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “Secularism and International Relations Theory,” in Religion and International Relations 




The post-secularist project, of which this dissertation is a part, is simultaneously critical and 
constructive. It is necessary, on the one hand, to illuminate the limitations, biases, and faulty 
assumptions built into the predominant frameworks for understanding religion and its rela-
tionship to politics. On the other hand, deconstructing these existing accounts invites the 
articulation of new ways of making sense of religion as it operates in the contemporary social 
and political world. 
A post-secularist approach entails a profound reconsideration of how religion is fig-
ured (or has failed to be figured) in scholarly work within political science and political the-
ory. A growing chorus of critics has made the case that, despite the resurgence in the public-
ity of religions around the world and the broad upsurge of academic discussion centered on 
religion, political science lags behind other disciplines in attending to religion in its theory 
and research. Claiming that political science’s relationship with religion is one of “genuine 
neglect,” Daniel Philpott writes that “religion’s place in political science scholarship is vastly 
underproportioned to its place in headlines around the globe, and to scholarship in political 
economy, security studies, international institutions, and the like.”11 Kenneth D. Wald and 
Clyde Wilcox caustically echo Philpott’s sentiment: “Apart from economics and geography, 
it is hard to find a social science that has given less attention to religion than political sci-
ence.”12 One recent empirical analysis of articles in political science publications over the last 
                                                                                                                                            
extensively on Talal Asad’s anthropological examinations of the concepts of ‘religion’ and ‘secularism.’ These 
thinkers, along with other scholars in the field of religious studies, are intellectual touchstones for the more 
elaborate discussion of the concept of ‘religion’ in Sections Two and Three of this chapter. 
11 Daniel Philpott, “Has the Study of Global Politics Found Religion?,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 
(2009), 184. 
12 Kenneth D. Wald and Clyde Wilcox, “Getting Religion: Has Political Science Rediscovered the Faith Fac-
tor?,” American Political Science Review 100:4 (2006): 523. Similar assessments of political science’s lack of en-
gagement with religion can be found in Eva Bellin, “Faith in Politics: New Trends in the Study of Religion and 
Politics,” World Politics 60:2 (2008): 315-47; Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics, edited by David C., 
Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Kenneth D. Ward, Adam L. Silverman, and 
Kevin Fridy, “Making Sense of Religion in Public Life.” Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005): 121–43; and 
Miroljub Jevtic, “Political Science and Religion,” Politics and Religion 1:1 (2007): 59-69. 
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decade suggests that the discipline as a whole has so far failed to significantly engage the sub-
ject of religion, particularly in comparison to the efforts of other social scientific fields such 
as sociology.13  
In order to redress the disciplinary neglect of religion and the problematic concep-
tions of ‘religion’ that undergird much of the extant discussion in political theory, this disser-
tation re-configures the perennial theoretical puzzle of Christianity’s place in American de-
mocratic politics by turning to the level of practice and bringing into view religion’s poetic 
and performative dimensions. If religious traditions, as I argue (following Tocqueville), are 
part and parcel of American political culture, how do traditions of evangelical Christianity 
relate to the practice and possibilities of democracy in the United States? How might we 
theorize and assess the political bearing of religion given a more robust conception of relig-
ion, both in terms of its constituent elements and its place in American culture? Finally, in 
light of this theoretical framework, how might materials drawn from evangelical Christianity 
and other religious traditions be understood to enrich, enable, constrain, and challenge the 
always precarious and risky conditions necessary for democratic claims making, contestation, 
and governance?  
In this introductory chapter, I develop and argue several key claims establishing the 
theoretical and interpretive groundwork for the chapters that follow. To put it differently, I 
establish here the urgency of my project, the insufficiency of the reflexive treatment of relig-
                                                
13 Steven Kettel, “Has Political Science Ignored Religion?,” PS: Political Science & Politics 45:1 (2012): 93-100. It 
is particularly noteworthy that political theory as a subfield of political science reproduced the discipline-wide 
tendency to marginalize religion and, in fact, lagged behind the subfields of political behavior, political institu-
tions, and comparative politics in terms of its proportional consideration of the intersection of religion and 
politics (95-96). Of course, Kettel’s analysis is methodologically limited in so far as it only surveys articles fea-
tured in the twenty top political science periodicals, and thus it does not consider book-length publications, 
lower-tier journals, or conference papers and presentations. Further, the study of religion in American politics 
and political theory has intensified, expanded, and deepened since the re-emergence of evangelical Protestants 
in the 1980s. One concrete manifestation of this increased attention is the landmark formation of the Religion 
and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association. 
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ion within political theory, and what I take to be a more promising analytical lens for such 
inquiry. I first argue that the theoretical framework structuring scholarship on religion is 
both a historically contingent political construct and conceptually impoverished and thus 
incapable of fully uncovering the significance of religion in American public life. I then iden-
tify how the hegemonic conceptual notion of religion as private belief informs and directs 
the major debates on the subject within political philosophy. Next, I articulate a political 
theory of religion that de-centers propositional beliefs in order to attend seriously to the 
practical and performative dimensions of Christian religious traditions. With this theoretical 
foundation established, I develop an account of how my re-conceptualization of religion il-
luminates the political potentials and powers of religious claims-making in a democratic soci-
ety such as the United States. The chapter concludes with an account of the project’s meth-
odology and a roadmap detailing the theoretical movements and contributions of subsequent 
chapters. 
§ 2. Get Behind Me, Lactantius! 
(Or: A Brief Critical History of ‘Religion’ in Western Christendom) 
 
Most considerations of religion in political science and political theory treat it as a 
self-evident, fixed, ahistorical, and universal category. One recent text examining the role of 
religion in American public life, for instance, offers a perfunctory statement that religion 
consists of “beliefs in supernatural powers, forces, and beings.”14 Although remarkably 
threadbare in its description, this formulation is representative of the conception of ‘religion’ 
implicit in much of the scholarship in political science. Even as they frequently dodge the 
question of explicitly defining ‘religion,’ these texts often rely on a notion of it as involving 
systems of propositional beliefs regarding the sacred or the supernatural that are privately 
                                                
14 Jon Butler, Grant Wacker, and Randall Balmer, Religion in American Life: A Short History (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2000), ix. 
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held by individuals and sustained by institutions such as churches. This rough definition cap-
tures the hegemonic idea of religion both in political science and, more generally, the Ameri-
can academy. It also, I argue, proscribes an overly narrow conception of religion that oc-
cludes theoretical consideration of politically significant dimensions of religious tradition. In 
this section I mean to develop a political theory of ‘religion,’ or a way of thinking about how 
historical exercises of power have constructed the concepts of ‘religion,’ ‘politics,’ and ‘secu-
lar’ (and the concomitant relationships between them) so as to pre-structure and delimit our 
theoretical imagination. By demonstrating the political origins of the common sense under-
standings of these terms, I open up a space for putting into question their analytical suffi-
ciency and, ultimately, assembling an alternative theoretical understanding of the relationship 
between religious traditions and political practice in the United States. 
The definitional problems associated with ‘religion,’ of course, are hardly news to the 
field of religious studies. As religious studies scholars have repeatedly pointed out, the 
hegemonic conception of ‘religion’ found in both popular and academic discourse is an arti-
fact of the unique political and intellectual history of the West.15 The common sense notions 
of ‘religion’ at work in the West (including discussions within political theory) are the prod-
uct of a series of political projects, dating back to the ascendency of Christianity in the Hel-
lenistic period. In this section I highlight two illuminating moments in the historical shift 
                                                
15 To name but a few in this burgeoning literature that were especially helpful in my own thinking: William E. 
Arnal and Russell T. McCutcheon, The Sacred and the Profane: The Political Nature of “Religion” (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Willem B. Drees, “‘Religion in Public Debates: Who Defines, for What Purposes?,” in 
Religion: Beyond a Concept, edited by Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 464-72; Daniel 
Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology, translated by William Sayers (Balti-
more: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003); Timothy Fitzgerald, Discourse on Civility and Barbarity: A Critical 
History of Religion and Related Categories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Tomoko Masuzawa, The Inven-
tion of World Religions, Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2005); Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1988); Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993); Russell T. McCuthcheon, “The Category of ‘Religion’ 
in Recent Publications: A Critical Survey,” Numen 42:3 (1995): 284-309; and Russell McCutcheon, Manufacturing 
Religion: The Discourse of Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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towards an interior, intellectual, and private account of religion: the early Christian reclama-
tion of the concept of religio and the Protestant Reformation.16 
The modern English word ‘religion’ can be traced back etymologically to the Latin 
term religio. In the dialogue De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods), Cicero provides a 
gloss on this concept through the voice of the Stoic Balbus, who links the term to relegere, 
which refers to the action of retracing or re-reading.17 As Richard King explains, 
This understanding of the term seems to have gained provenance in the ‘pagan’ Ro-
man Empire and made religio virtually synonymous with traditio. As such it repre-
sented the teachings of one’s ancestors and was essentially not open to question. 
Primarily, religio involved performing ancient ritual practices and paying homage to 
the gods.18  
 
The close association of religio and traditio, the latter a Latin term meaning the transmission or 
the giving over of something for safekeeping (and obviously, the root of the English word 
‘tradition’), is particularly striking in that it frames modes of worship as inheritances passed 
down through time in a given civic community. Tellingly, Cicero’s character of Balbus asso-
ciates religio with a litany of other terms, remarking, 
Those on the other hand who carefully reviewed and so to speak retraced all the lore 
of ritual were called ‘religious’ from relegare (to retrace or re-read), like ‘elegant’ from 
eligere (to select), ‘diligent’ from diligere (to care for), ‘intelligent’ from intellegere (to un-
derstand); for all these words contain the same sense of ‘picking out’ (legere) that is 
present in ‘religious.’19 
 
Thus, to be religious in the Ciceronian sense entails a certain measure of deliberately select-
ing and taking up—picking out—materials from the forms of worshipful life of a commu-
                                                
16 “Power,” Michael Foucault wrote, “is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its 
success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.” Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An 
Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1978), 86. Another way to pitch the purpose of 
this section, then, is to reveal the tactical manufacture of a certain ideational framework concerning religion 
and, through this effort, tear away the mask of power that narrows and directs how political theory understands 
the social and political place of religion. 
17 Cicero, De Natura Deorum II.72, translated by H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), 193. 
For further analysis of Cicero’s treatment of religion, see S.N. Balagangadhara, ‘The Heathen in His Blindness’: 
Asia, West and the Dynamic of Religion (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 241. 
18 Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and ‘the Mystic East,’ (London: Routledge, 1999), 
35. See also Hurd, “Secularism and International Relations Theory,” 72. 
19 Cicero, De Natura Deorum II.72, 193. 
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nity’s forbearers. As much as it involves the enactment of inherited modes of worship, the 
Ciceronian sense of religio contains an implicit pluralistic ethos; if religion is simply a lineage 
particular to a given community or city, then there is no necessary presumption that this in-
heritance possesses any universal truth or value over and against other forms of worship. 
The Christian writings of the third and fourth centuries performed a gradual dis-
placement of the Ciceronian sense of the term. Given its stress on a lineage going back in 
time, the Ciceronian notion of religion posed a thorny problem for the then nascent com-
munity of Christians. Unlike Roman paganism or Judaism, Christianity could not claim to 
possess a long history or roots in antiquity, and so Christians were charged with the “greatest 
impiety” of turning from ancestral rites because of the “meddlesome…[l]ove of innova-
tion.”20 In order to establish their status as a legitimate religious community, early Christians 
made a concerted effort to severe the conceptual link between religio and traditio. According 
to the early Christian author (and advisor to the Roman Emperor Constantine I) Lactantius, 
religio is defined as “worship of the true; superstition of the false. And it is important, really, 
why you worship, not how you worship, or what you pray for… [T]hey are superstitious 
who worship many and false gods; but we, who supplicate the one true God, are religious.”21 
Departing sharply from the earlier Ciceronian meaning, religio shifts from a system of wor-
ship-in-action that is handed down generation-to-generation to a set of beliefs possessing an 
absolute and universal truth. Practical forms of worship, Lactantius argues, are ultimately of 
a secondary importance to the beliefs and theological apparatus that motivate and inspire 
                                                
20 Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, 4.1, translated by Gifford, 141-142, quoted in Balagangadhara, 48. 
21 Lactantius, Institutiones Divinae IV.28, translated by Sister Mary Francis McDonald (Washington, D.C.: Catho-
lic University of America Press, 1964), 318-20; quoted in Balagangadhara, 242. Lactantius’ account should per-
haps be best understood as a lagging indicator, reflecting and articulating something that is already present in 
the world, so that the text itself is “an imaginative attempt to codify and legitimate Christian usage and practice 
with an authority based upon supposedly ancient etymological origins” (King, 37). Earlier Christian writers, 
including Minucius Felix and Tertullian, had already begun infusing religio with a “certain boundary-marking 
force” by establishing a hierarchical distinction between superstition and true religion (i.e. Christianity). See 
Brent Nongbri, Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 28-29. 
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that worship. Practice becomes, accordingly, the mere epiphenomenal expression of prior, 
interior beliefs, and thus is diminished in importance.22 The problem with pagans, so Lac-
tantius’s logic goes, is that they are “superstitious” (as opposed to strictly and properly relig-
ious) since they possess false beliefs that result in wrong practices of worship. To hold 
“true” beliefs—and beliefs, furthermore, that claim universal truth—becomes the measure 
of religion, and these true beliefs were unquestionably those of the Christian faith.23 
The conceptual tradition set down by Lactantius gradually became hegemonic 
throughout Western Christendom. His understanding of religio (and so too, religion) appears 
in the work of, among others, St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, and Vico. The 
framework informed not only formal Christian thought but, gradually, secular reflections on 
the subject of religion in the West. Indeed, contemporary conceptions of religion continue 
to operate in the shadow of Lactantius. One effect of this discursive shift is the common 
emphasis on propositional beliefs regarding the sacred and transcendent as the sine qua non of 
religion. Reflecting on the subtle skewing of discourse on religion in the West, King writes:  
                                                
22 Balagangadhara, 55. 
23 In addition to rejecting Cicero’s emphasis on inherited forms and practices, Lactantius also took issue with 
his etymology of the term itself. Rather than tracing it back to relegere as Cicero did, Lactantius claims that religio 
derives from re-ligare (to bind together). The religious believer and the religious community, thus, “are bound 
and tied to God by this chain of piety”  
 This image of bondage establishes religion as a matter of hierarchical authority and obligation, situating the 
individual believer as the subordinate of a single God. The believer must accordingly coordinate her actions in 
line with this foundational relationship. The vertical relationship of divinity and believer produces a horizontal 
relationship that unites a cohort of believers. The bonds of this community return again to the question of be-
lief, in that the uniting force at work is a shared set of ideas about the order of the world and the normative 
demands such an order places on individuals. Instead of the Ciceronian emphasis on a nation or community 
with a shared history of worship practices, Lactantius renders the roots and essence of religion to be the per-
sonal adherence to “true” doctrines of faith that bring together believer, believing community (or church), and 
God. 
 By way of contrast, Cicero does not map the distinction between religion and superstition onto a true-false 
binary; he instead defines superstition not by its theological content but its practical excesses and violation of 
moderation. Critically, he writes that the superstitious are those who “[spend] days in prayer and sacrifice in 
order that one’s children outlive their parents” (II.72). Cicero’s notion of ‘superstition,’ therefore, has more in 
common with Lucretius’s dismissive treatment of religio, which is described in On the Nature of Things as “exces-
sive concern about the gods.” Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, 6.58-64. 
 Lactantius, IV.28. Jacques Derrida discusses the competing etymological claims regarding ‘religio’ in “Faith 
and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone,” in Acts of Religion, edited by Gil 
Anidjar (London: Routledge, 2001), 40-101. 
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Modern discussions of the meaning and denotation of the term religio tend to follow 
Lactantius’ etymology, thereby constructing a Christianized model of religion that 
strongly emphasizes theistic belief (whether mono-, poly-, heno- or pan-theistic in na-
ture), exclusivity and a fundamental dualism between the human world and the tran-
scendent world of the divine to which one ‘binds’ (religare) oneself. Even when Lac-
tantius is not appealed to directly, ‘religion’ in a Christian (and post-Christian) con-
text now becomes a matter of adherence to particular doctrines or beliefs rather than 
allegiance to ancient ritual practices.24 
 
The transformation wrought by Lactantius and other early Christian thinkers established a 
conceptual equivalence between religion and theological belief. As King indicates, this new 
conceptualization focused on the question of articles of faith and displaced a central concern 
for inherited communal practices of worship. In so doing, religious scholar Malcolm Ruel 
claims, the discourse of religion incorporated a number of implicit assumptions. Among 
these “shadow fallacies,” as Ruel refers to them, are the presumptions that “belief is central 
to all religions in the same way as it is to Christianity,” “the belief of a person or a people 
forms the ground of his or their behaviour and can be cited therefore as a sufficient explana-
tion for it,” and “belief is fundamentally an interior state, a psychological condition.”25 
 A further development in this discourse of religion occurred with the Protestant 
Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the most basic sense, the Protes-
tant Reformation carried forward the centrality of belief but invested this idea with an em-
phasis on an internal and personal relationship to the divine. 26 Even as Protestant sects 
                                                
24 King, 37. 
25 Malcolm Ruel, Belief, Ritual and the Securing of Life: Reflexive Essays on a Bantu Religion (Boston: Brill, 1997), 57-
59. 
26 Referred to, by turns, as the sui generis, intellectualist, and private affair tradition of religion, these understand-
ings set religion apart from the rest of society and involved with “interior, personal, and utterly unique states 
and dispositions.” McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion, 55. See also the introduction to The Invention of Religion: 
Rethinking Belief in Politics and History, edited by Derek R. Peterson and Darren R. Walhof (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 2002). 
 Belief, Donald S. Lopez, Jr. states, exists as “the pivot around which Christians have told their history,” 
and the hegemonic status of Christianity during the formulation of the concept of ‘religion’ imprinted this sen-
sibility on the term itself. Other religions, of course, have made universalist claims to truth, but Christianity had 
the unique advantage of being allied with the dominant political and intellectual powers during the spread of 
European imperialism, thus making it possible to transport its intellectual framework to all corners of the globe 
(if not the universe), making belief the measure of what religion is understood to be. Lopez, “Belief,” 21. 
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broke with the theological regime and institutional authority of the Catholic Church, they 
retained its grammar of salvation wherein a person’s soul was saved by assenting to a set of 
true beliefs. “Following the Reformation,” Peter Harrison writes, “the fragmentation of 
Christendom led to a change from an institutionally based understanding of exclusive salva-
tion to a propositionally based understanding.”27 The mobilizing sensibility behind the re-
formers’ break with the Church sprang from disagreements regarding the Catholic estab-
lishment’s misinterpretation of the Christian scripture which, in turn, gave rise to putatively 
impious practices. A correction in underlying beliefs and doctrines, this logic went, would 
necessarily result in different practices and institutional structures that properly embody and 
carry out God’s will. The importance of personal beliefs becomes clear in articulations of 
Christian and religious freedom. Martin Luther and John Calvin, for instance, both formu-
lated Christian freedom as, first and foremost, the freedom of interior belief or conscience. 
The rightful jurisdiction of political authorities, both Luther and Calvin insist, extends no 
further than that which is visible; the individual soul and conscience—the domain of decid-
ing on and holding propositional beliefs regarding God, eternal life, and the order of the 
cosmos—remain solely under the control of the particular individual.28 Religious liberty, by 
these accounts, is singularly defined by the freedom of conscience—the freedom, in other 
words, for each individual to believe as she wants. 
As I make clear in the next section, the Protestant Christian conceptualization of re-
ligion is apparent in the discussions and debates regarding religion in both modern and con-
                                                                                                                                            
 Of course, it would be a mistake to take “belief” as itself an ahistorical term with a static meaning even 
within the Christian use of the concept. For a genealogical examination of the concept as it operates in the 
Christian tradition, see, e.g., Malcolm Ruel, “Christians as Believers,” in Religious Organization and Religious Expe-
rience, edited by John Davis (London: Academic Press, 1982), 9-31. 
27 Peter Harrison, “Religion” and the Religions in the English Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 63. 
28 See Martin Luther, “On Secular Authority: how far dos the Obedience owed to it extend?,” especially Part II, 
and John Calvin, “On Civil Government,” Book IV, Chapter 20, in Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority, edited 
and translated by Harro Höpfl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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temporary political theory. Before traversing that disciplinary terrain, however, it is helpful to 
zoom out from my admittedly partial exercise in conceptual archeology to consider the ef-
fects of the Protestant understanding of religion. The private-intellectualist framework re-
treats from the Ciceronian emphasis on both the activity or practice of worship and the in-
herent civic or political dimensions of religious traditions. The Protestant Christian concep-
tion of religion as personal beliefs relating to the transcendent, sacred, or divine abstracts 
faith from institutional or communal context (religion as sui generis) and attenuates its rela-
tionship to practical or aesthetic forms (religion as principally disembodied or spiritual). One 
key limitation is that religion qua belief, as much as it is understood to be essentially interior 
and personal, has come to be understood as outside politics and, indeed, as a quintessential 
component of the private sphere. In the next section, I continue to develop my critique of 
the inherited conception of religion as a- or anti-political by surveying how it has been aided 
by western political philosophy and continues to direct discussions in the field of political 
theory on the subject of religion. 
§ 3. Religion, Politics, and Political Theory 
 
 The Protestant Christian understanding of religion established the terms of intellec-
tual engagement for modern and contemporary political theory. The history of political phi-
losophy in the wake of the Reformation can be (and has been) construed as the on-going 
attempt to resolve the socio-political issues associated with conflicting systems of religious 
beliefs.29 The putative political problem of religion—in other words: the difficulties associ-
ated with heterogeneous religious traditions existing within a singular political community—
has formed a major point of departure for political thought over the past three centuries. 
The mission for political thinkers became resolving one central question, namely: How can 
                                                
29 See, e.g. Mark Lilla, Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West (New York: Vintage, 2008); and William 
E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1988). 
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believers within different and contradictory religious traditions live together in a harmonious 
and just fashion? Or to adopt the language of John Rawls: given that the “political culture of 
democratic society” (and of modern societies more generally) is characterized by the “fact of 
reasonable pluralism” by which there is a “diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines,” how can there exist a political arrangement whose basic 
structure is legitimate and acceptable to all reasonable citizens?30  
The position that eventually came to dominate and structure academic, popular, and 
governmental responses to this question was provided by modern liberalism. Building upon 
the Protestant Christian notion of religion as personal belief, liberal philosophers such as 
John Locke and Immanuel Kant constructed a partitioned model of society. Within this 
framework, religious belief is restricted to the private (and depoliticized) sphere of human 
activity so that it exists apart from and opposed to the domains of public deliberation and 
the state. Liberalism renders religion pre-political: a matter of private choice and personal 
belief that can remain removed from public life.31  
Consider Locke’s now-classic text, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). Motivated by 
an interest in fostering social stability and harmony under conditions of religious pluralism 
(or more specifically, Christian sectarianism), Locke formulated a normative theory of insti-
tutional differentiation.32 According to Locke’s model, the civil government was charged 
with the oversight of so-called civil interests, including the protection of life, health, liberty, 
                                                
30 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 36. 
31 See Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert Tucker (New York: 
Norton & Company, 1978), 26-46. Marx, of course, draws his sense of the American regime on the subject of 
religion from the writings of Tocqueville. 
32 Locke is quite explicit about the narrowness of his conception of religious pluralism and toleration. He 
makes this clear at the outset of his Letter, where he describes his project as only involving “the mutual Tolera-
tion of Christians in their different Professions of Religion.” John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, edited by 
James H. Tully (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1983), 23. For another critique of Locke’s 
framework, this one reflecting on how it conceals the circulation of power from ostensibly private (religious) 
forces to the public (state), see Craig Martin, Masking Hegemony: A Genealogy of Liberalism, Religion and the Private 
Sphere (London: Equinox, 2010). 
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and property, while the church retained authority regarding the salvation of souls. One key 
strut of this differentiation in institutional functions is a conception of religion as internal 
and sincere belief. Bringing this conceptualization together with a claim regarding the impos-
sibility of compelling true belief through external coercion and violence (that is, the tools of 
the state), Locke argues that the persuasive capacities of the church are functionally better 
suited to cultivating and sustaining faith. The carving out of mutually exclusive spheres of 
institutional jurisdiction, Locke maintains, allows for a civil community free from the relig-
ious strife of the early modern nation-states in Europe. The state would no longer enjoy the 
prerogative to police the religious beliefs of its citizens and, on the other hand, various relig-
ious sects would no longer vie violently to seize the reins of political power. As a result of 
these “twin tolerations” (to use Alfred Stepan’s phrase),33 collectivities could potentially 
avoid the bloody cycle of oppression and resistance that typified the European wars of relig-
ion. 
Underlying Locke’s argument, of course, is the diminution of religious practice and 
the elevation of interior belief as the untrammeled core of religion. “All the Life and Power 
of true Religion,” Locke writes, “consists in the inward and full perswasion [sic] of the mind; 
and Faith is not Faith without believing.”34 According to Locke, the salvation of souls—
which, again, is designated as the raison d’être of religion—depends on the act of genuinely 
believing certain articles of knowledge to be true. In his parsing of religion, Locke breaks 
apart what he terms the “speculative” and “practical” dimensions of faith. Speculative arti-
cles of faith are those aspects that are “required only to be believed” and thus “terminate 
simply in the Understanding.”35 These are, in other words, the purely interior and epistemic 
                                                
33 Alfred Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Tolerations,’” Journal of Democracy 11:4 (2000): 37-57. 
34 Locke, 26. 
35 Ibid., 46. 
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components of religion; they remain entirely in the minds of believers and consist of pro-
positional beliefs and knowledge relevant to the care and protection of each individual’s soul. 
Practical articles of faith, by contrast, entail not just belief but deeds. Belief must be trans-
lated into action, such as the performance of certain speech acts, rituals, behaviors, or mate-
rial practices that are necessary for the achievement of salvation. Because this latter category 
could affect the interests of others and thus have social consequences, the government can 
legitimately restrict and regulate them if they violate the dictates of common, public reason. 
It is with a mind towards practical effects, for instance, that Locke condones the exclusion 
of Catholics (whose obligations to the political authority of the state are threatened by their 
allegiance to the pope) and atheists (who lack the firm religious and moral framework Locke 
understands as necessary for fulfilling promises and obeying the law). 
Implicit within Locke’s theory, I suggest, is a diminishment of religion’s practical and 
embodied aspects. This is apparent, first, in Locke’s account of religion, which renders prac-
tices and performance as secondary emanations or expressions of the prior and primary core 
of religion: belief. Second, while Locke does not thoroughly dismiss the performative dimen-
sion of religion, he nonetheless stipulates, as Derek Peterson and Darren Walhof write, “that 
such practices were acceptable only to the extent that they were irrelevant to social and po-
litical realities.”36 The proper and unencumbered realm of faith becomes that of the individ-
ual’s internal conscience, wherein a believer can relate directly and privately with the divine 
as she understands it. Locke’s theory possesses a recognizably Protestant Christian account 
                                                
36 Derek R. Peterson and Darren R. Walhof, “Rethinking Religion,” in The Invention of Religion: Rethinking Belief in 
Politics and History, edited by Derek R. Peterson and Darren R. Walhof (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 2002), 4. For an alternative (and more elaborate) interpretation of Locke’s take on religion and religious 




of religion that forms the basis for both conceptualizing religion more generally and map-
ping out the contours of social space that define the private and public spheres. 
The private-intellectualist framework affirmed in Locke’s Letter continues to provide 
the set of assumptions and terms of engagement for political thought. This framework is 
readily apparent in the two fields of philosophical discourse currently most directly engaged 
with the issue of religion: the theorization of public reason and the study of political theol-
ogy. Although contributions to these on-going debates disagree on the merits of liberalism as 
a normative project, they all operate within the conceptual framework fashioned by modern 
liberalism regarding the nature of religion. 
The debate over public reason continues the thematic concern established in the 
seventeenth century regarding the normative legitimacy of religion in the public sphere and 
political discourse. The major figures in this dialogue, including John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas, are invested in constructing the appropriate parameters and protocols for justify-
ing collective arrangements. In other words, what reasons and lines of reasoning can legiti-
mately enter the public sphere and determine the collective’s operative rules and structures?37 
Entries in this discussion tend to consider religious traditions only so far as they offer prem-
ises, justifications, and logics for public argumentation. John Rawls, for instance, treats relig-
ious traditions as a particular class of “comprehensive doctrines,” or sets of values and truth 
                                                
37 Given the impressive number of contributions to this debate and the correspondingly modest space here, I 
cannot possibly capture it fully. In addition to those works featured in the main body of my discussion, see also 
the following: Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000); Christopher J. Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002); Troy Dostert, Beyond Political Liberalism: Toward a Post-Secular Ethics of Public Life (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2006); Bryan T. McGraw, Faith in Politics: Religion and Liberal Democracy (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010); Richard Rorty, “Religion in the Public Sphere: A Reconsideration,” Journal of 
Religious Ethics 31(1) (2003): 141-149; Richard Rorty, “Religion as Conversation Stopper,” Common Knowledge 3:1 
(Spring 1994): 1-6; Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Why We Should Reject What Liberalism Tells Us about Speaking 
and Acting for Religious Reasons,” in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, edited by Paul J. Weithman, (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,1997), 162-181; and Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Audi on Religion, Politics, 
and Liberal Democracy,” in Religion in the Public Square, edited by Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Lan-
ham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997). 
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claims that justify particular organizations of personal behavior and social arrangements.  So 
understood, religions pose a deliberative difficulty given their exclusionary nature—that is, 
religious reasons are only compelling to those who already accept the starting premises of 
that faith. These exclusionary premises can include, for instance, beliefs in a divine entity or 
God and a corresponding way to act and think in accordance with the will of that divinity. 
This logic holds that if reasons given in the public sphere must be broadly inclusive so that 
all those affected by the decision might reasonably accept it, then religious traditions must be 
excluded from public argumentation or, alternatively, either paired with or replaced by rea-
sons that could persuade those outside the tradition. 
The conceptualization of religion as justificatory system appears even in arguments 
in favor of allowing religion conditional admittance to the public square. Habermas, for in-
stance, recently reappraised the place of religion in modern society. In his ‘post-secular’ 
work, Habermas recognizes the continued motivational power of religious materials. 
Habermas argues religion provides a powerful means of mobilizing constituencies towards 
political action, which is especially valuable in a moment when the mechanisms of the state 
and economy are increasingly removed from democratic criticism and control. The religion 
he invokes, however, is cast in strict cognitivist and intellectualist terms. Put differently, 
Habermas understands religious traditions to have a public value in so far as they are bodies 
of moral ideas and ethical knowledge claims. To wit: 
Religious traditions have a special power to articulate moral intuitions, especially with 
regard to vulnerable forms of communal life. In corresponding political debates, this 
potential makes religious speech into a serious vehicle for possible truth contents, which can 
then be translated from the vocabulary of a particular religious community into a 
generally accessible language.38 
                                                
38 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 131. Emphasis added. In making this qualified allowance for relig-
ious reasons, Habermas follows the later Rawls. In his late philosophy, Rawls introduced his “proviso” by 
which principles from religious comprehensive doctrines could legitimately enter into public discourse if “in 




Even while acknowledging its political salience and potential, Habermas diminishes religion 
to the status of a vehicle for generalizable (secular) insights. By this account, religious tradi-
tions consist of doctrines containing and producing “possible truth contents” that can—
indeed, must—be translated into a secular form in order to gain currency in the public 
sphere.39 The premise that such a translation of contents can occur without losing precisely 
the meanings and motivations in question is problematic. He writes elsewhere: 
At best, philosophy circumscribes the opaque core of religious experience when it re-
flects on the specific character of religious language and on the intrinsic meaning of 
faith. This core remains as profoundly alien to discursive thought as the hermetic 
core of aesthetic experience, which likewise can be at best circumscribed, but not 
penetrated, by philosophical reflection.40 
 
The difficulty Habermas describes with respect to the philosophical engagement with relig-
ion illuminates the limits of his logic of translation and the underlying conception of relig-
ion’s political power. Certainly, “truth contents” can be shorn from a religious tradition for 
the purposes of persuading a generalized, secular audience, but the fuller political signifi-
cance of religion exceeds these translatable moral propositions. As Habermas recognizes, the 
web of practices, sensibilities, and conceptions of the world that mobilize religious subjects 
to political action—those elements constituting what he refers to as “the opaque core of re-
ligious experience”—cannot be accurately captured in philosophical discourse. 
Political theology, the second of the two philosophical discussions that engage relig-
ion and politics, echoes Habermas’s sense that there is something of value in religious tradi-
                                                                                                                                            
that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are said to support.” John Rawls, “The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 129-180. 
39 Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2006), 51-52. Cf. Michelle Dillon, “Jürgen Habermas and the Post-Secular Appropriation of 
Religion: A Sociological Critique,” in The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary Society, edited by Philip S. 
Gorski, David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey, and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (New York: New York University 
Press, 2012), 249-78; and Friedo Reiken, “Postmetaphysical Reason and Religion,” in An Awareness of What is 
Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age, 51-58. 
40 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the Public Use of Reason by 
Religious and Secular Citizens,” in Between Naturalism and Religion (London: Polity Press, 2008), 143. 
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tions. Contributors to the field of political theology take as a starting point the proposition 
that the legacy of religion, to quote Slavoj !i"ek, “is much too precious to be left to the fun-
damentalist freaks.”41 By contrast to normative work on public reason and religion in de-
mocratic deliberation, works examining or articulating political theology recognize religion as 
a social force that not only must be reckoned with but moreover should be utilized as a 
powerful resource for philosophical reflection. As reflected in the terminology of political 
theology, participants in this scholarly field take up religion as an intellectual resource that can 
be recruited for producing analytical and normative theories. Among the cohort of contribu-
tors to political theology are a number of overtly atheistic thinkers such as !i"ek, Alain 
Badiou, Giorgio Agamben, and Jacques Derrida.42 The turn to religion in these works is a 
tactical one. Inasmuch as they are dissatisfied with western modernity—and, most typically, 
liberal capitalism—these thinkers find ready resources for resistance in that which the struc-
tures of modernity have actively suppressed and displaced: religion. Ola Sigurdson captures 
this impetus clearly, writing, “If religion has been the ‘other’ of modernity, it is not surprising 
that philosophers of very different stripes—post-secular secular philosophers or post-
                                                
41 Slavoj !i"ek, The Fragile Absolute: Or Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (London: Verso, 2008), 2. 
42 See Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, translated by Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2003); Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, translated 
by Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, trans-
lated by Dana Hollander (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); and Bonnie Honig, Emergency Politics: Para-
dox, Law, Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). In addition, there have been a number of 
anthologies focusing particularly on political theology, including Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh, The 
Blackwell Companion to Political Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); Creston Davis, John Milbank, and Slavoj 
Zizek, Theology and the Political: The New Debate (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); and Hent de Vries 
and Lawrence E. Sullivan, Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-secular World (New York: Fordham Univer-
sity Press, 2006). 
 The current wave of scholarship on political theology owes much to the work of German legal theorist 
Carl Schmitt. Besides popularizing the term in his work, Political Theology (1922), Schmitt argued that all modern 
concepts of political theory and legal philosophy could be traced back etymologically to theological discourse. 
One implication of Schmitt’s claim is that the continued use of this conceptual framework demands an atten-
dant theological foundation. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, translated by 
George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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religious secular philosophers—have taken up reading religious texts as a way of trying to 
find alternatives to a certain version of modernity.”43 
 Despite operating with otherwise disparate investments and commitments, both of 
these discursive fields—that is, public reason and political theology—share a certain reduc-
tion and reification of religion into a system of personal beliefs and theological doctrines. 
The reification of religion performed in both of these discussions results in an abstraction 
from the play of religious traditions in concrete political activity. Because they focus on relig-
ion as an intellectual or ideological edifice these theories elide crucial dimensions of power, 
sensibility, and performance that mark the lived experience of religious and political life. A 
richer conceptualization of religion that attends to the level of practice, I suggest, can facili-
tate a richer account of its relationship to American democratic culture and the effects on 
political subjects. I begin to develop such a conceptualization in the next section. 
§ 4. Towards a Political Theory of Religion 
 
At the outset of his classic sociological investigation into religious phenomena, Émile 
Durkheim writes, “[W]e must first define what is properly understood as a religion. If we do 
not, we run the risk of either calling a system of ideas and practices that are in no way relig-
ious, or of passing by religious phenomena without detecting their true nature.”44 Of course, 
the act of definition is an act of construction rather than an act of discovery. This is particu-
larly true in the instance of religion, which Jonathan Z. Smith argues in an especially polemi-
cal passage: 
“Religion” is not a native term; it is a term created by scholars for their intellectual 
purposes and therefore it is theirs to define. It is a second-order, generic concept that 
plays the same role in establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as “lan-
                                                
43 Ola Sigurdson, “Beyond Secularism?: Towards a Post-secular Political Theology,” Modern Theology 26:2 (2010): 
184. 
44 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, translated by Karen E. Fields (New York: The Free 
Press, 1995), 21. 
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guage” plays in linguistics or “culture” plays in anthropology. There can be no disci-
plined study of religion without such a horizon.45 
 
The lingering question is the makeup of that horizon. If the common sense notion of relig-
ion is historically contingent and analytically deficient, how might it be revised or rede-
fined—and ultimately re-imagined—in order to provide political theorists with the requisite 
conceptual tools to better grasp the play of religious claims in American democracy? 
 In this section I develop a contingent foundation upon which to build an under-
standing of American religion—specifically evangelical Christianity—as it bears on democ-
ratic practice. I fashion my conceptualization of religious traditions and my theorization of 
religion in democracy by engaging, on the one hand, recent contributions from the field of 
religious studies and, on the other, the theory of hegemony and common sense provided by 
Antonio Gramsci. 
 One uniting insight between recent work in religious studies and Gramscian theory is 
a concern with practice and the lived dimensions of power. The methodological focus on 
lived religion can be traced back intellectually to earlier inquiries into “popular religion” or 
“folk religion” and how religious traditions are enacted outside the imposed authority of the 
institutional church. While abandoning the high-low opposition that tends to mark these 
previous modes of study, the study of lived religion and the materiality of religion continues 
the interest in religion as it is performed and transformed by religious practitioners. We make 
a foundational mistake, so these theorists claim, in following the hegemonic equation of re-
ligion as interior belief and theology.46 A more grounded conceptualization recognizes that 
                                                
45 Jonathan Z. Smith, Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 
193-94. For a partial critique of Smith (primarily pointing out that ‘religion’ exists as a “folk category” prior to 
attempts at scholarly formulation), see Arnal and McCutcheon, chapter 6.  
46 As William Robertson Smith observes, “Our modern habit is to look at religion from the side of belief rather 
than that of practice… Thus the study of religion has been mainly the study of Christian beliefs, and instruction 
in religion has habitually begun with creed, religious duties being presented to the learner as flowing from the 
dogmatic truths he is taught to accept.” William Robertson Smith, “The Study of the Religion of the Semites,” 
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religion is something that people do—a way of being in the world that is performed and felt. 
It must be approached in terms of lived (and living) traditions that operate in time and mani-
fest both at the level of formal ideas and more diffuse practices, sensibilities, and disposi-
tions. As Robert Orsi states, “Religion comes into being in an ongoing, dynamic relationship 
with the realities of everyday life.”47 Religion here carves out a space of idiomatic innovation 
and possibility as well as a limit on what can be desired, imagined, and done. In this way, 
Orsi says, lived religion exists as a site of “relative cultural freedom” that can foster “dissent, 
subversion, and resistance” as well as “[sustain] structures and patterns of alienation and 
domination.”48 
 Gramsci, a Marxist political theorist and activist, offers a similar sense of religion as a 
historical complex that unites habits of mind and body and has the dual potential to either 
shore up or transform existing relations of power.49 For Gramsci, religion is defined as “a 
unity of faith between a conception of the world and a corresponding norm of conduct.”50 
Put differently, religious faith can be said to be a praxis, an ethical practice or habit that ema-
nates out from a particular way of seeing and interpreting the world. This unity of perception 
and action is elaborated further in Gramsci’s consideration of so-called “popular religion.” 
Popular religion, Gramsci explains, involves “the entire system of beliefs, superstitions, opin-
ions, ways of seeing things and of acting, which are collectively bundled together under the 
                                                                                                                                            
in Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion: Aims, Methods and Theories of Research, edited by Jacques Waardenburg 
(The Hague: Mouton, 1973), 155. 
47 Robert Orsi, “Everyday Miracles: The Study of Lived Religion,” in Lived Religion in America: Towards a History 
of Practice, edited by David D. Hall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 7. 
48 Ibid., 15. For a more elaborate theoretical articulation of Orsi’s point regarding the enabling and constraining 
effects of religious action, see Manuel A. Vasquez, More Than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2011). 
49 For alternative uses of Gramscian theories in conceptualizing religion, see Dwight B. Billings, “Religion as 
Opposition: A Gramscian Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 96:1 (1990): 1-31; Rhys H. Williams, “Religion 
as Political Resource: Culture or Ideology,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 35:4 (1996): 368-78; and John 
Fulton, “Religion and Politics in Gramsci: An Introduction,” Sociological Analysis 48:3 (1987): 197-216. 
50 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, translated by Quintin Hoare and Goeffrey Nowell Smith 
(New York: International Publishers, 1971), 326. 
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name of ‘folklore.’”51 As much as it provides the interpretive and performative materials for 
practitioners to make sense of the world and be active in it, popular religion informs what 
Gramsci refers to as “common sense”: the naturalized and taken-for-granted assumptions 
that are seeded throughout a society and provide the conditions for consenting to particular 
forms of political rule. The formation of these conditions for rule in the ideas, habits, and 
relations of a people is what Gramsci refers to as hegemony, which allows power to be exer-
cised through modes of consent rather than naked coercion. Though common sense and 
popular religion are not manifestations of a robust ideology or intellectual order—Gramsci 
remarks that they “cannot be reduced to unity and coherence”—they nonetheless are both 
composed of notions and dispositions that are the building blocks for meaningful thought 
and appropriate, legible action in a given community. 
 Gramsci’s theory provides a fruitful contextualization of religion in a system of 
power that can be fleshed out further by turning to scholarship in religious studies. One of 
the more sophisticated articulations of religion as a system of symbolic meaning appears in 
the cultural anthropological work of Clifford Geertz. In his classic formulation, religion is a 
cultural system that involves: 
(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general 
order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality 
that (5) moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.52 
 
Geertz’s definition points to the multiple levels upon which religious traditions work on 
their subjects. Echoing Gramsci’s location of power in the diffuse system of common sense 
and culture, Geertz identifies religion as a “cultural system,” an order that creates meaning in 
the world. Yet, significantly, this system does not operate only on the level of cognition or 
                                                
51 Ibid., 323. 




intellect—that is, knowledge of the world—but also on dispositions, the sets of “tendencies, 
capacities, propensities, skills, habits, liabilities, pronenesses” that are sedimented into a relig-
ious practitioner.53 Thus, religious traditions are technologies that involve not only convic-
tions (or conceptions of the world that produce meaning) but also ways of feeling and re-
sponding to the world.  
 Gramsci and Geertz both indicate that religion entails an aesthetic dimension. I use 
the term aesthetics here in line with its etymological roots in the ancient Greek term aisthesis, 
which refers to the capacity to perceive, sense, and feel. To say, then, that religions possess 
an aesthetic aspect is to bring attention to the visceral or sensual levels that subtend the ideo-
logical formulations found in a religion’s creed.54 The content of religious creeds and experi-
ences should not be summarily discounted or ignored. The crucial task is to locate religious 
beliefs and claims about the world as nested within a larger web of action and feeling. 55 Cul-
tural theorist Raymond Williams captures this aesthetic dimension well in his term “the 
structures of feelings.” He writes that a structure of feeling is “concerned with meanings and 
values as they are actively lived and felt, and the relations between these and formal or sys-
tematic beliefs are in practice variable… We are talking here [not of] feeling against thought, 
but thought as felt and feeling as thought.”56 Religious traditions cultivate particular struc-
tures of feelings, thus shaping how religious subjects perceive the social and natural world, 
judge practices and arrangements, and act out commitments in meaningful and intelligible 
ways.  
                                                
53 Ibid., 95. 
54 See, e.g., William E. Connolly, Why I Am Not A Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
55 There is a distinction between de-centering religious belief—demoting it from its status of definitional pri-
macy—and rejecting it completely as a relevant aspect of religious traditions. Cf. Terry F. Godlove Jr., “Saving 
belief: on the new materialism in religious studies,” in Radical Interpretation in Religion, edited by Nancy K. Frank-
enberry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 10-24. 
56 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 132. Quoted in Vasquez, 
250. See also Talal Asad, “Thinking About Religion, Belief, and Politics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Religious 
Studies, edited by Robert A. Orsi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 51. 
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 Although Geertz’s now classic account of religion foregrounds this aesthetic dimen-
sion, it neglects any consideration of the play of power or the place of practice. These two 
points form the crux of Talal Asad’s critique of Geertz’s theory of religion. According to 
Asad, Geertz neglects “the sense in which power constructs religious ideology, establishes 
the preconditions for distinctive kinds of religious personality, authorises specifiable religious 
practices and utterances, produces religiously defined knowledge.”57 Religions, in other 
words, are the sedimented effects of past exercises of power—they are, in Gramsci’s terms, 
artifacts of hegemony that help produce subjects invested with certain modes of interpreting, 
speaking, and acting. Yet as Gramsci insists, recognizing religions as disciplining apparatuses 
and modes of power need not foreclose the possibility that they might be used for the pur-
poses of resistance and opposition.  
This potential is found not only in the discourses and ideas of a religion but also, to 
move to Asad’s other point, its body of practices. Purposefully rejecting the Protestant 
Christian definitional concern with interiority, Asad stresses the importance of practice, em-
bodiment, and performance to historical religious orders.58 In other words, religions—even 
forms of Protestantism that ideologically stress the primacy of internal belief—encompass 
and entail ways of doing things and producing meaning through and with activity. While 
Asad’s interests in an analytical incorporation of practice lie primarily with the training and 
disciplining of the religious body, I mean to highlight the poetic and innovative capacities for 
religious activity. By referring to religious action (and later forms of religious claims-making) 
as poetic I again mean to capture a sense of the ancient Greek origins of the term, which can 
                                                
57 Talal Asad, “Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz,” Man 18:2 (1983): 237. 
58 See Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1993). For an alternative account of religion as centrally concerned with practice, see 
Martin Riesebrodt, The Promise of Salvation: A Theory of Religion, translated by Steven Rendall (Chicago: The Uni-
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be traced back to poiesis (“to make”). Religious practice creates meaning and, in so doing, ex-
ists as action that transforms and (re)makes the world. Of course, religious performance of-
ten emanates from and cites conventions and schemas within an established ritual or liturgi-
cal order, yet the iterability (repetition that opens possibility for novelty and difference), 
portability (enactment in new contexts and circumstances), and plasticity (capacity for varia-
tion) of these practices means that practitioners can remake them. 
 The conventions—the performative forms, rhetorics, and materialities—of religious 
traditions provide a rich body of resources for political action. This performative repertoire 
constitutes what I term a cultus. Although I give a fuller articulation of the cultus in Chapter 
Three, it is helpful to provide an outline of the concept here. According to Charles Clayton 
Morrison, the concept of the cultus captures “the total cultural expression of a religion as an 
organic historical phenomenon” and involves “the expression of certain specific aspirations, 
beliefs, emotions, in a body of recognized conventions, habits and organizations.”59 Al-
though Morrison’s interests stress the institutionalized liturgical manifestations of the Protes-
tant cultus, I mean it to capture the full repertoire of a religious tradition’s expressive styles, 
ritual practices, and aesthetic forms. Inasmuch as religious traditions offer extensive bodies 
of languages and practices that have arisen over time and retain the power to shape mean-
ings, cultivate dispositions, and direct feelings and energies, they exist, in philosopher Hent 
de Vries words, as “an immensely extended, diversified, and deep-seated archive of the 
past…whose resources we have barely begun to fathom, to realize, let alone to exhaust” and 
that “consists in more than theorems, theologemes, dogmas, and concepts.”60 De Vries’ no-
tion of the archive captures the depths and density of religious traditions and their “seman-
                                                
59 Charles Clayton Morrison, The Social Gospel and the Christian Cultus (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1933), 28, 
30. 
60 Hent de Vries, “Why Still ‘Religion’?” in Religion: Beyond a Concept, edited by Hent de Vries (New York: Ford-
ham University Press, 2008), 69, 76. 
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tic, figurative, argumentative, rhetorical, visual, visceral, affective, and effective dimensions” 
that must be recovered as valuable levels of analysis.61 Whereas de Vries’ explicit concern for 
the archive springs from his belief that it can provide valuable materials for the production 
of philosophical and theoretical insights, my conceptualization of the cultus is motivated by 
an interest in how these materials and dimensions are taken up, performed, and circulated in 
the practice of democratic politics. 
Taken altogether, these considerations necessitate the subtle terminological and con-
ceptual shift from speaking of ‘religion’ as an abstract, ahistorical, and reified concept to in-
stead thinking of ‘religious traditions.’62 While scholars such as Habermas have used these 
terms synonymously, the concept of ‘religious traditions’ recognizes and foregrounds the 
dynamic and manifold character of religions as objects in history. Although he does not use 
the language of ‘tradition,’ the recent work of Bruce Lincoln clarifies the multiple compo-
nents and dimensions of religious orders. According to Lincoln, religion necessarily entails 
and involves four particular elements or domains: 
 A discourse whose concerns transcend the human, temporal, and contingent, and that 
claims for itself a similarly transcendent status… 
 A set of practices whose goal is to produce a proper world and/or proper human sub-
jects, as defined by a religious discourse to which these practices are connected… 
 A community whose members construct their identity with reference to a religious dis-
course and its attendant practices… 
 An institution that regulates religious discourse, practices, and community, reproduc-
ing them over time and modifying them as necessary, while asserting their eternal va-
lidity and transcendent value…63 
                                                
61 Ibid., 70. 
62 A facially similar framework, it must be said, appears in the work of Wilfred Cantwell Smith. Smith offers a 
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End of Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991). 
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These components are not static. As traditions are passed down through history and taken 
up by different actors in different circumstances, gradual and potentially sudden transforma-
tions take place. 64 With this in mind, as well as my theoretical re-orientation to the practical 
and felt dimensions of religious traditions (and the concomitant de-centering of belief and 
doctrines), I want to return to the particular context of the United States and repose the 
theoretical question of religion’s relationship to American democracy. 
§ 5. Claiming Religion in America 
 
 At the beginning of this chapter I discussed how Tocqueville and Grund described 
the power and ubiquity of religion (particularly the constellation of religious traditions 
broadly referred to as Judeo-Christianity) in the United States. Subsequent observers of 
American society have repeatedly echoed Tocqueville’s claim regarding the interweaving of 
religion, politics, and social mores in the United States. In answering the question “What is 
America?,” for instance, English writer G.K. Chesterton succinctly described America as 
“the nation with the soul of a church.”65 According to Chesterton, the civil society and gov-
ernmental regime of the United States are peculiar by virtue of their grounding in a theologi-
cally-inflected creed. The principles that make up this creed—such as commitments to 
                                                                                                                                            
(2) institutions and practices embodying and reproducing those precepts. Hence traditions are not merely 
sets of ideas. 
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equality and justice—manifest in popular political discourse and foundational documents 
such as the Declaration of Independence, which often trace their legitimacy back to a divine 
authority. A similar, albeit more expansive, position is expressed by Justice David Brewer. 
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in an 1892 decision, Justice Brewer declared that if 
one analyzed “American life as expressed by its laws, its business, its customs and its society, 
we find everywhere a clear recognition of the same truth...that this is a Christian nation.”66 
Chesterton and Brewer gesture at two distinct levels upon which Christianity shapes Ameri-
can democracy. While Chesterton points to the hegemonic status of a Christian-inflected 
creed—a common ideology replete with certain beliefs and values—that provides a language 
of legitimation and critique, Brewer’s opinion bespeaks a more diffuse and expansive con-
touring of social mores that resonates with the perspectives of Tocqueville and Grund. Ac-
cording to the school of thought reflected in Brewer’s statement, Christianity structures not 
only overt commitments but also the web of taken-for-granted habits, attitudes, and man-
ners in the United States. 
To be sure, the United States that Tocqueville encountered was in the midst of the 
Second Great Awakening and was thus a society in spiritual and evangelical extremis. Yet al-
most two centuries after Tocqueville recorded his wonderment at the vibrant religious life of 
the fledgling republic, religion continues to figure substantially in the debates and discourse 
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of American politics.67 Despite constitutional prohibitions on religious tests for public serv-
ice, the religious commitments of political officers—to name but a few: the Catholic back-
ground of John F. Kennedy, the evangelical redemption narrative of George W. Bush, and 
the purported Islamic leanings of Barack Obama—are the subjects of animated public con-
troversy. Social, economic, and environmental disagreements are animated by and articulated 
through arguably religious notions such as sanctity, sacredness, charity, and stewardship. Re-
ligious rhetoric inflects policy questions regarding both foreign and domestic issues, includ-
ing abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia, democratization, war, and torture. A steady stream 
of conservative commentators voice anxiety over declines in public morality and losses of 
liberty instigated by the abandonment of a religious (more often than not, Christian) pres-
ence in the classroom, legislature, and public sphere more generally. Extending attention to 
the broader history of the United States—to the primordial Puritan settlements, the roiling 
evangelical energies of the Great Awakenings during the nineteenth century, and the dra-
matic confrontations between the hegemonic constellation of Protestant denominations and 
growing Judaic, Catholic, and Islamic constituencies—only strengthens the sense that relig-
ion is and has been a vital element in American political culture. 
Empirical evidence supplied by surveys and demographic studies consistently paints 
the United States as a country marked by acute religiosity. “Any discussion of religion in 
America,” write Robert Putnam and David Campbell, “must begin with the incontrovertible 
fact that Americans are a highly religious people. One can quibble over just how religion, 
and religiosity, should be gauged, but, by any standard, the United States (as a whole) is a 
                                                
67 Some scholars have staked out the bold claim that contemporary manifestations of religious traditions in 
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religious nation.”68 In terms of polities with members belonging to an organized religion, 
practicing religious behaviors, and holding religious beliefs, the United States ranks remarka-
bly high, particularly in comparison with other industrialized constitutional democracies. Ac-
cording to a 2001 survey performed by the Pew Research Center for the People and the 
Press, almost two-thirds of Americans (64 percent) described religion as very important, 43 
percent said they attend religious services at least weekly, and 90 percent claimed to pray at 
least once a week.69 The 2006 Faith Matters survey similarly highlights, on the one hand, the 
magnitude of religious feeling in the United States—with only five out of the 3,108 people 
surveyed labeling themselves as non-believers—and, on the other hand, the rich (and grow-
ing) diversity of religious affiliations and traditions within the country.70 Even as more recent 
surveys have found an increasing demographic that claims no particular religious affilia-
tion—the so-called “nones” or “unchurched”—the majority of this group continue to pro-
fess a belief in God and identify themselves as either religious or spiritual even as they reject 
institutionalized religious authorities.71 
                                                
68 Robert D. Putnam and David E. Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2010), 7. 
69 The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Faith-Based Funding Backed, but Church-State 
Doubts Abound,” April 10, 2001, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=15 (accessed May 
1, 2012). 
70 The results of this survey are analyzed extensively in Putnam and Campbell, American Grace. Similar survey 
results regarding American religiosity can be found in Baylor Religion Survey, “American Piety in the 21st Cen-
tury: New Insights to the Depth and Complexity of Religion in the U.S.,” (Waco, TX: Baylor Institute for Stud-
ies in Religion, 2006). 
71 The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, “‘Nones’ on the Rise: One-in-Five Adults Have No Religious 
Affiliation,” October 9, 2012, http://www.pewforum.org/Unaffiliated/nones-on-the-rise.aspx#growth (ac-
cessed January 15, 2013); and, Gallup, “In U.S., Rise in Religious ‘Nones’ Slows in 2012,” January 10, 2013, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/159785/rise-religious-nones-slows-2012.aspx#1 (accessed January 15, 2013). 
Only a small sliver (approximately 6%) of the individuals in this group identified themselves as either agnostic 
or atheist. The overwhelming majority of those claiming no affiliation attribute their distance from organized 
religion to the corruption or domineering authority of religious institutions and the doctrinal emphasis on rules 
and laws. In their simultaneous pushing away from specific institutional affiliations and loosely drawing the-
matic, doctrinal, or practical elements from existing religious traditions, these “nones” echo what sociologists 
Robert Bellah and Richard Madsen labeled “Sheilaism.” See Robert Bellah and Richard Madsen, Habits of the 
Heart (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 
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Although my canvas of history, the terrain of political discourse, and contemporary 
demographics in the United States can only be suggestive, it demonstrates that Christian re-
ligious traditions are embedded in American political culture. Given that the United States 
has never been secular—with secular here understood as free of religious discourse and 
practices in the public sphere—then there are two immediate implications for trying to make 
interpretive sense of religious claims-making in the United States. First, we should abandon 
the common counterfactual starting point found in the public reason literature that presup-
poses religion to be outside the public sphere and politics.72 Such a presupposition not only 
flies in the face of the social and political history of the United States but also relies on, as I 
discussed earlier, a problematic conception of religion as presumptively interior and capable 
of being fully privatized. Second, the juridical language of the separation of church and state 
is analytically insufficient. While religious institutions may be conceptually and functionally 
distinct from those of the state in the United States, this formal separation does not stop the 
play of religious traditions within the space of democratic culture and political contestation.73 
Following the theoretical lead of Gramsci and other thinkers, both in political theory 
and American political development, I propose a shift from the singular concentration on 
the level of state institutions to a broader analysis of culture as not only the site of democ-
ratic practice but also, even more generally, a place of power, structure, and change.74 Gram-
                                                
72 For a slightly more developed articulation of this “operative assumption,” see Judith Butler, “Is Judaism Zi-
onism?,” in The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, edited by Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 71. 
73 Furthermore, scholars have questioned both the historical validity and pragmatic viability of separating 
church and state (at least as it is articulated in the First Amendment of the Constitution). See, e.g., David Sehat, 
The Myth of American Religious Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Steven K. Green, The Second 
Disestablishment: Church and State in Nineteenth-Century America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Win-
nifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
74 For similar criticisms of traditional approaches to APD, see Nancy D. Wadsworth, “Reconciling Fractures: 
The Intersection of Race and Religion in United States Political Development,” in Race and American Political 
Development, edited by Joseph Lowndes, Julie Novkov, and Dorian T. Warren (New York: Routledge, 2008), 
312-336; and Joseph Lowndes and Victoria Hattam, “The Ground Beneath Our Feet: Language, Culture and 
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sci expresses a similar perspective in his rejection of the liberal notion of an insulated state 
that transcends civil society and political culture. He writes, “‘State’ should be understood 
not only [as] the apparatus of government, but also [as] the ‘private’ apparatus of ‘hegemony’ 
or civil society.”75 I understand culture as constituted not simply by “a network of mean-
ing”—as Geertz, among others, claims in his theorization of religion—but rather a matrix of 
relationships between meaning, discourse, materiality, practices, and institutions.76 The corol-
laries of this conception of culture are that, on the one hand, politics and political institu-
tions are embedded in—and in significant ways shaped by—a cultural matrix and that, on 
the other hand, culture is irreducibly political. Anne Norton writes: “In this reading culture 
appears, as it has in recent American political history, as the theater of the agon, the site of 
those necessarily participatory public contests that constitute politics. Culture is a fight.”77 
Thus, to speak, as some social observers continue to do, of a culture war in America is re-
dundant—culture is always already a struggle.  
                                                                                                                                            
Political Change,” in Formative Acts: Reckoning with Agency in American Politics, edited by Stephen Skowronek and 
Matthew Glassman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 199-219. 
 Other thinkers have pointed to the dynamism of American political culture and how it is formed by “mul-
tiple traditions” or its discursive landscape features a “varied topography.” Rogers M. Smith, “Beyond Toc-
queville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America,” The American Political Science Review 87: 3 
(1993): 549-566; and Mark S. Cladis, “Painting Landscapes of Religion in America: Four Models of Religion in 
Democracy,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 76:4 (2008): 874-904. Smith does make a passing com-
ment that religious elements are intertwined with all political traditions (564) but stresses throughout his piece 
how they appear in inegalitarian claims. A critical rejoinder to Smith’s framework (and specifically its charac-
terization of religion) appears in Jacqueline Steven’s response in Stevens and Smith, “Beyond Tocqueville, 
Please!,” American Political Science Review 89:4 (1995): 987-995. As Stevens writes, “The inclusion of beliefs in 
inherent religious superiority as doctrines of ascriptive inequality baffles me, since Smith is surely aware of the 
Christian abolitionists in the United States and England who used religion against ascriptive inegalitariaism … 
not to mention the suffragists who did the same… It is true that many Protestants thought themselves supe-
rior, but the relation between this and ascriptive inegalitarianism is not as straightforward as Smith implies” 
(994f1). 
75 Gramsci, 261. For an earlier articulation of this insight regarding the interrelation of the state and civil soci-
ety, see Marx, “On the Jewish Question.” 
76 Anne Norton, 95 Theses on Politics, Culture, and Method (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 1. 
77 Ibid., 11. From this insight, Norton goes on to claim that the idea of ‘political culture’ is redundant and, fur-
ther, is deceptive in as much it implies that there is culture free of politics and politics free of culture. “I have 
learned to argue instead,” she states, “for understanding the political as an aspect of culture, and culture as the 
field in which politics is conceived and enacted” (12). 
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Another way of putting this is to say that a democratic regime, such as that of the 
United States, necessarily exceeds its institutional structures and formalized articulations. 
While majoritarian and representative institutions may be necessary or pragmatic conditions 
for a democratic order, they are not, in and of themselves, sufficient. An additional necessary 
condition for democracy is a social order marked by vibrant citizen participation and broad 
political activity. The rule (kratos) of the people (demos), I suggest, springs from the interac-
tions and public performances of members of a polity. A similar perspective manifests in 
Michaele Ferguson’s account of democracy as activity, which centers on the “exercise of po-
litical freedom in acts of self-government” and the “never-ending, ongoing process of shap-
ing the world we inhabit with plural others.”78 The vision of a democracy as a project and 
process of collective world building undertaken by equal citizens involves more than the lib-
eral-deliberative account would suggest or allow. The notion of democracy as constituted 
solely by processes of reason giving and oriented towards consensus occludes the embodied 
dimensions of disagreement and the irreducibility of difference and power. In recognizing 
these aspects, my account of democracy bears the influence of agonistic theories that em-
phasize the inevitability of conflict and resistance given the permanent condition of social 
power differentials. 
Given all this, the religious traditions that inform American culture and that facilitate 
citizens in their active efforts to shape the world must be understood as part and parcel of a 
practice of democratic politics. The political work of transforming social arrangements and 
institutions, Gramsci contends, must begin with rudiments drawn from that society’s politi-
cal culture and mores. As he explains, “The starting point [for counter-hegemonic efforts] 
must always be that common sense which is the spontaneous philosophy of the multitude 
                                                
78 Michaele L. Ferguson, Sharing Democracy (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2012), 12, 138. 
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and which has to be made ideologically coherent.”79 Any effort at political transformation 
requires, Gramsci claims, “an intellectual and moral reform.” Such a reform must begin with 
the web of discourses, habits, and sensibilities—in a phrase: the social mores—of the politi-
cal community.80 As discussed earlier, Christianity provides structures of feeling and action 
for the American practice of democracy. In this way, Christian traditions not only invigorate 
the public engagement and exercise of political freedom on which American democracy de-
pends but also equip religious subjects with techniques of citizenship that can be taken up, 
inhabited, and performed in the on-going struggle to remake the American political order. 
§ 6. The Map and the Territory 
 
Given this dissertation’s explicit concern with moving beyond abstract and reified 
conceptions of religion, the chapters that follow depart from the common disciplinary prac-
tice within political theory of developing arguments through close readings of canonical 
works in western political thought. The methodological approach taken here instead directs 
analytical attention to specific episodes and social actors in the history of American politics. 
My analysis re-orients theoretical concern towards democratic practices and the concrete,  
“on the ground” activity of claims-making that constitutes religious and political struggle.  
 The cases I have chosen span the broad swath of American history, from the 
antebellum period struggle over the institution of chattel slavery to the aftermath of the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. These case studies 
facilitate analysis of the historical-empirical interplay of American religion and politics from 
                                                
79 Gramsci, 421. 
80 For the political significance of social mores—or what he refers to as les moeurs (“morals/manners”)—see the 
theoretical work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, most especially “Letter to M. D’Alembert.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 




distinct perspectives in order to further develop the conceptual framework established in this 
introductory chapter. 
 I begin in Chapter One by engaging one of the major theoretical frameworks for 
conceptualizing public religion in America: civil religion. An interest in civil religion as a be-
lief system shared by all members of a political community recurs in canonical works of 
normative political philosophy. Thinkers as varied as Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rous-
seau all ruminated on the creation of a programmatic imposition of religious beliefs and 
practices. Over the last half-century, however, social scientists have followed the lead of so-
ciologist Robert Bellah in applying the term as an empirical description of the United States. 
Unlike previous philosophical articulations, Bellah defines civil religion in a Durkheimian 
manner as a set of organic beliefs and rituals that sacralize consensual values and the com-
munity. By reading the works of Tocqueville and Walt Whitman alongside the theory of 
Gramsci, I construct an alternative conception of civil religion as a poetic practice that in-
forms the meaning of political values and can be marshaled to contest the terms of political 
standing. I pair my conceptual articulation with an examination of abolitionist William Lloyd 
Garrison, which allows me to illuminate how civil religious performances are exercises in 
world- and meaning-making shot through with dimensions of power. 
 My discussion of Garrison’s inflammatory public persona calls to mind the fraught 
subject of religious fanaticism, which I turn to directly in Chapter Two. Implicit within the 
anxieties surrounding fanaticism is the association of public religions with problematic en-
thusiasms, passions, and potential violence. At face value the figure of the fanatic is a patho-
logical manifestation—a troubling, potentially anti-democratic force. Rather than categori-
cally redeeming or condemning the religious fanatic, I use militant abolitionist John Brown 
and Operation Rescue founder Randall Terry to build an account of how the practice of fa-
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naticism manifests in democratic regimes. Specifically, I develop an understanding of relig-
ious zealotry as the excessive and exacting enactment of faith, wherein the performance of a 
conspicuous religio-ethical practice challenges the prevailing set of sensibilities and institu-
tions in a community. Through my readings of Brown and Terry, I construct an account of 
how their particular Christian traditions endowed them not only with personal motivations 
but also the idioms and performative resources through which they confronted what they 
perceived to be the unjust and unmarked remainders of previous political settlements. 
 Chapter Three moves from individual religious figures to the level of religious pub-
lics as well as from critical disruption to mobilizing and sustaining a political bloc. Drawing 
on religious aesthetics scholarship and the historical case of the Social Gospel, I develop an 
account of religious publics as communities constituted through aesthetic forms and prac-
tices. The facilitating condition of a religious public, I argue, is a cultus, a term that captures 
the aesthetic and practical materials of a religious tradition. The cultus gives form and force 
to religious faith as a way of being and acting in the world. As a part of developing this con-
cept and theorizing its political implications, I develop and sharpen my critique of the con-
ception of religion as a state of holding particular beliefs. According to my analysis, the So-
cial Gospel’s repertoire of practices and texts brought into being a network of religio-
political subjects equipped with commitments and dispositions that countered those of the 
dominant American traditions of liberal capitalism and evangelical Protestantism. Put in dif-
ferent terms, I read the Social Gospel as advancing what can be conceptualized as a counter-
cultus, which challenges the dominant Christian liturgy of the time and cultivates subjectiv-
ities that have the capacities and dispositions to rework the social-structural order. 
The final content chapter draws together the conceptual threads developed in previ-
ous chapters in an analysis of the religious politics of mourning. As recent theoretical contri-
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butions have elaborated, moments of public mourning are crucial points in which collective 
memory, belonging, and value are unsettled and negotiated. Yet even as public mourning has 
been recognized as a moment in which the political community can be reformed and recon-
stituted—even if that formation relies on the reproduction of established modes and man-
ners—there has been a curious neglect of how religion is implicated in the management of 
memory and the process of mourning. Yet, as Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann 
write, “Religion gives meaning both to violence and to the suffering incurred by it.”81 As I 
argue, the cultus of religious traditions encompass both a praxis and poetics of mourning that 
enable actions in light of existing conceptions of the cosmos and the (re)making of meanings 
and subjectivities through ritual enactments. The substance of the chapter’s analysis turns to 
three figures—George W. Bush, Jerry Falwell, and Jeremiah Wright—who differently drew 
on the materials of the Christian tradition in order to alter the meanings of foundational po-
litical principles and frame the place of the United States in the world after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.  
 I close the dissertation with a short concluding section in which I return to the pro-
ject’s overarching objective of theorizing religious claims-making as a democratic practice in 
the United States. I also use this closing section to highlight areas of my project for future 
development, expansion, and elaboration. 
                                                
81 Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann, “Introduction,” in Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and 





“A SUBLIME AND SERIOUS RELIGIOUS DEMOCRACY”:  




“[The] separation of church and state has not denied the 
political realm a religious dimension… This public relig-
ious dimension is expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, 
and rituals that I am calling the American civil religion.” 
— Robert Bellah, 
“Civil Religion in America”1 
 
“Religion is sociologically interesting not because, as vulgar 
positivism would have it, it describes the social order 
(which, insofar as it does, it does not only very obliquely 
but very incompletely), but because, like environment, po-
litical wealth, jural obligation, personal affection, and a 
sense of beauty, it shapes it.” 
— Clifford Geertz, 
“Religion as a Cultural System”2 
 
 One of the fundamental insights provided by Alexis de Tocqueville (and discussed in 
the introductory chapter) is that while religion in the United States may be formally sepa-
rated from the state it nonetheless remains a vibrant and crucial part of American public life. 
Indeed, according to Tocqueville, the Christian religious tradition thoroughly penetrates and 
informs American political culture and the vernacular political discourse. Two centuries after 
the publication of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1840), analytical and interpretive schol-
arship still struggles with how to schematize the exact workings and nature of the relation-
ship between religion (Christianity) and politics (liberal democracy) in the United States. This 
                                                
1 Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus 96 (1967), 3. 
2 Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic, 1973), 119. 
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on-going effort produced a number of models and concepts claiming to provide greater pre-
cision and accuracy in understanding the political work of American religion. Most notable 
among these is the idea of ‘American civil religion,’ which persists as a ready analytical 
framework long after its initial popularization by sociologist Robert Bellah in the late 1960s.3 
The conceptual lineage of ‘civil religion,’ of course, stretches back much farther, with the 
idea appearing either implicitly or explicitly in numerous works of normative political phi-
losophy both ancient and modern.4 In repurposing the term for his interpretative project, 
Bellah proffered a broad definition of civil religion as “that religious dimension, found I 
think in the life of every people, through which it interprets its historical experience in the 
light of transcendent reality.”5 American civil religion as a conceptual category indexes the 
diffuse “collection of beliefs, symbols, and rituals with respect to sacred things” that is dis-
tinct from organized religious denominations (churches) and the institutions of government 
                                                
3 The thematic elements that Bellah captures by his term, it should be noted, were far from novel or off the 
radar of the academic milieu in which he worked. Numerous similar concepts were introduced both before and 
after Bellah offered the language of “American civil religion.” To name but a few: “common religion” (Robin 
Williams), “common faith” (John Dewey), “the religion of the Republic” (Sidney Mead), and “American creed” 
(Seymour Lipset). I single out Bellah for my present discussion because his concept of American civil religion 
has become the iconic articulation of the imbrication of politics and religion in the United States. 
4 The term ‘civil religion’ first appears in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which I will discuss in more detail 
further on in the chapter. The Roman philosopher Marcus Terentius Varro offers a similar concept in his lan-
guage of civil theology (theologica civilis). Though Varro’s writings have been lost, St. Augustine provides a gloss 
on Varro’s theological typology in Book VI, Chapter 5 of The City of God. Per Varro’s formulation, civil theol-
ogy is the theology of the city—“that which the citizens in the towns, and especially the priests, ought to know 
and put into practice”—and codifies the official gods and modes of worship for a given community. It is dis-
tinguished from mythical theology (theology of the theater) and natural theology (theology of the philoso-
phers). St. Augustine, The City of God, translated by Henry Bettenson (New York: Penguin, 2003), 235-36. 
 Civil theology and civil religion, at least as Rousseau articulates the concept, are not identical. The pagan 
civil theology described by Varro and criticized as corrupt by Augustine are what Rousseau refers to as “the 
religion of the citizen.” The crucial distinction Rousseau makes between this and civil religion properly under-
stood is the explicit parochialism of civil theology, which narrowly sacralizes the city, as compared to the uni-
versalistic dimension attributed to civil religion.    
 For secondary studies of civil religion as it manifests elsewhere in western political philosophy, see e.g., 
Ronald Beiner, Civil Religion: A Dialogue in the History of Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011); and Civil Religion in Political Thought: Its Perennial Questions and Enduring Relevance in North America, 
edited by Ronald Weed and John von Heyking (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University Press, 2010). 
5 Robert N. Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial (New York: The Seabury Press, 
1975), 3. 
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(the state).6 It is a “national faith” that not only reinforces communal solidarity and cohesion 
but also possesses the capacity to engender and undermine the legitimacy of social structures 
and policies.  
Despite several decades of criticism, elaboration, and appropriation, Bellah’s formu-
lation continues to serve as the preeminent point of departure for analyses of religion in 
American politics.7 The definition Bellah provides for the concept rests on a problematic 
account of religion drawn from Durkheim that stresses its consensual and integrative func-
tion. Looking beyond Bellah’s model, an alternative paradigm of civil religion appears in the 
works of, among others, Niccolò Machiavelli and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The formulation 
articulated by Machiavelli and Rousseau stresses civil religion’s disciplining (or policing) po-
tential and its utility for political elites and regime maintenance to undertake projects of 
domination. The Machiavellian-Rousseauian tradition, however, neglects to consider the 
protean character of civil religion by which it can be taken up by multiple social actors either 
to sustain or challenge relations of power. Both schools of thought thus provide overly nar-
row analytical frameworks that fail to attend to the dynamic and contestatory qualities of re-
ligio-political discourse in a democratic society such as the United States. 
This chapter addresses a foundational conceptual question, namely, what is Ameri-
can civil religion and how does it bear on the practice of democracy? Given that civil religion 
                                                
6 Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” 8. 
7 While an exhaustive list of such analyses would be unnecessary and belabored, here is a partial list of entries in 
the extensive literature building on, responding to, or revising Bellah’s notion of civil religion: Philip S. Gorski, 
“Barack Obama and Civil Religion,” Political Power and Social Theory 22 (2011): 177-211; Gail Gehrig, “The 
American Civil Religion Debate: A Source for Theory Construction,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 20 
(1981): 51-63; Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones, American Civil Religion (San Francisco: Mellen Research 
University Press, 1990); the entries in Varieties of Civil Religion, edited by Robert N. Bellah and Phillip E. Ham-
mond (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980); Richard V. Pierard and Robert D. Linder, Civil Religion and the 
Presidency (Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1988); Rhys H. Williams and Susan M. Alexander, “Religious Rhet-
oric in American Populism: Civil Religion as Movement Ideology,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 33 
(1994): 1-15; and David Morgan, “Seeing Nationhood: Images of American Identity,” in Powers: Religion as a 
Social and Spiritual Force, edited by Meerten B. Ter Borg and Jan Willem Van Henten (New York: Fordham Uni-
versity Press, 2010), 81-102. Additionally, a number of entries on the Social Science Research Council’s blog 
The Immanent Frame (online at: http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/) have revisited the concept of civil religion. 
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is a second-order concept constructed by scholars to make sense of the world, we might 
more properly pose this question slightly differently: how should American civil religion be 
understood in order to more fully and richly grasp the play of religious rhetoric and per-
formance in the democratic political culture of the United States? Rather than discard the 
term altogether, I propose that a conceptual re-orientation is in order. I argue that American 
civil religion would be more richly conceptualized in terms of aesthetics and the sensuous 
dimensions of public life.8 Instead of speaking of American civil religion as a set or settled 
object composed of shared beliefs, I develop an account of a civil religious poetics, which in-
volves the innovative combination of materials from political and religious traditions in the 
process of collective world making. 
To flesh out this framework, I look to the antebellum period and the abolitionist ac-
tivity of William Lloyd Garrison. The case of Garrison is useful for my purposes both in 
how he performed a civil religious poetics and how he conceptualized its political work and 
effects. Garrison stands as simultaneously exemplary and exceptional—exemplary in the 
sense that he uses modes of religious performance and voice that were widespread among 
anti-slavery activists, and exceptional in his radical positions relative to both mainstream 
American society and even the bulk of the anti-slavery movement. At the outset of his ten-
ure as publisher and writer for The Liberator, Garrison famously proclaimed “I am in ear-
nest—I will not equivocate—I will not excuse—I will not retreat a single inch—AND I WILL 
                                                
8 To head off any potential confusion at the pass, I do not mean aesthetics as narrowly relating to art and the 
apprehension of the beautiful. As I hope will become clear in my usage of the term, my definition hues closer 
to the original Greek term, aisthesis, which refers to “things perceptible by the senses, as distinct from things 
which were immaterial or which could only be thought.” Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture 
and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 27. Understood as involving modes and regimes of sen-
suous knowledge, aesthetics eschews the hierarchical mind-body dualism that separates out bodily sensation 
from the processes of rational thought. An aesthetics orientation refuses the abstraction of intellectual proc-
esses (ideology, ideas, beliefs, etc.) from the regimes and modes of perception (sensing, feeling, hearing, seeing). 
The limits and capacities of our political thinking, in other words, are conditioned on our sensuous engagement 
with the world. 
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BE HEARD.” As a part of these efforts to be heard and persuade his fellow citizens, Garrison 
models a certain way of claiming—of contesting the meaning of American political tradi-
tions—that I call a civil religious poetics. Exploring Garrison’s performance grounds the 
chapter’s theoretical examination of civil religious poetics as a means of reforming political 
culture and reshaping the sensibilities of citizens. At the same time, my analysis facilitates a 
more nuanced interpretation of Garrison’s abolitionist activities and challenges the long-
standing critique made by both his contemporaries and subsequent commentators that he 
was overly moralistic and anti-political. 
I begin by critically engaging the two established schools of thought regarding the 
concept of ‘civil religion’—the Durkhiemian and Machiavellian models—and develop an 
alternative understanding of the term as entailing a poetical practice by bringing together the 
works of Tocqueville, Walt Whitman, and Antonio Gramsci. After establishing my theoreti-
cal framework regarding American civil religion, I provide a brief historical sketch of the 
antebellum debate over the status of slavery and its religious dimensions in order to situate 
Garrison’s position and emphasize its radical quality. Then I proceed to analyze the rhetori-
cal practices of Garrison, illuminating how he used religious modes of performance and 
voice to rework established political ideas and challenge the existing terms of political stand-
ing and sensibility. I close by considering how Garrison articulates a conception of democ-
ratic political activity as directed towards unsettling and re-constructing the terms of political 
discourse and subjectivity that must necessarily precede social-structural transformation. 
§ 1. A Lyrical Civil Religion 
Within the now extensive scholarly literature on civil religion, two general conceptual 
models appear: the first model, which is informed by the sociological theory of Émile Durk-
heim, understands civil religion as a social consensus that rises organically and sacralizes 
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common values. The second or Machiavellian model casts civil religion as an ideological de-
vice for the manipulation and control of subjects by the state or political elites. In the schol-
arship that flowed in the wake of Bellah’s early work, the Durkheimian model became the 
norm though a few scholars continued to use the Machiavellian conception of civil religion 
as a means of political control.9 Both of these models, I argue, fail to accurately capture the 
dynamics of religious forms and discourse as they operate in American political culture.  
The Durkheimian tradition that includes Bellah’s theorization of American civil relig-
ion contends that religion is necessarily social. According to this normative functionalist ac-
count, religion is a universal, natural, and consensual phenomenon by which a society comes 
into being and sustains itself as a unified, harmonious unit. Although Durkheim never ex-
plicitly uses the language of ‘civil religion’ in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912), the 
concept is implicit within his social theory of religion, which posits that the religious and civ-
il communities are “coterminous” and co-constitutive. Any fully functioning and stable 
society, Durkheim claims, requires a shared body of ideas, behaviors, and symbols that ex-
press and reflect commonly held values. As he writes, there “can be no society which does 
not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments 
and collective ideas which make its unity and its personality.”10 These shared ideas and values 
arise out of instances of social gathering, most particularly moments of religious worship, 
that inspire the intense state of fellow feeling and inter-connection that Durkheim refers to 
as collective effervescence. Religious orders sacralize the community and render its essential 
unity and values transcendent. In addition to operating as coordinating devices that organize 
a community members’ ideas and behavior (and provide “moral unity”), religions also pro-
                                                
9 For a contemporary formulation that fits squarely within the Machiavellian paradigm, see Sheldon S. Wolin, 
“America’s Civil Religion,” Democracy 2 (April 1983): 7-17. 
10 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, translated by Karen E. Fields (New York: The Free 
Press, 1995), 474-75. 
48 
vide occasions such as rites and ceremonies that bring members together to reaffirm these 
common sentiments, solidify social bonds, and celebrate the collective. Put differently, relig-
ion according to Durkheim forms the connective tissue that holds a civil society and moral 
community together.  
A Durkheimian sensibility informs Bellah’s conception of American civil religion.11 
Bellah defines civil religion as “a collection of beliefs, symbols, and rituals with respect to 
sacred things and institutionalized in a collectivity.”12 Though Bellah claims that this collec-
tion of beliefs has an integrity and coherence that allows it to be categorized as a religion, it 
is distinct from what José Casanova calls a “public religion.” For whereas a public religion is 
a sectarian religious tradition that enters into the public sphere replete with its idiosyncratic 
or particularistic rhetorics, logics, and references, American civil religion is a diffuse body of 
ideas and practices abstracted from any particular theological tradition. It is a civil religion in 
that the materials recycled from a generic Christianity are combined with elements from re-
publican and liberal discourse to form a way of understanding the United States within a 
transcendent order. By offering a theologically thin variation of Christianity, American civil 
religion resonates with the personal faith of Christian citizens regardless of denominational 
differences.13 American civil religion represents a generalized consensus composed of “cer-
tain common elements of religious orientation that the great majority of Americans share.”14 
                                                
11 The middleman in this intellectual lineage is Talcott Parsons, who introduced Durkheim’s functionalist soci-
ology to American scholars and served as Bellah’s mentor. Almost two decades after its publication, Bellah 
admitted that Parsons originally intended to write the Daedalus piece on American civil religion until he decided 
to hand it off to Bellah. Robert N. Bellah, “Comment,” Sociological Analysis 50 (1989): 147. 
12 Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” 10. As a part of an effort to endow Bellah’s language with greater theo-
retical precision, John A. Coleman provides a helpful elaboration on this definition, writing that civil religion is 
“the set of beliefs, rites, and symbols which relates a man’s role as citizen and his society’s place in space, time, 
and history to the conditions of ultimate existence and meaning.” John A. Coleman, “Civil Religion,” Sociological 
Analysis 31 (1970), 70.  
13 Catherine Albanese, “Dominant and Public Center: Reflections on the One Religion of the United States,” 
South Atlantic Quarterly 81:1 (1992): 14–29; and Phillip E. Hammond and Robert Bellah, Varieties of Civil Religion 
(San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1980). 
14 Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” 3. 
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These components include notions of national chosenness and a foundational covenant be-
tween the American people and God that places a special burden on the United States to 
redeem the world. Bellah constructs his account through an examination of the speeches and 
writings of political officials. Though Bellah acknowledges that such public actors may only 
be performing a “semblance of piety” for instrumental purposes, he claims that their words 
are still revealing, inasmuch as they express common notions that inform American political 
culture and are broadly shared by the national audience. 
As articulated in these accounts, civil religions (and religions more generally) are or-
ganic and seemingly spontaneous social phenomena. According to the Durkheimian tradi-
tion, civil religion “well[s] up naturally from the bottom, from the very depths of the social 
experience itself.”15 The rituals and ideas of a civil religion, then, are the natural (and appar-
ently unintentional) expression of a nascent consensus. Religious traditions, it is true, pro-
duce social subjects by equipping them with the values and habits of the community, but the 
Durkheimian account of religious subjectification proceeds without agentic will or influence. 
By defining religion as a naturally occurring device—a process that springs from the very 
logic of social life—the model advocated by Durkheim and Bellah fails to consider civil relig-
ion’s implication in relations of power and forecloses questions regarding the formation and 
contestation of civil religion. This absence is most pronounced in Durkheim’s description of 
religion, which depicts religious phenomena as entirely abstracted from any economy of 
power within society. Even in Bellah’s framework, which rests squarely on analyses of the 
utterances of political actors, the play of power and persuasion are marginalized. Thus, 
statements of political actors are interpreted as manifestations or reflections of a preexisting 
symbolic order rather than attempts at persuasion, manipulation, or innovation.  
                                                
15 N.J. Demerath and Rhys H. Williams, “Civil Religion in an Uncivil Society,” Annals of the American Academy 
480 (1985): 156. 
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Although equally interested in the functionality of religious traditions, the Machiavel-
lian model couples this concern with a stress on the political utility and instrumentality of 
civil religion. That is, thinkers in this tradition are principally interested in how religion 
serves as a tool for elites to manipulate, discipline, and police subjects and thus maintain the 
order of political rule.16 While this idea manifests in a passing manner in The Prince (1532) 
where Machiavelli instructs political leaders to appear (though not necessary be) religious, it 
appears in a far more developed fashion in Discourses on Livy (1531). In Discourses, Machiavelli 
discusses at length the utility of the Roman civil religion devised and implemented by Numa 
Pompilius. The Roman civil religion, Machiavelli claims, “served to command armies, to 
animate the plebs, to keep men good, to bring shame to the wicked.”17 Machiavelli stresses 
that the relative truth-value of a religion—that is, whether or not it accurately describes the 
cosmos and offers the proper path to salvation—is of secondary concern. What is most 
pressing is the political utility of a religion. With this in mind, Machiavelli argues that the 
Roman civil religion furnished by Numa is a particular achievement in terms of manufactur-
ing compliant subjects who are respectful of the laws, dedicated to their social commitments, 
and eager to battle for the city’s survival and greatness. The famous lawgivers of antiquity 
such as Lycurgus and Solon, Machiavelli observes, all similarly resorted to civil religion as a 
means of establishing and shoring up their social orders, allowing these elites to “easily im-
press any new form on [the people].”18 The qualities necessary for a stable republic, including 
legitimacy of the state, a disciplined citizenry, and respect for laws, are imposed—
“impress[ed]”—on subjects through the instrument of civil religion. 
                                                
16 Paul Christopher Johnson tracks a similar notion of civil religion’s tactical potential in his conceptualization 
of “instrumental civil religion.” See Paul Christopher Johnson, “Savage Civil Religion,” Numen 52:3 (2004): 289-
324. 
17 Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 34-35. 
18 Ibid., 35. 
51 
 An analogous formulation appears in the republican theory of Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau. Credited with coining the concept of ‘civil religion,’ Rousseau introduces the subject in 
Chapter Eight of the fourth volume of The Social Contract (1762). Civil religion figures into 
Rousseau’s discussion (with an acknowledged debt to Machiavelli and Hobbes) as a means 
of fostering political bonds and nourishing citizens’ love of duty. “[N]o State,” Rousseau 
boldly claims, “has ever been founded without religion serving as its base.”19 Canvassing 
what he sees as the three known varieties of religion, however, Rousseau finds each and 
every one wanting with respect to the crucial criterion of social unity: “the religion of the 
citizen” strengthens the pull of civil obligation but is prone to empty ceremony and intoler-
ant chauvinism; “the religion of the priest,” as exemplified by Catholicism, actively subverts 
the allegiance of subjects to the polity; and “the religion of man”—Christianity in its purest, 
most deinstitutionalized form—engenders political quietude, other-worldliness, and depend-
ency.20 Faced with these shortcomings Rousseau articulates a fourth approach, which he calls 
a “purely civil profession of faith.” Such a civil profession (or civil religion) preserves a space 
for individuals to possess their own personal religion but dictates “a few, simple, and exactly 
worded” pieces of dogma that all citizens must hold and that are meant to provide social 
stability and institutional legitimacy. These prescribed “sentiments of sociability” include the 
existence of a divinity and an afterlife, the punishment of transgressions, the sanctity of the 
social contract and laws, and a proscription against intolerance.21 By embedding these quali-
ties within a transcendent framing, Rousseau overlays civic duties with a moral resonance 
and a divine sanction to the acts of the state. 
                                                
19 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On The Social Contract, translated by Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publish-
ing Company, 1987), 99. 
20 It should be said that Rousseau’s treatment of civil religion in The Social Contract is hardly exhaustive of his 
thoughts on religion and religious experience. Indeed, in a section of Emile entitled “Profession of Faith of the 
Savoyard Vicar,” Rousseau articulates a deistic spirituality that stands apart from any civic purpose. 
21 Ibid., 102. 
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 As opposed to the Durkheimian model, the Machiavellian tradition foregrounds 
power and domination. The objective of civil religion according to Machiavelli and Rousseau 
resembles that posited by Durkheim, namely, the production of social subjects and the re-
production of the social order. The Machiavellian model differs crucially in its second prem-
ise: civil religion, as all religion, is an artifact created by humanity and should be deliberately 
crafted as an instrument in light of some given ends. Even as they locate civil religion within 
a matrix of power relations, the account of power informing Rousseau’s and Machiavelli’s 
theories is unidirectional and top-down. The lawgiver and the state impose civil religious be-
liefs and practices on a given populace to pacify it and endow the activities of the political 
elites with greater legitimacy. To use Rousseau’s language, civil religion serves as a device for 
manufacturing “good citizen[s]” and “faithful subject[s].”22 The exclusive attention to official 
civil religion—that is, the religious order formally proclaimed and authorized by state institu-
tions—brings about a reduced consideration of how civil religion can operate as a resource 
for resistance to the existing social order. The collection of symbols and meanings compos-
ing a civil religion, however, cannot be thoroughly shielded from contestation and re-
appropriation. Every discourse, as Michel Foucault observes, can be made to support pro-
jects quite different from (and even directly opposed to) those of its originators: 
[W]e must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical 
function is neither uniform nor stable. To be more precise, we must not imagine a 
world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or 
between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of dis-
cursive elements that can come into play in various strategies…and with the shift 
and reutilizations of identical formula for contrary objectives that it also includes.23 
When paired with the inevitability of resistance to any arrangement of power, Foucault’s 
point regarding the portability of discourse suggests that civil religion cannot be adequately 
                                                
22 Ibid., 102. 
23 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: Introduction (New York: Vintage, 1990), 100. 
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theorized singularly as an instrument of domination. Given the Machiavellian model’s nar-
row focus on civil religion as an instrument of the state and a means of subject production, 
this framework on its own cannot provide the analytical tools necessary for grappling with 
civil religious discourse when it is engaged in a project of resistance and unsettling the social 
order. 
Rather than adopting either of these reified and partial models of civil religion, I ad-
vance a conception of civil religion as identifying a genre of claims making that plays on 
conventional religious forms, images, and rhetorics in order to reform a given polity’s self-
understanding and social mores.24 In other words, I take civil religion to be a conceptual 
category rather than a particular historical or empirical category, a capacious genre or form 
rather than a single set system of belief or practice. As a way of articulating and developing 
my alternative framework, I turn to two eloquent observers of religion as it figures into 
American political culture: Walt Whitman and Alexis de Tocqueville. 
Writing in the aftermath of the Civil War, Walt Whitman foresaw the coming ascen-
sion of a new, religious stage of American democracy in his essay “Democratic Vistas” 
(1871). This stage would build upon the two previous movements within American devel-
opment that had established, respectively, the “political foundation of rights” (democratic 
institutional structures) and “material prosperity” (economic and industrial development). 
Alongside these legal-political and economic moments, Whitman anticipated a cultural and 
literary transformation that would empower and unite the citizenry of the country: 
                                                
24 Cf. Marcela Cristi, From Civil to Political Religion: The Intersection of Culture, Religion and Politics (Waterloo, Ontario: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2001). Though Cristi provides a critique of the existing discourse on civil relig-
ion that resonates with my own, the solution that she offers to distinguish civil religion as “culture” and civil 
religion as “ideology” is unsatisfying. In consigning consensus theories of civil religion to the realm of culture, 
Cristi implicitly casts culture as removed from the play of power, which is ascribed primarily to the ideological 
apparatus of the state. My analysis shares Cristi’s interest in attending to civil religion as it is implicated in 
power relations but proceeds from an understanding that power in modern societies, especially modern democ-
ratic societies, cannot be adequately mapped onto a state-civil society binary.  
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I, now, for one, promulge, announcing a native expression-spirit, getting into form, 
adult, and through mentality, for these States, self-contain'd, different from others, 
more expansive, more rich and free, to be evidenced by original authors and poets to 
come, by American personalities, plenty of them, male and female, traversing the 
States, none excepted — and by native superber tableaux and growths of language, 
songs, operas, orations, lectures, architecture — and by a sublime and serious Relig-
ious Democracy sternly taking command, dissolving the old, sloughing off surfaces, 
and from its own interior and vital principles, reconstructing, democratizing society.25 
 
As Whitman describes it, religion forms an integral element in the rich social and cultural 
fabric of American democracy that at once shapes political aspirations and identity and pro-
vides the assortment of cultural practices and productions necessary for their expression.  
To be clear, the religion Whitman refers to is not the hierarchical and submissive 
strain of Christianity he sees at work in much of human history. He instead anticipates a ma-
ture (“adult”) religious formation that actively engages subjects in constructing meaning and 
making sense of man’s (and the nation’s) place in the cosmos. Religion takes on shades of 
another artistic medium or genre, a mode of expression and world making that “authors and 
poets to come” can use to reconstruct and democratize the country. This commanding “Re-
ligious Democracy,” Whitman insists, would reinforce the agentic powers and creative ca-
pacities of members while also providing an articulation of communal togetherness and the 
cosmological connection linking the society together. 
 Like literature and poetry generally, Whitman’s characterization of religion is deeply 
tied to the aesthetic constitution of democracy.26 He offers a vision of democracy constituted 
                                                
25 Walt Whitman, “Democratic Vistas,” in Prose Works, 1892, vol. 2, edited by Floyd Stoval (New York: New 
York University Press, 1964), 410. 
26 “The central problem, as Whitman understood it, was the democracy had not yet found its aesthetic expres-
sion, and so there was a tragic disconnection between formal democratic institutions and a culture still invested 
in forms of feudal hierarchy.” Jason Frank, “Promiscuous Citizenship,” The Political Companion to Walt Whitman, 
edited by John E. Seery (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 162. See also Jason Frank, Constituent 
Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 185; and Stephen 
John Mack, The Pragmatic Whitman: Reimagining American Democracy (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2002), 
135-159.  
 For various attempts to theorize the aesthetic dimensions of politics generally and democratic politics 
more specifically, see F.R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy beyond Fact and Value (Palo Alto: Stan-
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through aesthetic practices that train conscious and unconscious beliefs and produce a soci-
ety’s system of meaning. According to Whitman, democracy “is only of use there that it may 
pass on and come to its flower and fruits in manners, in the highest forms of interaction be-
tween men, and their beliefs.”27 Above and beyond its institutional architecture, a democratic 
order entails a robust political culture that unites members as active participants and fellow 
citizens in the always-incomplete process of collective self-determination and expression. 
The array of cultural and aesthetic productions within a society—with poetry, of course, the 
privileged and paradigmatic practice for Whitman—draws from these conditions of life (so-
cial manners, intersubjective relations, ideas, etc.) but also works to give shape to this way of 
life. Because of this formative power, Whitman endows aesthetic practices with a generative 
or transformative potential that at once arises from and is productive of the people. In his 
preface to the 1872 edition of Leaves of Grass, Whitman explicitly joined the aesthetic, politi-
cal, and religious dimensions, writing that religion “must enter into the Poems of the Nation. 
It must make the union.”28 By highlighting religion as one form of poetry, Whitman links it 
to this aesthetic dimension of democracy and frames it as a register of voice and perform-
ance open to human creativity and remaking. In other words, religion is a vernacular poetic, 
a form of speech and action that rises from the languages and traditions of the society but 
that can be taken up and reformed by agents in order to transform that society. As he writes 
in “Democratic Vistas,” Whitman envisions religion—or rather, the sense-making potential 
                                                                                                                                            
ford University, 1996); Davide Panagia, The Poetics of Political Thinking (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); 
Davide Panagia, The Political Life of Sensation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); Jacques Rancière, “Jacques 
Rancière: Literature, Politics, Aesthetics: Approaches to Democratic Disagreement,” SubStance 92 (2000): 3-24; 
and Jacques Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” Theory and Event 5:3 (2001). 
27 “Democratic Vistas,” 389. George Kateb glosses Whitman as calling for a democratic “stylization of life” 
complete with “a distinctive set of appearances, habits, rituals, dress, ceremonies, folk traditions and historical 
memories.” George Kateb, The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1992), 240; quoted in Jason Frank, “Aesthetic Democracy: Walt Whitman and the Poetry of the People,” The 
Review of Politics 69 (2007): 411. 
28 Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass: Comprehensive Reader’s Edition, edited by Harold W. Blodgett and Scully Bradley 
(New York: New York University Press, 1965), 745. 
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within the poetry of religion—as “dissolving the old, sloughing off surfaces, and from its 
own interior and vital principles, reconstructing, democratizing society.”  
Although writing earlier than Whitman and experiencing American society as an out-
sider looking in, Tocqueville echoes Whitman’s emphasis on the political significance of re-
ligion and, in fact, positions it as the foundation for democratic political life in the United 
States. One of the major reasons for Tocqueville’s stress on religion in democracy is pre-
cisely its capacity to save democracy from itself. Throughout his analysis of the United 
States, Tocqueville remains ambivalent about democracy, recognizing it as an achievement in 
terms of its conditions of freedom and equality but also as sowing the seeds of its own disso-
lution. Among these excesses, Tocqueville singles out for special concern the regime’s ten-
dency towards materialism, the tyranny of the majority, and social isolationism. According to 
Tocqueville, religious traditions such as Christianity offer a felicitous supplement and check 
on these destructive democratic tendencies by compelling citizens to get outside of them-
selves: 
The greatest advantage of religions is to inspire entirely opposite instincts. There is 
no religion that does not place the object of the desires of men above and beyond 
the good things of the earth, and that does not naturally elevate his soul toward 
realms very superior to those of the senses. Nor is there any religion that does not 
impose on each man some duties toward the human species or in common with it, 
and that does not in this way drag him, from time to time, out of contemplation of 
himself.29 
 
By drawing attention to a transcendent realm, eternal life, and the duties that flow from this 
cosmological order, religion functions to rein in the destabilizing effects of individual self-
interest and materialism. At moments Tocqueville seems to echo the Machiavellian tradition 
by foregrounding the political utility of civil religion. For instance, Tocqueville writes, 
                                                
29 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated and edited by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Win-
throp (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 745-46. For an elaborate discussion of Tocqueville’s 
position regarding religion as a tool for curtailing democratic excesses, see Patrick J. Deneen, Democratic Faith 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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“[W]hat is most important for [society] is not that all citizens should profess the true religion 
but that they should profess religion.”30 Yet even as he identifies the value (or utility) of relig-
ious traditions to democracy, Tocqueville actively resists instituting religion in the govern-
mental apparatus.  
 Though Tocqueville locates religion solely within the domain of political culture, he 
nonetheless claims that it provides the scaffolding for American democracy and indirectly 
shapes the civic constitution of the nation-state. In a manner similar to Whitman, Toc-
queville conceptualizes democracy as, first and foremost, a social and cultural order. The 
Christian religion, Tocqueville claims, suffuses the field of political discourse in the United 
States and serves as the ground upon which democratic processes take place.31 While he ac-
knowledges that religious and political institutions are formally distinct and separate in 
America, religious traditions such as Christianity nonetheless provide the framework for po-
litical life. According to Tocqueville,  
It is religion that gave birth to the Anglo-American societies: one must never forget 
this; in the United States religion is therefore intermingled with all national habits 
and all the sentiments to which a native country gives birth… Christianity has there-
fore preserved a great empire over the American mind.32  
 
Tocqueville sets up religion as a subtle yet powerful grammar for American political thought 
and practice. This imperial vision of Christianity as an “involuntary agreement” holding a 
“quiet sway” throughout the entire nation positions it as at once the root and limit of politi-
cal meanings and possibilities. Importantly, the “great empire” of Christianity over political 
ideas emanates from its embeddedness in social mores, the web of “national habits” and 
“sentiments” that compose American culture.  
                                                
30 Ibid., 290. 
31 Ibid., 280. 
32 Ibid., 405-6. 
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I seek to unite these insights from Whitman and Tocqueville into an analytical 
framework that will facilitate a richer interpretation of American civil religion. While differ-
ing in significant ways in their normative assessments of Christianity, they together illuminate 
religion as both an organizing tradition within America’s democratic political culture and a 
poetic vernacular voice marked by plasticity and creativity.33 This starting point, I argue, pro-
vides a fruitful foundation for conceptualizing the character of civil religion as it works 
within the political culture of the United States. According to Tocqueville, religious tradi-
tions infuse the American citizenry and inflect ostensibly secular political traditions and 
commitments in the United States. Whitman provides a corrective supplement to Toc-
queville’s account by bringing to the fore the plasticity and transformative capacities of relig-
ious registers. Working with these religious materials enables social actors to be authors—
that is, performers with putative authority—who can poetically reform the moral, intellec-
tual, and sensuous dimensions of public life. 
 As with the broader theoretical framework of the dissertation, my interpretation of 
the poetics of civil religion bears the strong influence of Antonio Gramsci’s theory of he-
gemony. Within Gramsci’s framework, hegemony constitutes the “common sense” of a so-
ciety that facilitates consent and enables particular forms of political rule.34 A common sense 
                                                
33 To briefly gesture at the normative divide between Whitman and Tocqueville on this matter, both thinkers 
perceived Christianity to be a limiting force on democratic agency, but Whitman saw this as a problem in as 
much as it thwarted the creative powers of citizens while Tocqueville valued it for curbing the destructive ex-
cesses of the masses. For an elaborate account of the differences in Tocqueville and Whitman with respect to 
their views on religion, see Peter Augustine Lawler, “Whitman as a Political Thinker,” A Political Companion to 
Walt Whitman, edited by John E. Seery (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 245-71. 
34 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, translated and edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith (New York: International, 1971). This framework was further developed in the work of Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985). Benedetto Fontana provides 
a concise description of this dynamic, writing, “hegemony describes the ways and methods by which consent is 
generated and organized, which, in turn, is directly related to the mechanisms and processes by which knowl-
edge and beliefs are first, produced, and second, disseminated. Here the crux is the formation of a ‘conception 
of the world’ and its dissemination throughout the people. A conception of the world (an ‘ideology’ or a system 
of beliefs) is always opposed to differing conceptions of the world, so they are constantly in conflict, in a ‘bat-
tle’ against each other. The hegemonic conception is one that has become the ‘common sense’ of the people.” 
59 
involves the widely held and taken for granted body of assumptions, perceptions, and behav-
iors that allow a particular social and political arrangement appear natural or legitimate. He-
gemony operates principally through civil society and culture, allowing the operation of 
power to be seeded (and naturalized) in customs, habit, and lived practice and thus rendered 
invisible. In contrast to the crude conceptualization of ideology as systems of ideas, Gramsci 
argues that domination involves “the unconscious, inarticulate dimensions of social experi-
ence” and what could be called, following Raymond Williams, a “structure of feeling.”35 Put 
differently, we might say that a common sense encompasses a common sensibility, which Wil-
liams defines as “the formation of a particular mind: a whole activity, a whole way of per-
ceiving and responding, not to be reduced to either ‘thought’ or ‘feeling.”36 The active for-
mation and cultivation of ways of thinking, sensing, and feeling (understood as co-
constitutive rather than disjunctive) falls into the category of what I have been calling the 
aesthetic. 
The poetics of civil religion, I suggest, is a crucial mode through which a hegemonic 
order can be formed or contested in the United States. Every hegemonic formation—that is, 
the permutation of sense and sensibility that facilitates a system of political rule—remains 
always a fragile political achievement open to challenge and dissolution. A struggle to trans-
form the arrangements in a society never occurs simply on the order of institutional struc-
tures. According to Gramsci, political struggles necessarily involve what he calls a war of po-
sition that actively combats and resists the cultural foundations of domination, the “realm of 
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values and customs, speech habits and ritual practices” that undergird the existing order.37 
Civil religion enables such counter-hegemonic projects by being, on the one hand, an estab-
lished and powerful modality in the dense network of American political culture and, on the 
other hand, a mode of speech and performance that is protean and open to creative re-
appropriation. In what follows, a poetics of civil religion highlights the potential for actors to 
remake and revise an inherited language linking religion and politics as well as the way in 
which these innovations construct meaning, cultivate ways of sensing, and order relations 
that open or foreclose potential social arrangements. Approaching it as an aesthetic practice, 
American civil religion is analogous to Nietzsche’s depiction of truth: 
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomor-
phisms—in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, 
and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, ca-
nonical, and obligatory to a people.38 
 
Bellah and the scholarship that appropriated his theoretical framework focus on the final 
movement of this process, the ossification of a system of beliefs and symbols so that they 
“seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people.” What falls out of this account—and what 
I want to bring into focus—is the active creation and revision of the images and rhetorics 
that become sedimented (or alternatively, fossilized) into the reified structure Bellah calls 
American civil religion. How, the operative question becomes, has “the mobile army” of re-
ligious materials been “poetically and rhetorically” taken up and reconfigured so as to affect 
the dominant common sense and institutional arrangement of the United States? 
                                                
37 Eagleton, 114. 
38 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense,” in The Portable Nietzsche, edited by Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 42. Quoted in Nancy K. Frankenberry, “Religion as a ‘mobile army 
of metaphors,’” in Radical Interpretation in Religion, edited by Nancy K. Frankenberry (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 171. Nietzsche, it must be said, harshly denounces truth, describing it as “worn out and 
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not the case with American civil religion, which retains much of its image and sensuous pull. 
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I move in the next three sections to an extended examination of William Lloyd Gar-
rison. This historical excursion provides a concrete grounding for my theoretical account as 
well as an occasion to more fully illuminate the dynamics of civil religious poetics in action 
by exploring how Garrison mobilizes Christian rhetorics and ritualistic forms in order to 
generate and sustain a critical claim against slavery and the socio-political structures that en-
able it. 
§ 2. Situating Garrison’s Poetic Practice 
Throughout the antebellum period, Garrison and his fellow abolitionists stood si-
multaneously inside and outside American political culture. In one sense they existed at the 
margins of society by advocating a political position that was frequently derided as danger-
ous, radical, and fanatical. To help overcome such resistance and advance their political pro-
ject, Christian abolitionists like Garrison mobilized and reinterpreted religious resources im-
manent within American political culture and infused in the citizenry. 
By the time Garrison published the first issue of his abolitionist newspaper, The Lib-
erator, in January 1831, anti-slavery societies and movements had long occupied a marginal 
position in American politics.39 Debates over the practice of slavery began in the late seven-
teenth century when Quakers, who earlier opposed the institution in Great Britain, brought 
their arguments to the New World. This early opposition to slavery, though, remained 
largely a feature of religious groups such as the Quakers and Methodists and ultimately a mi-
nority position; at the same time, other religious sects such as the Catholic, Anglican, Lu-
                                                
39 “Anti-slavery” and “abolitionist,” I should clarify, are not equivalent concepts. “Anti-slavery” is a broad term 
that refers to individuals and organizations who opposed the enslavement or ownership of humans as property 
during the period in which the national government formally sanctioned slavery (1776-1865). “Abolitionism” 
refers to a historically specific group of actors and organizations that appeared first in the early 1830s and who 
shared a thorough-going commitment to racial equality and the immediate emancipation of all slaves. 
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theran, and Presbyterian churches sanctioned black slavery.40 After a brief increase in egali-
tarian fervor and criticism of slavery following the American Revolution, religious institu-
tions including the Methodist Episcopal Church refused to take a critical stance on the issue 
and the Quakers gradually became less active in antagonistic anti-slavery efforts due to their 
pacifistic beliefs.41  
 While almost completely absent in the South, anti-slavery activists and organizations 
in the North persisted not only as a minority of the population but also a particularly con-
troversial and derided one. Beyond its central commitment to ending slavery and establishing 
social and political equality, the abolitionist movement was also associated with English sen-
sibilities and the political activity of women. All of these elements helped paint abolitionists 
as threatening to the status quo and the current distribution of racialized and gendered roles 
and privileges.42 Expressions of anti-abolitionism came from many directions. Southerners 
such as Governor George McDuffie of South Carolina labeled abolitionists “enemies of the 
human race” who should be sentenced to “death without benefit of clergy,” while fellow 
South Carolinian statesman James Henry Hammond urged that “these men must be silenced 
in but one way—Terror—Death.”43 President Andrew Jackson urged “severe penalties” for 
those who circulated “incendiary material”—namely, anti-slavery publications and litera-
ture—that could possibly incite resistance and insurrection among the slave population.44 
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These anxieties also manifested in systemic social discrimination against abolitionists, mob 
actions, race riots that targeted anti-slavery presses and meetings, law suits, the tampering 
with and censorship of mail, and the introduction of a gag rule in the United States Congress 
that prevented the hearing of anti-slavery petitions. Garrison was personally threatened on 
multiple occasions, including one instance on August 21, 1835 in which he was chased down 
by a mob of several thousand Bostonians until he was hauled by rope out of a second-story 
window onto the street where he narrowly avoided being lynched.45 
 Abolition, in short, was widely perceived to be an extremist and potentially danger-
ous project, and those who advocated such a stance were the subject of both formal and in-
formal practices of discrimination and intimidation. The majority of the nation continued to 
recognize the legitimacy of slavery in the South, with prominent figures in mainstream poli-
tics going only so far as to oppose the expansion of slavery into the new territories in order 
to leave those areas open for free (white) labor. The greater part of the Republican Party 
prior to the Civil War understood the principal flaw of slavery to be its socio-economic con-
sequences for whites. According to this strain of economic criticism, slavery stymied regional 
progress through a lack of incentives and social mobility, threw the majority of white labor-
ers into poverty, and produced a society marked by “sluggish inactivity.”46 Only a small 
group of radical Republicans, including Charles Sumner, Henry Wilson, and John Andrew, 
consistently sought to challenge slavery as a moral wrong (and these figures all credited their 
position to abolitionist publications such as Garrison’s Liberator).47 Even in free states such 
as Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, and Oregon, the absence of slavery was frequently cou-
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pled with statutes that excluded any blacks from entering or residing in the state. Thus, while 
in the South blacks were consigned to subhuman status and suited only for the position of 
slaves, northern sentiments hardly granted freedmen equal status or consideration.48 When 
they were not excluded from residing in a territory, blacks were denied equal political mem-
bership. This widely held and practiced principle of exclusion was made federal law in Chief 
Justice Roger B. Taney’s majority opinion in the 1857 Dred Scott decision, which ruled that all 
persons of African descent, whether free or slave, could not obtain full U.S. citizenship.49  
 The exclusionary sentiment found another, subtler formulation in the efforts of or-
ganizations such as the American Colonization Society that mobilized financial and political 
support necessary to transport freed slaves to Africa. While certainly some members of the 
society urged the emancipation of slaves and the return of them to their native land, the or-
ganization as whole was not opposed to slavery. Indeed, the shipping of former slaves off 
the American continent was intended to prevent a population of free blacks from accumulat-
ing in the United States and destabilizing the systems of racial hierarchy throughout the 
country. Though earlier in his activist career Garrison agreed with the society’s mission and 
saw its efforts as aiming to benevolently resolve racial conflict, he later repudiated it, saying, 
“They [the Society members] have an antipathy against the blacks. They do not wish to admit them to 
an equality. They can tolerate them only as servants and slaves, but never as brethren and 
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friends. They can love and benefit them four thousand miles off, but not at home.”50 As 
Garrison came to realize, the American Colonization Society and other like-minded organi-
zations were not manifestations of a Christian commitment to racial equality and justice but 
rather another variation of racial animus and caste. 
 Garrison and his fellow abolitionists resisted both these formal institutional expres-
sions of white supremacy and their underlying logic of a hierarchy of persons. Garrisonian 
abolitionists advocated a radical egalitarianism, claiming that not only should slavery be im-
mediately abolished—with no compensation to the former slaveholders—but also the 
freedmen and freedwomen should be granted equal social and political status to whites. Gar-
rison repeatedly characterizes slavery as the most extreme and revealing instantiation of a 
system of racial prejudice—what Garrison refers to as, by turns, “colorphobia” or “complex-
ional caste”—that is pervasive, albeit in varying degrees of institutionalization, throughout 
American society.51 Accordingly, the abolition of slavery represented only the first step in a 
broader program of eliminating racial hierarchy. This racial component was coupled with a 
concern for gender equality as well; Garrison was outspoken throughout his career on the 
need to extend equal status and rights to women. Garrison pointedly opposed any claim to 
natural inequality that would justify or legitimate any social and political hierarchy. “I deny the 
postulate,” he states in an 1830 address, “that God has made, by an irreversible decree, or any inherent 
qualities, one portion of the human race superior to another.”52 By this logic, all inequality is contin-
gent and a product of social relations rather than the necessary and essential will of God and 
nature. Packed into Garrison’s argument is a critical edge by which every form of political 
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rule and human governance—how powers and positions are distributed within a commu-
nity—is robbed of any resort to natural or divine legitimacy that would otherwise insulate it 
from political contestation.53  
Garrison’s public denunciations of not only slavery but also inequality more generally 
set him apart from the main body of anti-slavery activists. His call for equality extended be-
yond a claim for civil equality—that is, the ownership of one’s body and labor—into more 
radical demands for national belonging and social equality across racial and gender lines.54 In 
his 1829 “Address to the American Colonization Society,” which featured many of the the-
matic elements that he would sustain and develop over the course of his life, Garrison ar-
gues, 
education and freedom will elevate our colored population to a rank with the 
white—making them useful, intelligent and peaceable citizens… A very large proportion of 
our colored population were born on our soil, and are therefore entitled to all the privileges 
of American citizens. This is their country by birth, not by adoption. Their children 
possess the same inherent and unalienable rights as ours, and it is a crime of the 
blackest dye to load them with fetters.55 
 
The language of black citizenship clarifies and enhances Garrison’s comments at the outset 
of The Liberator where he calls for the “immediate enfranchisement of our slave popula-
tion.”56 While the language of “enfranchisement” can be read narrowly as simply the end of 
formal slavery and the recognition of freedmen’s right to contract and sell their own labor, 
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Garrison’s comments before the Colonization Society make clear that this civil freedom is 
paired with the endowing of former slaves and their children with formal political member-
ship on terms equal to white citizens.57 The Garrison-penned “Declaration of Sentiments” of 
the American Anti-Slavery Society repeats the call for all persons, regardless of race, “to be 
admitted forthwith to the enjoyment of the same privileges, and the exercise of the same 
prerogatives, as others.”58 The extension of political standing directly counters the sentiment 
expressed in the Dred Scott decision that blacks cannot possibly become citizens. Indeed, 
Garrison recognizes blacks as constituent members of the American nation: “Why, their 
country is ours. They were born here. They are bone of our bone, and blood of our blood.”59 
The question of belonging and membership is a simple one for Garrison; all those born in 
the United States, regardless of their race or any other qualities, are due recognition as equal 
subjects as well as full standing to make claims on the polity. 
At the same time, he also recognizes the standing—and concomitant claim on politi-
cal power and authority—of women. “The natural rights of one human being are those of 
every other,” Garrison argued before the 1853 National Women’s Rights Convention, “in all 
cases equally sacred and inalienable.” He further clarifies the political privileges of women by 
saying they have the right to “the elective franchise—and to a voice in the administration of 
justice and the passage of laws for the general welfare.”60 Here Garrison highlights not only 
the practical terms in which he conceptualizes gender equality but also the foundational role 
he assigns public opinion in democratic politics. As much as elections are a means of chan-
neling and determining public opinion, it is necessary to secure voting rights—“the elective 
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franchise”—for all members of the political community. He remarks on this in a letter, writ-
ing, “As the right to private judgment in matters of religious faith is fundamental in Protes-
tantism, so is impartial and universal suffrage essential to the maintenance of a people’s gov-
ernment.”61 I will expand on Garrison’s position with respect to democracy and public opin-
ion, as well as the seeming contradiction between this value and his resistance to electoral 
politics later in Section Three. 
Although he advocated extending full political standing to women and freed slaves, 
Garrison curiously hesitated to make voting rights an essential component of abolition or 
what it meant to end slavery. This reluctance became especially clear following the passage 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, when Garrison moved to put an end to The Liberator and the 
American Anti-Slavery Society. While he successfully brought The Liberator to a close, Garri-
son’s position that the Society’s mandate was fulfilled ultimately failed to convince his fellow 
members.62 Yet even if Garrison believed the shared purpose of these enterprises—namely, 
“the extermination of chattel slavery”—to be formally complete, he was also aware of the 
continued need to combat inequality. He writes, “Though the chains of the captive have 
been broken, he is yet to be vindicated in regard to the full possession of equal civil and po-
litical rights.”63 This sentiment is repeated in his correspondence of the period, where he 
elaborates on the principle behind his declaration that abolition is accomplished. In an 1864 
letter to Francis William Newman, Garrison writes, “The abolition of slavery is first in order, 
and of paramount importance, before we begin to determine the exact political status of 
those set free. The elective franchise is a conventional, not a natural right; yet, the more it is 
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enjoyed in any community, as a general statement, the better for public safety and adminis-
trative justice.”64 Garrison defines abolition as a question of self-ownership and a natural or 
God-given right that is conceptually and normatively distinct from a conventional right such 
as voting that is created and bestowed by a political community. Yet, as he hints at in the 
epistolary passage above, Garrison recognizes that even if abolition has been a formal suc-
cess there is still much to be done. Writing in the final issue of The Liberator, he states, “I nei-
ther counsel others to turn away from the field of conflict, under the delusion that no more 
remains to be done, nor contemplate such a course in my own case.”65 
At least part of Garrison’s hesitation can be attributed to his understanding of the 
mechanics of political transformation. For Garrison, transformation of social mores must 
necessarily precede structural or institutional change. Absent an alteration in the web of sen-
timents, habits, and ideas, individuals or groups invested in the existing system of social mo-
res will oppose and undermine new laws and institutions. Later in his 1864 letter to New-
man, Garrison explicitly opposes the imposition of black suffrage through presidential fiat 
since he (quite perceptively) foresees prejudiced Southern whites using their political and 
financial resources to exclude blacks from the polls. “In other words,” he writes, “universal 
suffrage will be hard to win and to hold, without a general preparation of feeling and senti-
ment.”66 What must be changed is not (or not merely) governmental institutions and laws 
but the network of sensibilities and feelings that undergirds them and influences their practi-
cal realization. Therefore, while Garrison conceptualized abolition’s end in the self-
ownership and citizenship of blacks, this did not mean that he saw this as the horizon of re-
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form—rather, it was a necessary first condition that must be secured before the struggle for 
a robust political equality could be pursued. 
 Despite his refusal to build voting rights into the definition of abolition, Garrison 
was anomalous, even among critics of slavery, in his expansive embrace of social equality 
and inclusion. He championed the end of school segregation in Massachusetts and was one 
of two white speakers at a celebratory dinner held by black leaders in Boston when the prac-
tice terminated in 1855 (the other speaker being fellow Garrisonian Wendell Phillips). Yet 
this conception of equality found perhaps its most radical manifestation in Garrison’s persis-
tent advocacy of interracial marriage. As early as February 5, 1830, Garrison wrote in the Ge-
nius of Universal Emancipation, saying, “The time is to come when all the nations of the earth 
will intermarry, and all distinctions of color cease to divide mankind.”67 Later, when he be-
gan publishing The Liberator, Garrison continued this line of argumentation, calling for the 
“obliteration” of a Massachusetts law preventing interracial marriage, calling it “an invasion 
of one of the inalienable rights of every man, namely, ‘the pursuit of happiness’—disgraceful 
to the State—inconsistent with every principle of justice—and utterly absurd and preposter-
ous.”68 Similar articles appeared in the publication until 1843 when the state repealed the law.  
 By arguing against naturalized hierarchies and for a profound transformation of soci-
ety, the Garrisonians broke from the national consensus and were remarkably radical within 
the context of the broad and diverse abolitionist movement. The Garrisonian understanding 
of racial equality was particularly unpopular throughout the antebellum period (and would 
remain so well in to the twentieth century). Throughout the North racial prejudice and the 
belief in a social, political, and biological inequality between the races founded on a natural 
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ordering remained an article of nation-wide common sense.69 Faced with a field of political 
discourse and organized political interests hostile to his abolitionist project, Garrison con-
structed a forceful public performance by bringing together two popular traditions in the 
nineteenth-century American public sphere: democratic republicanism and evangelical Chris-
tianity. In the next section I turn more directly and closely to the workings—the how—of 
Garrisonian civil religious rhetoric. 
§ 3. “An Old and Well-Known Phrase” 
  
On the afternoon of July 4, 1854, the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society gathered at 
Harmony Grove, on the banks of Farm Pond in Framingham, Massachusetts for a day of 
picnicking and lectures. Over the course of the day a parade of speakers, including Henry 
David Thoreau, Lucy Stone, and Sojourner Truth, took the stage before the assembly of six 
hundred abolitionists and offered speeches on the political injustice, social ill, and moral sin 
of chattel slavery. It was early in the day when Garrison moved to the speaker’s platform. 
Two months before, at a meeting of the American Anti-Slavery Society, Garrison pro-
claimed that he “had no Constitution, no Union, no country, no Bible, no God, aside from 
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THE SLAVE.”70 Now on the annual celebration of the birth of his disavowed country and 
the writing of the Declaration of Independence—the one national document that he revered 
and cited with approval, frequently in tandem with the Bible—Garrison walked out on a 
platform that was draped in black. In the days prior to the Fourth of July meeting, a fugitive 
slave, Anthony Burns, had been forcefully returned from Massachusetts to Richmond and 
Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which opened the western territories to the insti-
tution of slavery. At the back of the raised platform hung the state insignia of Virginia 
marked with victory ribbons alongside the seal of Massachusetts with the phrase “Redeem 
Massachusetts” scrawled across it. Above the rostrum flew two white flags labeled “Kansas” 
and “Nebraska”; a portrait of Garrison stood defiantly between the two flags. And behind 
these was the flag of the United States, hung ignominiously upside down with a black crepe 
border.  
 After a solemn account of the continued contamination of the national soul by the 
evil of slavery and the confounding blindness that prevented Americans from recognizing all 
human beings as deserving the equal liberty promised in the Declaration, Garrison pro-
ceeded to read from the Bible. When he finished, he closed the book and lit a candle. Now, 
he said, he would “proceed to perform an action which would be testimony of his own soul, 
to all present, of the estimation in which he held the proslavery laws and deeds of the na-
tion.”71 With that, he produced a copy of the Fugitive Slave Law and put it to the candle 
flame. As the documents burned he instructed the audience to respond in the style of evan-
gelical revivalists and say “Amen,” ritualistically mirroring the form of Deuteronomy 27:15-
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26.72 This action was repeated for the judicial decision ordering Burns to be returned to Vir-
ginia and the charges against those who stormed the courthouse in an attempt to free Burns. 
When the fire consumed these papers, he then pulled out and held above his head a copy of 
the American Constitution. This, Garrison told the audience as he moved it into the flame, 
was “a covenant with death, an agreement with hell.... So perish all compromises with tyr-
anny! And let all the people say, Amen!” The paper curled and blackened and crumbled into 
ash, which Garrison promptly ground beneath his foot as the audience gave a final “Amen” 
before erupting into a roar of applause and a few scattered hisses. 
 The episode at Harmony Grove exemplifies several aspects of Garrison and his fiery 
brand of religious rhetoric that deserve further analytical parsing. Substantially, there are his 
commitment to the principles of the Founding as articulated in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and his vilification of the Constitution and the federal government’s continued 
complicity in the enterprise of southern slavery.73 The theatrical act of physically demolishing 
the Constitution dramatizes Garrison’s repudiation of half-measure compromises and the 
possibility of retaining a political unity in face of the continued existence of slavery. Such an 
immoderation was a staple of his public persona. He proclaimed his rejection of moderation 
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in the inaugural issue of The Liberator, writing, “I am aware, that many object to the severity 
of my language; but is there not cause for severity? I will be harsh as truth, and as uncom-
promising as justice. On this subject, I do not wish to think, or speak, or write, with modera-
tion. No! no!”74 Garrison’s pronounced hostility towards moderation is rooted in the ur-
gency and significance of the problem posed by slavery. This attitude stands in sharp con-
trast to the previous tone of anti-slavery advocates, who sought a gradual dissolution of the 
practice through methods of deliberation and compromise. Garrison frames slavery as a 
fundamental wrong that is grievous in itself and must be corrected immediately if the politi-
cal community is not to suffer the punishment meted out by both God and those who are 
currently enslaved. Considering these two dimensions of slavery (the intensity of the harm 
and the corresponding intensity of the impending judgment), Garrison rejects the path of 
compromise or moderation and instead takes up the language of confrontational prophecy in 
order to catalyze the process of redemption he sees as necessary to save the nation. 
Most accounts of Garrison’s speech foreground these aspects—especially his pro-
vocative burning of the Constitution—but neglect consideration of his use of religious rhet-
oric and ritual.75 The Christian religion not only manifests in the content of his speech—the 
reading from scripture, the language of damnation and redemption, the locating of God as 
the source of human equality—but also the form of his performance. Through the citation 
and performative mimesis of Deuteronomy and the hailing of the audience into a joint rejec-
tion of the nation’s foundational political text, Garrison staged his political protest with and 
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and through recognizably religious forms.76 The gestures and choreography of his perform-
ance tap into established evangelical rituals of call and response popularized most recently 
during the Second Great Awakening. In the biography of him written by his two children, 
for instance, Garrison is described as “using an old and well-known phrase” and enacting a 
“Lutheran incendiarism” that gestures at the iconic image of Martin Luther burning canon 
law and the papal order excommunicating him for heresy.77 This Christian theatricality reso-
nates with and accentuates the event’s carefully arranged iconography, which casts Massa-
chusetts and the Union as a whole as complicit in the practices of slavery. The force of the 
performance draws on this chain of associations—the effervescent energies of the Great 
Awakening and the reformative zeal of Luther—and overlays a call for political reconstitu-
tion (the preservation of society through directed transformation) with the moral gravity and 
pull of Christian redemption (the salvation of the nation from the sin of slavery).  
The day itself is also significant. The Fourth of July occupied a privileged place in the 
anti-slavery campaign. Two years prior to Garrison’s fiery performance at Harmony Grove, 
Frederick Douglass performed his famous speech “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?,” 
which vigorously condemned the hypocritical inconsistency in a nation celebrating principles 
of justice, liberty, and independence while simultaneously casting an entire population into 
slavery. So too the day recurs throughout the work and life of Garrison. On July 4, 1829, for 
instance, he spoke before the American Colonization Society (in a speech that contained the 
germs of why he broke with the group) and celebrated the principles underlying the holiday: 
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Fifty-three years ago, the Fourth of July was a proud day for our country. It clearly 
and accurately defined the rights of man; it made no vulgar alterations in the estab-
lished usages of society; it presented a revelation adapted to the common sense of 
mankind; it vindicated the omnipotence of public opinion over the machinery of 
kingly government; it shook, as with the voice of a great earthquake, thrones which 
were seemingly propped up with Atlantean pillars; it gave an impulse to the heart of 
the world, which yet thrills to its extremities…78 
 
The Fourth of July as a civic holiday celebrates a moment of divine “revelation” that is ar-
ticulated through the Declaration of Independence.79 What is striking, though, is the upshot 
of this revelation, which is not the omnipotence of God but rather “the omnipotence of 
public opinion” over and against monarchical forms of power.  
Strikingly, Garrison invokes the “omnipotence” and ultimate authority of public 
opinion rather than its infallibility. Indeed, he goes on, both in this same address and his 
abolitionist career, to emphasize that it is fallible and that the unthinking political attitudes of 
citizens and the institutionalized evil of slavery undermine the promise of the country’s 
founding principles.80 In an 1854 speech repudiating the principle of compromising with 
slavery, Garrison explains,  
My crime is that I will not go with the multitude to do evil. My singularity is that 
when I say that freedom is of God and slavery is of the devil, I mean just what I say. 
My fanaticism is that I insist on the American people abolishing slavery or ceasing to 
prate of the rights of man.81  
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80 In the second issue of The Liberator, for instance, Garrison offers a piece simply entitled “Truisms,” which 
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When read in conjunction with his sacralization of public opinion as not simply an omnipo-
tent force but also a divinely-inspired “revelation,” Garrison’s denunciation of the multitude 
as either morally blind or corrupt is striking. Garrison erects a bifurcated system of authority 
in which the people as a whole are all-powerful within the political realm but prone to moral 
corruption. On the other hand, while the divine does not possess any political power, it 
nonetheless is morally infallible. With this division of moral and political labor in place, Gar-
rison can celebrate the power of public opinion and ally himself with God (and divinely or-
dained principles of freedom) in a denunciation of the public as evil and sinful. 
 Here and elsewhere Garrison invokes the Declaration and the founding principles it 
embodies as critical leverage against slavery and the myriad inequalities that radiate out from 
it. Garrison positions himself as performing exactly this type of critique by innocently hold-
ing up America’s founding values and using these as the measure of its current practices. In 
one public statement, for instance, Garrison states: 
Before God, I must say, that such a glaring contradiction as exists between our creed 
and practice the annals of six thousand years cannot parallel. In view of it, I am 
ashamed of my country. I am sick of our unmeaning declamation in praise of liberty 
and equality; of our hypocritical cant about the inalienable rights of man.82  
 
Despite his claims at simply mirroring foundational American values to create productive 
dissonance, Garrison is, in a real sense, generating this tension by poetically re-imagining 
these commitments. While Garrison certainly evokes the Declaration against the Constitu-
tion and the principles of equality against hierarchy, he at the same time performs a selective 
revision of these foundational commitments. As Garrison construes it, the Declaration of 
Independence “presented a revelation adapted to the common sense of mankind” by defin-
ing the liberties and powers of each person as ordained by God and recognized by the politi-
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cal community. In this way, the Declaration becomes an instantiation—a political revela-
tion—of a divine principle of equality. Equality and freedom are not only core political 
commitments of republicanism but also are inflected with a divine authority and imperative. 
The language of a divine precept being “adapted” so as to be legible and, even more, obvi-
ous (self-evident) to a mortal audience is telling. Elsewhere Garrison characterized the Dec-
laration as “sublime” in so far as it articulated the principle of equality, which was “a noble 
sentiment, written by the finger of God in legible characters upon the heart of man.”83  
 This notion, as well as Garrison’s framing of slavery as a sin against the will and or-
der of God, taps into a tradition of natural law that elevates certain moral dictates or princi-
ples derived through reason or revelation as above human institutions and thus capable of 
being used to assess the legitimacy of laws and practices. This discourse of natural law—and 
slavery’s break with its tenets—appears clearly in his “Declaration of the National Anti-
Slavery Convention”: 
That all those laws, which are now in force, admitting the right of slavery, are therefore 
before God utterly null and void; being an audacious usurpation of the Divine preroga-
tive, a daring infringement on the law of nature, a base overthrow of the very founda-
tions of the social compact, a complete extinction of all the relations, endearments and 
obligations of mankind, and a presumptuous transgression of all the holy command-
ments—and that therefore they ought to be instantly abrogated.84 
Garrison draws from the natural law tradition within American political thought but devel-
ops it into a broader vision of the guilt of the nation and its need for redemption. By institu-
tionalizing and sustaining slavery, America violates the laws of nature and, in so doing, sins 
against the order of God. Importantly, Garrison attributes culpability for the sin of slavery 
beyond the confines of the South and actual slaveholders, and extends it to include those in 
the North: “So long as we continue one body—a union—a nation—the compact involves us 
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in the guilt and danger of slavery… We are guilty—all guilty—horribly guilty.”85 This shared 
guilt and responsibility is the framework for the majority of Garrison’s rhetorical efforts, and 
ultimately the public recognition of this guilt is his most immediate goal. He seeks to compel 
a collective realization, to startle those in the North who currently disavow their share in the 
maintenance of slavery into seeing their complicity.  
 Such a realization is catalyzed through Garrison’s prophetic performance and his 
rhetorical appropriation of the evangelical tradition of the jeremiad. The genre of the jere-
miad identifies the moral corruption of society and the sources of this decline, and highlights 
the necessity of remedying this situation by invoking the prospective punishment that will be 
reaped if this corruption is not given due attention and correction. As George Shulman ex-
plains, “By a jeremiad prophets narrate conduct as a decline from origins, to address a com-
munity about its constitutive commitments and current difficulties, to make its future con-
tingent on a ‘decision’ about its conduct… [P]rophets identify the fateful choices that form, 
endanger, and redeem their community.”86 The task of the prophet consists in forcing a col-
lective decision on fundamental moral matters that at once constitute and threaten the moral 
and social existence of a given group. Garrison appropriates the jeremiad to give form to the 
national sin of slavery and the resulting punishment that awaits not just the southern slave-
owners but also the whole of the United States. Through this illumination, Garrison con-
structs a tension between putative commitments and public opinion and practices with the 
aim of unsettling and transforming that opinion—compelling citizens to ruminate upon the 
issue and exercise judgment. 
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The tactical use of the jeremiad form appears in the first issue of The Liberator, in 
which Garrison published his poem “Universal Emancipation.” In the poem he paints a hor-
rific portrait of what will befall the country if the slaves are not liberated immediately 
through peaceful means: 
Wo if it [liberation] come with storm, and blood, and fire, 
When midnight darkness veils the earth and sky! 
Wo to the innocent babe—the guilty sire— 
Mother and daughter—friends of kindred tie! 
Stranger and citizen alike shall die! 
Red-handed Slaughter his revenge shall feed, 
And Havoc yell his ominous death-cry, 
And wild Despair in vain for mercy plead— 
While Hell itself shall shrink, and sicken at the deed!87 
 
Garrison poetically conflates God’s vengeance (the punishing elements and natural phenom-
ena) and the slaves’ bloody revenge upon not just those who owned them but also all those 
implicated in allowing for the domination to continue, including ostensibly innocent women 
and children. The motif of a looming punishment reappears most dramatically after the at-
tempted slave insurrection led by Nat Turner, when Garrison calls the rebellion’s bloodshed 
“but the prelude to a deluge from the gathering clouds.” The emancipatory violence under-
taken by Turner and his followers previewed the more devastating vengeance to be meted 
out eventually by God if the corruptive element of slavery was not eliminated. Only through 
such a dramatic social change could the nation be redeemed: “We shall cry, in trumpet tones, 
night and day,—Wo to this guilty land, unless she speedily repent of her evil doings! The 
blood of millions of her sons cries aloud for redress! IMMEDIATE EMANCIPATION can 
alone save her from the vengeance of Heaven, and cancel the debt of ages!”88 According to 
Garrison, the only way to avoid an apocalyptic judgment is through a process of redemption. 
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That is, the political community must become aware of the sin of slavery and immediately 
act to purge itself of relations of inequality and domination.  
 Through these simultaneous temporal gestures backward to the Founding and into 
the future of the seemingly inevitable apocalypse, Garrison brings about an unsettling and 
potentially transformative sense of untimeliness. Robert Fanuzzi points to “Garrison’s inten-
tion in conjuring the ghosts of Jefferson and Paine” in order to disrupt the antebellum public 
and “precipitate the awareness of a historical crisis among his contemporaries.”89 Through 
the conjuration of the country’s revolutionary past, Garrison demonstrates the incomplete-
ness and lingering on of this past—that, indeed, the revolutionary moment and its principles 
have not passed away or been realized in the existing social arrangement but continue to 
haunt the present and demand a re-constitution of the political community. What Fanuzzi 
neglects, however, is the rhetorical fusion Garrison performs between the political past (the 
Revolution) and the looming—though not immutable—apocalyptic future (the judgment).90 
By entwining these discourses, Garrison invests the revolutionary principle of equality with a 
renewed urgency and significance. The principle of equality exists not just as a political decla-
ration and a formative commitment of the civic community but also a manifestation of a 
transcendental order. This fusion invests the revolutionary past with a messianic promise 
that falls upon the present to bring into being with a national cataclysm as the price of fail-
ure. Antebellum America takes on a heightened, messianic significance; it must redeem the 
past and prevent the devastating judgment that looms if the social order is not fundamentally 
transformed so as to bring it into alignment with the principle of equality.  
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 Garrison’s framing fundamentally revises the traditional conception of America’s 
cosmic role and the place of the Constitution in this narrative. Whereas the Constitution was 
previously understood as a sacred compact—a divine covenant—that gives institutional 
form and integrity to the United States as a sanctified city on the hill and chosen people, 
Garrison positions it as the corruption of the political community. 91 The Constitution be-
comes the source of an evil and injustice that permeates the nation. According to Robert 
Abzug, Garrison  
re-created the evangelical drama of American society’s sin, declension, and possibility 
for renewal, and he reset its terms. The troublesome black population, slave and 
free...here shared the rights of all Americans and were the most aggrieved citizens in 
the land. The evangelical church...in this version was as lost in darkness on slavery as 
any group of Americans. The Constitution and American unity, which in the evan-
gelical drama constituted a divine presence to be protected and nurtured, in Garri-
son’s view hypocritically shackled the slave ever tighter.92 
 
Far from being a “sacred” covenant, Garrison’s vision of the Constitution portrays it as “the 
most bloody and heaven-daring arrangement ever made by men for the continuance and 
protection of a system of the most atrocious villainy ever exhibited on earth.”93 For Garrison 
the Constitution is the enabling condition of the nation’s sin inasmuch as it provides the in-
stitutional order necessary for the flourishing of the slave system.94 If a renewal of the politi-
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cal community is to be achieved and the sin of slavery successfully purged, the nation must 
be fundamentally re-constituted. Such a re-constitution could be achieved through, on the 
one hand, significantly altering the present document through a new constitutional conven-
tion or amendments (which was unlikely given the power of the slaveholding bloc of states) 
or, on the other, secession and the separation of the free states in the Union from the slave 
states. In any scenario, though, the Constitution must be fundamentally altered in order to 
end slavery.95 
§ 4. The Politics of Garrison’s Civil Religious Poetics 
 
In his respected biography of Garrison, John Thomas presents Garrison as eschew-
ing democratic politics because of his rejection of both candidates in the 1836 presidential 
election: “Faced with a decision that involved choosing the lesser of two evils—a cardinal 
rule in democratic politics—Garrison refused to take the step which he believed an aban-
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donment of principle. In thus committing his followers to a boycott of elections he was in 
effect challenging the democratic process.”96 Thomas is far from alone in this characteriza-
tion of Garrison as working outside the “democratic process” and replacing politics with 
morality—Garrison was frequently tarred with the label of apolitical or anti-political given 
his emphasis on moral suasion and his rejection of party politics, voting, and the Constitu-
tion.97 Yet Thomas and others move too quickly from Garrison’s avoidance of institutional 
politics to the conclusion that he challenges democracy or is acting apolitically. Such a posi-
tion rests on the problematic premise that the field of democratic politics is exhausted by 
electoral or partisan politics. As a method for the “reeducation of the moral sentiments,” 
moral suasion aims at transforming public opinion rather than challenging laws directly or 
building formal political parties.98 
 By relying upon the rhetorical touchstone of the Declaration of Independence as 
well as a dramatically fanatical tone and religious language and forms, Garrison’s perform-
ances sought to unsettle and startle its audience into re-examining their commitments, prac-
tices, and sensibilities. In order to break through the obfuscating moderation of deliberate 
political language, Garrison indulged, as fellow radical abolitionist Wendell Phillips explains, 
“in fierce denunciations, instead of appealing to [the audience’s] reason and common sense 
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by plain statement and fair argument.”99 What Phillips points to is a purposefully non-
deliberative practice of political discourse. Such non-deliberative and impassioned forms of 
claims making were far from rare in the rather raucous and frequently riotous public sphere 
of the antebellum period.100 Rather than partake in dispassionate deliberation, Garrison and 
other abolitionists operated in diverse registers of public engagement meant to reconfigure 
the dense network of ideas and sensibilities in their audience. In their justifications for an 
inflammatory and provocative mode of engagement, Phillips and Garrison consistently in-
voked “the enormity” of the crime in question that “has grown monstrous” and threatens to 
destroy the entire political community.101  
The monstrosity and enormity of slavery, though, is not simply a matter of the inten-
sity of its violence and its transgression of the divine principle of freedom. The true horror 
of slavery stems from its subtle but pervasive corruption of social mores throughout the na-
tion. According to Garrison, slavery is more than a socio-economic institution or a particular 
distribution of roles and powers; as much as it entailed a denial of liberty and equality, slav-
ery constituted a national sin and evil, but this sinful institution was bound up in a particular 
configuration of citizens’ sensibilities. He explains this operation, writing, “The wrong as-
sailed has grown to a colossal size: its existence not only implies, but demonstrates, universal 
corruption. It has become organic—a part of the habits and customs of the times. It is incorporated 
into the State; it is nourished by the Church. Its support is the test of loyalty, patriotism, pi-
ety.”102 The modes and manners of the citizenry—its “habits and customs”—bear the influ-
                                                
99 Wendell Phillips, “Philosophy of the Abolition Movement,” in Against Slavery: An Abolitionist Reader, edited by 
Mason Lowance (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 246. 
100 See Kimberly K. Smith, The Dominion of Voice: Riot, Reason, and Romance in Antebellum Politics (Lawrence: Uni-
versity of Kansas, 1999). 
101 See ibid., 246; Garrison, Letters, Vol. I, 229-30, 439; and The Liberator, April 26, 1839. 
102 The Liberator, December 21, 1855. Emphasis added. 
86 
ence of this corruptive social institution.103 The American experience with slavery, Garrison 
argues, has cultivated a particular configuration of these sensibilities that occludes moral rec-
ognition of blacks and critical evaluation of slavery and inequality.104 In order to get his pro-
ject of sweeping social, political, and religious reform off the ground, Garrison works to con-
front and alter these established sensibilities. If the common sense of society is shaped and 
influenced by the institution of slavery, any effort to abolish slavery must inevitably chal-
lenge common sense or work to reconfigure these elements in order to cultivate an infrasen-
sible environment hospitable to reform. Such a reformation requires, first of all, a certain 
form of infidelity and an uncompromising resistance to the established terms and modes of 
political deliberation that have been influenced by the extant system of power relations. That 
is, it must break from existing practices and frameworks of thought and speech and seem, by 
the light of the extant common sense, as “fanatical, insane, destructive, treasonable, infi-
del.”105  
 The principle of public engagement Garrison articulates and enacts through his re-
pudiation of “fair argument” is explicitly agonistic. Garrison explains this logic in a letter to 
William Ladd, founder of the American Peace Society, which he reprinted in the pages of 
The Liberator: 
You do not understand the philosophy of reform. If you would make progress, you 
must create opposition; if you would promote peace on earth, array the father against 
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the son, and the mother against the daughter; if you would save your reputation, lose 
it. It is a gospel paradox, but nevertheless true—the more peaceable a man becomes, 
after the pattern of Christ, the more he is inclined to make a disturbance, to be ag-
gressive, to ‘turn the world upside down.’106 
 
The “gospel paradox” that Garrison describes brings together, on the one hand, a commit-
ment to non-resistance and peaceful engagement and, on the other, forceful language that 
seeks purposefully to disrupt the existing social order. This philosophy of reform thus ori-
ents political performance towards cultivating antagonisms that can then be mobilized for 
political change. The fracturing of the community into adversarial divisions puts into ques-
tion its common sense and that which was formerly taken for granted. The social world, per 
Garrison, needs to be turned “upside down” so that the subterranean network of assump-
tions and feelings comes to light and becomes the site of struggle. 
 For Garrison, then, the reformation of social mores must occur outside the existing 
institutional framework of politics. It is because of this stance and his injunction against 
forming a political party, holding office, or even voting that he is often presented as com-
pletely (and problematically) removed from the political world. Yet Garrison carefully pitch-
es this mode of engagement as not anti- or a-political but rather political in a particular 
sense:  
Once more, I beg not to be misapprehended. I have always expected, I still expect, 
to see abolition at the ballot-box, renovating the political action of the country—
dispelling the sorcery influences of party—breaking asunder the fetters of political 
servitude—stirring up the torpid consciences of voters—substituting anti-slavery for 
pro-slavery representatives in every legislative assembly—modifying and rescinding 
all laws which sanction slavery. But this political reformation is to be effected solely by a change 
in the moral vision of the people—not by attempting to prove that it is the duty of every abolitionist 
to be a voter, but that it is the duty of every voter to be an abolitionist.107  
 
The preliminary step towards any political change, Garrison makes clear, is to alter “the 
moral vision of the people” and bring into view the profound wrong constituted by slavery 
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and their own complicity in this practice.108 Garrison’s arsenal of moral suasion, including his 
emphatic language, uncompromising stance and prophetic rhetoric, are the means he con-
siders necessary to achieve this readjustment of moral vision or sensibility.  
 When successful, the effect of Garrison’s performance was akin to a conversion and 
indeed, was interpreted as such by those who experienced it.109 Unitarian minister Samuel J. 
May attended a lecture performed by Garrison on October 15, 1830 and likened the experi-
ence to a religious revelation. In his memoirs, May later described Garrison as “a prophet,” 
saying, “He only had his eyes so anointed that he could see that outrages perpetuated upon 
Africans were wrongs done to our common humanity; he only, I believe, had his ears so 
completely unstopped of ‘prejudice against color’ that the cries of enslaved black men and 
black women sounded to him as if they came from brothers and sisters.”110 In this autobio-
graphical account May narrates a fundamental change in sensibility—a road to Damascus 
moment. Garrison’s performance opens the spectators’ eyes and ears to the long ignored or 
unrecognized presence of African Americans and the wrong that is their exclusion and en-
slavement.  
 At the same time Garrison weaves his public persona and performance from relig-
ious materials drawn from the Christian tradition, he actively works to undermine and desta-
bilize the existing terms of political and religious authority. Indeed, a subversive indetermi-
nacy threads throughout his claims and undergirds his position both on the social order and 
religious interpretation. In his criticism of slavery and institutional politics, Garrison com-
bines an absolute equality of persons with a presumption of power’s corruptive nature. As 
                                                
108 Garrison, Letters 2: 481. 
109 Consider, e.g., this hyperbolic passage from Phillips: “We never argue! These men, then, were converted by 
simple denunciation! They were all converted by the ‘hot,’ ‘reckless,’ ‘ranting,’ ‘bigoted,’ ‘fanatic’ Garrison, who 
never troubled himself about facts, nor stopped to argue with an opponent, but straightway knocked him 
down” (249). 
110 Samuel J. May, Some Recollections of Our Antislavery Conflict (Boston, 1869), 19. Quoted in Abzug, 153. 
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discussed above, Garrison develops a cosmological account of human equality that finds 
voice—or revelation—not just in the Christian tradition but also the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. This founding notion of equality is coupled with a profound skepticism towards 
claims of authority. Like other of his contemporary evangelicals who came of age during the 
Second Great Awakening, Garrison’s notion of authority was informed by a Protestant ethos 
that was “suspicious of power and its potential for corruption in human hands, where it 
could so easily work against God’s designs.”111 On the one hand, the principle of equality 
reveals the contingency of elaborate hierarchies in all political regimes, social orders, and re-
ligious authority; in the absence of any ordering principle within society, claims of authority 
can only be conventional and thus contestable and transformable. On the other, if power is 
known to tend towards corruption, members of communities—whether religious or politi-
cal—must exercise constant vigilance and judgment over those endowed with authority. 
 Garrison assumes a similarly skeptical approach in his relationship to religious inter-
pretation and theological texts. Even as he imbues his rhetorical and performative presenta-
tion with religious idioms, Garrison remained, on the one hand, acutely aloof and critical of 
religious institutions and, on the other, dismissive of a passive acceptance of the biblical text. 
He presents both the church and the scripture as human artifacts that, while standing as me-
diators between believer and divinity, are subject to the corruptive and fallible character of 
humanity. According to Garrison, there is neither an ultimate interpreter nor an unproblem-
atic or transparent scripture; this rejects both the Catholic notion of an authoritative meditat-
ing institution (the church) and the Lutheran privileging of a specific and authoritative text 
(the Bible). As he wrote in the context of defending women’s rights, “The Bible has never 
yet settled any question. It has filled the world with theological discussions, growing out of 
                                                
111 Clark, 189. 
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the various interpretations given to the book. The human soul is greater than any book. If 
there is truth in the Bible, we take it; if error, we discard it.”112 Given Garrison’s frequent use 
of biblical examples, his personal religious conviction, and his more general reliance on relig-
ion for argumentative resources, this selective treatment of the religious text—seemingly tak-
ing what is useful for his agenda and discarding what is not—is curious. At first glance it also 
seems particularly at odds with his rhetorical use of the Declaration of Independence, which 
Garrison extols as revelatory and a profound (and accurate) expression of God’s principle of 
equality. Yet here again—as with his radically egalitarian claim that there is no natural or di-
vine legitimation for social inequality—Garrison reveals an anarchistic edge to his principle 
of equality. 
The biblical text and religious institutions are, as any and all human enterprise, 
flawed and, as such, they—like the social order or political regime—can fall short of the di-
vine principle of equality. In a largely positive review of a collection of Tom Paine’s theo-
logical thought, Garrison explains: 
To say that everything contained within the lids of the bible is divinely inspired, and 
to insist upon the dogma as fundamentally important, is to give utterance to a bold 
fiction, and to require the suspension of the reasoning faculties. To say that every-
thing in the bible is to be believed, simply because it is found in that volume, is 
equally absurd and pernicious… To discard a portion of scripture is not necessarily 
to reject the truth, but may be the highest evidence that one can give of his love to 
truth.113 
 
If humans are flawed and corrupt and the biblical text is an artifact of human production—
even if these humans are merely functioning as mediators to the divine—this necessarily 
opens it to skepticism and the prospect that the text deviates from the divine will. In this 
way Garrison grounds a principle of textual infidelity upon a claim of religious and epistemic 
fidelity. Put differently, to conform to the demands of their faith (properly understood), 
                                                
112 The Liberator, January 12, 1855. 
113 The Liberator, November 21, 1845. 
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Christians must be willing to depart from the strict letter of the Bible. The discovery of 
God’s will demands a reader to not passively consume the Bible wholly and literally—or pas-
sively defer to the interpretive claims of institutions and authorities—but scrutinize it in light 
of foundational religious principles and exercise judgment.  
 The intervention Garrison makes in this textual or interpretive struggle allows him to 
undermine an overtly biblical—that is, text-based—defense of slavery and shore up a more 
elusive Christianity located in the realm of sensibility. There is an undisputable tactical ele-
ment here since pro-slavery advocates who advanced religious arguments primarily did so 
through a literalist exegetical approach to scripture.114 “It is to be examined with same free-
dom as any other book, and taken precisely for what it is worth,” Garrison writes. “To know 
what it teaches, men must not stultify themselves, nor be made irrational by a blind homage. 
Their reason must be absolute in judgment, and act freely, or they cannot know the truth.”115 
Rather than simply dismiss the entire text (as Paine does), Garrison offers the position that it 
is only when these texts (the Bible, the Declaration of Independence) and institutions (the 
church, the state) are judged according to reason to align with the transcendent order and 
recognize all persons as equal, rights bearing members that they are due respect and author-
                                                
114 These defenders of slavery rattled off a sizable body of biblical passages demonstrating the divine sanction 
of slavery, including the story of Canaan (Genesis 9:25-27), Abraham’s ownership of slaves (Genesis 17.12), 
and enslavement of Israel’s enemies (Deuteronomy 20:10-11). Similarly, in the New Testament, defenders of 
slavery highlighted Paul’s approving stance on the subject of servants and obedience. Besides pointing to these 
particular passages, pro-slavery advocates argued that despite living within the Roman Empire and thus being 
familiar with the formal practice of slavery Jesus Christ never said anything against the practice of slaveholding. 
These sections of scriptures were fused with a racial theory identifying blacks as naturally and divinely fit for 
servitude. From this, pro-slavery advocates argued for the moral and religious legitimacy of slavery, with more 
moderate supporters only going so far as to claim the institution morally neutral. Even in this latter case, slave-
holding could be moral as long as the master behaved in appropriate ways—with these behaviors, of course, 
described in scripture. 
 An impressive secondary literature has developed over the biblical defenses of slavery in the antebellum 
period. See, e.g., Mark A. Noll, The Civil War as a Theological Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2006); McKivigan, The War Against Proslavery Religion: Abolitionism and the Northern Churches, 1830-1865; and 
Eugene D. Genovese, “Slavery Ordained of God”: The Southern Slaveholders’ View of Biblical History and Modern Politics 
(Gettysburg: Gettysburg College, 1985). 
115 Ibid. 
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ity. Garrison stops short, however, of completely dissolving the authoritative power of the 
scriptural text. True, Garrison argues that the Bible should not be thought to be the literal 
and unadorned word of God as pro-slavery advocated and many orthodox Christians in-
sisted. 116 Likewise, he refuses to countenance the possibility of a theodicy that eliminates 
politics in the name of scriptural authority and the privileging of certain scriptural interpret-
ers. Nonetheless the Bible and the Declaration of Independence were pivotal texts for Garri-
son. They are both, as he says, revelations of a divine will and as such are touchstones that 
must be recognized and given due place in the moral community of the United States. The 
way Garrison evokes the texts and the constellation of images and references orbiting 
around them, however, reveals that their centrality is paired with a resistance to interpretive 
closure. Divine truth must always be translated—“adapted”—to speak to the common sense 
of mankind while also transforming it.   
Conclusion 
 
Over the course of this chapter I have developed an account of the poetics of Amer-
ican civil religion. As opposed to existing approaches that conceptualize civil religion as a 
static body of beliefs and practices springing either from the nature of society or the will of 
political elites, my framework centers on acts of citizen claims making. Bringing into view 
the capaciousness of civil religious rhetoric and the potential for instances of innovative po-
etic practice within it, relocates authority from an abstract social entity or established elites to 
citizen subjects. One upshot of the openness of this modality of political presentation is that, 
                                                
116 For staking out this claim Garrisons were widely charged as infidels and irreligious. Consider this typical 
passage, written by George Fitzhugh: “Liberty, infidelity, and abolition, are three words conveying but one idea. 
Infidels who dispute the authority of God will not respect or obey the government of man. Abolitionists, who 
make war upon slavery, instituted by God and approved by Holy Writ, are in a fair way to denounce the Bible 
that stands in the way of the attainment of their purpose.” See Sociology for the South: Or the Failure of Free Society 
(Richmond: A. Morris, 1854); the rhetorical charge of infidelity against abolitionists is also discussed in Mitchell 
Snay, Gospel of Disunion: Religion and Separatism in the Antebellum South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 53-77. 
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properly speaking, there is no single civil religion or structural form of civil religion in Amer-
ica. What is present in the United States, by contrast, is a poetic politics embedded in a relig-
iously infused citizenry.  
If we follow Whitman in seeing religion as a poetic form—one open to creative re-
working that in turn can be used to creatively revise a polity’s conception of the world and 
way of life—then American civil religion becomes one key vector by which social actors can 
attempt to transform the constitution of the political community. Here of course I speak not 
of the formalized constitutional order of the United States but rather the social mores and 
common sense of the American people that, in turn, can offer or withhold consent to the 
organization and operation of the state. A civil religious poetics, then, not only operates, as 
Garrison demonstrates, to provide novel shades of moral meaning to political ideas but also 





“THEIR BLOOD CRIES OUT”:  
RELIGIOUS ZEALOTRY AND THE FANATICAL MODES OF  
DEMOCRATIC DISSENT IN AMERICA 
 
 
“And what is a fanatic but a madman?” 
— Thomas Hobbes, 
“An Answer to a Book  
Published by Dr. Bramhall”1 
 
“It was the wild-eyed prophesies of John Brown, his will-
ingness to spill blood and not just words on behalf of his 
visions, that helped force the issue of a nation half slave 
and half free.” 
— Barack Obama,  
The Audacity of Hope2 
 
William Lloyd Garrison and his followers were frequently tarred with the pejorative 
label of fanatics. One representative polemic against Garrison’s brand of abolitionism pro-
claimed, “Fanaticism, perhaps, never assumed a more dangerous form than that it now pre-
sents in the United States. It is waging a direct, inveterate warfare against the Constitution 
and the Union… Its principles have a direct tendency to civil and servile war—to rapine, 
murder, and pollution.”3 The danger of abolitionist fanaticism, the article explains, is two-
fold. At least by the lights of pro-slavery advocates, Garrison’s anti-constitutionalism and 
principle of racial equality seem posed to bring about an anarchic interracial society that will 
give license to the violent passions they ascribe to persons of color. In addition to the danger 
posed by the substance of Garrison’s principles, the article also recoils from the fanatical
                                                
1 Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Vol. 4, edited by Sir William Molesworth 
(London: John Bohn, 1840), 328. 
2 Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (New York: Vintage, 2006), 116. 
3 “The Conspiracy of Fanaticism,” The United States Magazine, and Democratic Review (May 1850), 26. 
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form of his political action, which explicitly threads together political polemic and religious 
materials and possesses a recalcitrant tone that seems to herald a violent confrontation over 
the question of slavery. For their part, Garrisonians proudly affirmed the title of fanatic, thus 
avowing their status as steadfast critics who would vigorously resist and decry practices of 
inequality and domination regardless of the national consensus. Yet for all his intellectual 
flirtations with violence, Garrison patently refused to justify or practice physical violence. 
John Brown, by contrast, joined his resistance to slavery and his religious rhetoric with a 
willingness to resort to militant and aggressive action. Because of his use of physical vio-
lence, Brown dramatizes in a more powerful and visceral fashion than Garrison the fraught 
twining together of religion and aggressive political action that marks the figure of the relig-
ious fanatic in the popular imaginary. For this reason Brown offers a compelling invitation to 
reflect on the place of religious zealotry in the democratic culture of the United States.4 
John Steuart Curry’s famous mural “Tragic Prelude” vividly captures Brown’s dis-
comfiting entanglement of Christianity, violence, and politics. The painting depicts Brown 
posed within the war-torn Midwestern landscape as the vibrant manifestation of Niccolò 
Machiavelli’s militarized Moses, one epitomizing the notion that “all the armed prophets 
                                                
4 While I return to this question further on in the chapter, I want to be clear from the beginning that violence is 
neither a definitional nor necessary feature of a fanatic. Fanaticism may or may not involve recourse to vio-
lence. In this respect it differs conceptually from terrorism, which is the tactical use of violence with a purpose 
to create fear in a particular population. As the article attacking Garrisonian fanaticism demonstrates, there is a 
frequent connection made between fanaticism and violence that can be traced back to the anticipation that 
enthusiasm, passion, and certainty causes or at least tends towards violent action when met with external resis-
tance or opposition. The move to violence, however, is not an essential part of fanaticism or religious fanati-
cism. 
 For diverse approaches to the relationship between religion and violence, see From Jeremiad to Jihad: Religion, 
Violence, & America, edited by John D. Carlson and Jonathan H. Ebel (Berkley: University of California Press, 
2012); The Blackwell Companion to Religion and Violence, first edition, edited by Andrew R. Murphy (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011); Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, Third Edition 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 2003); and Hent de Vries, Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives 
from Kant and Derrida (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2002). While these works interrogate this 
connection with due nuance and consideration, others adopt analytical frameworks that are reductive and flat-
footed to the point of articulating patently absurd assertions such as “the purpose of religion is to organize 
killing energy.” Carolyn Marvin and David W. Engle, Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and the American 
Flag (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 10. 
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conquered and the unarmed ones were ruined.”5 With a Bible in one bloodied hand and a 
Sharpe rifle in the other, Curry’s rendering of Brown connects the man’s profound Calvinist 
faith and his abolitionist violence, implicitly staging the former as legitimizing the latter. The 
body of Brown—his arms outstretched as if crucified—stands centered, forming the nexus 
point between the dead soldiers at his feet, the warring Unionists and Confederates on either 
side, and a roaring conflagration of flame and wind behind. Simultaneously awesome and 
horrifying, the painting gestures at how Brown tracks at once the hopes and anxieties of the 
democratic imagination, enacting an egalitarian, racially inclusive community but through 
troubling and fanatical means. 
In this chapter I open up a space for rethinking religious fanaticism and argue that 
the dominant understandings of religious zealotry are incomplete, both in their conception 
of fanaticism and its place in a democratic society. Rather than adopt the position that fa-
naticism cannot be accommodated within the framework of democratic politics, I seek to 
analyze how the enactment of religious fanaticism relates to matters of citizenship, participa-
tion, and political action in a democratic order such as the United States. I argue that relig-
ious fanaticism must be approached as, first and foremost, a story of politics, and that the 
complex figure of the fanatic reveals the limits and risks inherent to democratic politics. I am 
not interested here in normatively redeeming religious fanatics and rendering them somehow 
more pleasant.6 The upshot of the chapter is not that we should suspend criticism of relig-
                                                
5 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, Second Edition, translated by Harvey C. Mansfield (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1998), 24. 
6 For normative philosophical and theological reflections on the ethics of fanaticism, see Incredible Forgiveness: 




ious fanatics; instead, I want to facilitate a more productive practice of critique grounded in a 
richer understanding of how religious fanaticism works politically and aesthetically. 7  
Over the course of the chapter I develop an understanding of religious zealotry as 
the excessive and exacting enactment of faith. A religious fanatic undertakes a public per-
formance that is simultaneously a conspicuous religio-ethical practice and a radical political 
action. My framework focuses on how the religious fanatic is a figure of righteous uncommon 
sense; that is, a person who dramatically acts and talks in ways outside the domain of accept-
ability carved out by social hegemony and who constructs both his public identity and his 
spectacular deviation from social norms with and through inherited religious materials. Relig-
ious traditions offer not only sets of justificatory arguments and personal motivational ener-
gies for fanatics but also the rhetorical idioms and performative resources through which 
they can stage confrontations with a community’s social mores.  
I proceed by first surveying how religious fanaticism has been pathologized in politi-
cal theory and made to mark the constitutive outside of acceptable political and psychologi-
cal practice. I then build from the innovative work of Joel Olson and other theorists in order 
to move beyond the terms of the liberal-deliberative paradigm. After establishing this con-
ceptual ground, I delve into the particular cases of Brown and Randall Terry, founder of the 
anti-abortion organization Operation Rescue, in order to illuminate how their public per-
formances leveraged strains of Christian religious traditions in order to unsettle what they 
saw as unjust systems of exclusions and violence.8 Drawing on my interpretations of Brown 
                                                
7 In this respect my understanding of critique tracks that of Saba Mahmood. “Critique,” Mahmood writes, “is 
most powerful when it leaves open the possibility that we might be remade in the process of engaging another’s 
worldview, that we might come to learn things that we did not already know before we undertook the engage-
ment. This requires that we occasionally turn the critical gaze upon ourselves, to leave open the possibility that 
we may be remade through an encounter with the other.” Saba Mahmood, The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival 
and the Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 36-37. 
8 Throughout this discussion, I use the terminology of “anti-abortion” to refer to the ideological position of 
Terry and Operation Rescue. Given the fraught and polemical nature of labels in the abortion discussion—i.e., 
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and Terry, I close by returning to the conceptual task of theorizing religious fanaticism as a 
manner of public performance. I articulate an account of religious zealotry that distinguishes 
it from religious fundamentalism and locates its generative power in its apparent excesses, 
which possess the potential to disrupt hegemonic modes of thinking, feeling, and acting. 
§ 1. Fanaticism as Political Pathology 
 Before delving into the specific examples of Brown and Terry, it is necessary to first 
survey the conceptual terrain and the operative conceptions of religious fanaticism within 
political and theoretical discourse. While space constraints prevent a full and careful review 
of these discursive formations, my account highlights how fanaticism has historically been 
either explicitly or implicitly de-politicized and pathologized. 
Especially in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, scholars and social observ-
ers have frequently lumped together religious zealotry with fundamentalism, strong religion, 
and terrorism and juxtaposed this constellation of concepts to liberal democracy. Indeed, as 
philosopher Yolande Jansen suggests, much of the persistent liberal-secularist handwringing 
over religion in the public sphere can be seen as springing from anxieties not over religion in 
a general sense but rather religious fanaticism.9 Consider, for instance, the theoretical frame-
work of the ‘clash of the civilizations,’ a phrase coined by Bernard Lewis and popularized by 
Samuel Huntington. According to Lewis and Huntington, the salient conflicts in the con-
temporary world no longer track national or political divides but rather civilizations and cul-
                                                                                                                                            
prolife, prochoice, pro-death, anti-choice, etc.—I believe this to be the most precise and dispassionate language 
for the present discussion. Also, it should be said that by bringing together the abolitionism of Brown and the 
anti-abortion campaign of Terry I am not establishing an equivalence or unproblematic parallelism to these two 
movements (even as members of the anti-abortion movement construct themselves as modern day analogues 
to nineteenth century abolitionists). 
9 Yolande Jansen, “Postsecularism, piety and fanaticism: Reflections on Jürgen Habermas’ and Saba Mah-
mood’s critiques of secularism,” Philosophy Social Criticism 37:9 (2011): 977-998. 
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tures, with the major clash occurring between the modern West and Islam.10 Other observ-
ers, however, have seized upon this framing and expanded it so as to characterize an existen-
tial battle between secular democracy and “strong religion.”11 Writing in the Nation, Ellen 
Willis argues, “[T]he ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis [is] half right. There is a clash, but it is not 
between East and West. The struggle of democratic secularism, religious tolerance, individ-
ual freedom and feminism against authoritarian patriarchal religion, culture and morality is 
going on all around the world.”12 The implication (and, at times, explicit argument) of these 
related positions is that strong religion—as exemplified in contemporary discussions typically 
by Islamic fundamentalism and elements of the Christian Right—is atavistic, intolerant, to-
talitarian, and anti-democratic.  
The paired concepts of fanaticism and zealotry recur throughout the canonical works 
of western political thought. Like specters, they are the uncivil excesses that haunt a norma-
tive tradition that has sought to exorcise them in order to produce a rational and relatively 
peaceful civil order.13 Fanaticism and its associated concepts mark, by turns, the social dan-
ger of passion, a psychological pathology, and a political disease. Such a conception mirrors 
the conventional usage of the term in Christian theological discourse, where it referred pejo-
ratively to heterodox religious formations and ostensibly deviant forms of faith that threat-
ened established religious institutions and traditions. In order to begin to understand these 
concepts, consider these entries in the Oxford English Dictionary: 
                                                
10 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World (New York: Simon & Schus-
ter, 1996), 95-101. 
11 I take the language of “strong religion” from George A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, 
Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms Around the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).  
12 Ellen Willis, “Bringing the Holy War Home: There is a Link Between Our Own Cultural Conflicts and the 
Logic of Jihad,” Nation, 17 December 2001, 15. Barbara Ehrenreich offers a similar binary between punitive 
religious fundamentalisms and “liberatory” culture in “Christian Wahhabists,” Progressive 66 (January 2002): 12-
13. 
13 For a superb account of the interrelationship of the concepts of civil society and fanaticism—particularly 
how they have been consistently imagined in opposition to one another—see Dominique Colas, Civil Society and 
Fanaticism: Conjoined Histories, translated by Amy Jacobs (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). 
  
 100 
Fanatic: (1) A mad person. In later use: a religious maniac. Obs.; (2) A fanatic person; 
a visionary; an unreasoning enthusiast. Applied in the latter half of the 17th c to Non-
conformists as a hostile epithet… Of persons, their actions, attributes, etc.: Charac-
terized, influenced, or prompted by excessive and mistaken enthusiasm, esp. in relig-
ious matters. 
 
Zealot: (1) Member of a Jewish sect which aimed at a Jewish theocracy over the earth 
and fiercely resisted the Romans till the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. (2) One who is 
zealous or full of zeal; one who pursues his object with passionate ardor; usually in 
disparaging sense, one who is carried away by excess zeal; an immoderate partisan, a 
fanatical enthusiast…14 
 
Though of course reflecting certain subtle shifts in meaning over time, these definitions 
point to fanaticism and zealotry—two terms that I will use interchangeably—as sharing a 
core concern regarding the overwhelming power of passion or enthusiasm that hinders 
proper reasoning and results in immoderate or unorthodox behavior. At least in their etymo-
logical roots, the uncanny passion or certainty indicated by these concepts is traced back to a 
religious source, though contemporary usage has now broadened the terms to the point 
where even overtly secular pursuits and commitments can give rise to behavior labeled as 
zealotry and fanaticism—see, for example, environmentalism and the Philadelphia Eagles.  
 Within the western philosophical tradition, there has been a longstanding effort to 
contain, if not eliminate, the formation of these immoderate passions.15 While a full historical 
                                                
14 “Fanatic” and “Zealot,” Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com (accessed on November 9, 2012). Consider 
also: “Fanaticism: (1) The condition of being, or supposing oneself to be, possessed. Obs. (2) The tendency to 
indulge in wild and extravagant notions, esp. in religious matters; excessive enthusiasm, frenzy… eagerness or 
enthusiasm in any pursuit.” 
15 While the roots of the philosophical campaign to police the public domain and human mind to prevent fa-
natical influence can be traced back to Plato’s diminishment of the appetitive and passionate elements in the 
Republic, the struggle reached its apotheosis during the European Enlightenment. In his magisterial work A 
Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), Charles Taylor points to the constellation of terms 
that emerged during the eighteenth century and constituted the Enlightenment discussion on religion and poli-
tics: 
Three kinds of dangerous religion were categorized as “superstition”, “fanaticism”, and “enthusiasm”. The 
first designated the enchanted dimension of religion, the rites and cults and practices which partook of 
magic in their understanding… ‘Fanaticism’ designated the kind of religious certainty that seemed to the 
agent concerned to licence going well beyond, and even committing gross violations against the order of 
mutual benefit. While ‘enthusiasm’ meant the certainty that one heard the voice of God, and could act on 
it, without having to rely on external authority, ecclesiastical or civil. (239) 
Curiously, David Hume stands apart from this tradition of simply rejecting all variants of “dangerous religion” 
in so far as he recognizes some felicitous political role for enthusiasm. While judging enthusiasm to be a cor-
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survey of this effort is beyond the scope of this chapter, a brief consideration of Thomas 
Hobbes clarifies one dominant understanding of the issue, even if his programmatic remedy 
is idiosyncratic. In his response to a rather harsh review of Leviathan, Hobbes paused to clar-
ify his conception of divine inspiration or revelation. All theological notions of divine inspi-
ration, he explains, should be understood not literally but rather metaphorically, as God’s 
guidance of human reason towards truth. With an account of revelation as operating through 
the normal processes of cognitive reasoning, Hobbes dismisses the legitimacy of all claims to 
a privileged or unique insight into the divine intelligence. Indeed, he explains, “the pretence 
or arrogating to one’s-self Divine inspiration, is argument enough to show a man is mad, is 
my opinion.” The purported revelatory powers of fanatics—the specialized insight they pro-
fess to have into God’s will—are ultimately manifestations of a personal psychological dis-
order. As Hobbes pointedly asks, “And what is a fanatic but a madman?” More worrying for 
Hobbes, however, is how this personal madness spills out and destabilizes the political 
community. Reflecting on the recently concluded English Civil War, Hobbes writes, 
whereas [Dr. Bramhall] says, I make the pretence of inspiration to be pernicious to 
peace; I answer, that I think his Lordship was of my opinion; for he called those 
                                                                                                                                            
ruption of proper religion, Hume nonetheless conceptualizes it as proceeding along a developmental arc from 
an initial violent intensity that can cause “the most cruel disorders” to a cool moderation. Unlike the particu-
larly Catholic trait of superstition, which arises from weakness and ignorance and primes individuals to submit 
to priestly authority, enthusiasm stems from a forceful, even hyperactive imagination. As a result, “enthusiasm, 
being the infirmity of bold and ambitious tempers, is naturally accompanied with the spirit of liberty; as super-
stition, on the contrary, renders men tame and abject, and fits them for slavery.” Hume here recognizes, on the 
one hand, the risks involved in enthusiasm and, on the other hand, the political virtues immanent within it. 
The counter-Enlightenment, of course, adopted this same language of fanaticism in their repudiation of 
the philosophes. In this polemical use of the term, the translation of philosophical frameworks into the world—as 
exemplified most profoundly in the public imagination by the French Revolution—became the essence of fa-
naticism. Surveying the sanguinary expanse of the Revolution, Madame de Genlis asked, “Is this horrible fa-
naticism not a thousand times more dangerous than that inspired by religion?” The haughty exemplar of this 
repackaging of ‘fanaticism’ against the forced realization of secular abstract principles in the real world, of 
course, is Edmund Burke. Railing against the excesses of the Jacobins, Burke developed his critique of philoso-
phers as dangerous in their destruction of customs and established modes of social relations in the pursuit of 
abstractions. In his usual caustic fashion, Burke writes, “These philosophers are fanaticks; independent of any 
interest, which if it operated alone would make them much more tractable, they are carried with such headlong 
rage towards every desperate trial, that they would sacrifice the whole human race to the slightest of their ex-
periments.” Demonstrating the portability of the term, Burke here casts the secular “metaphysicians” as fanat-
ics partly because of their rejection of the political place of religion. 
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men, which in the late civil war pretended the spirit, and new light, and to be the 
only faithful men, fanatics; for he called them in his book, and did call them in his life-
time, fanatics… And what can be more pernicious to peace, than the revelations that 
were by these fanatics pretended?16 
 
For Hobbes, a fanatic is one with a disordered mind who, because of this condition, inevita-
bly disorders the public sphere, often with violent and catastrophic results. Oliver Cromwell 
and his followers exemplify this tendency, with their fanatical commitments to puritan religi-
osity and republicanism resulting in political tumult and war.17 Here we have the threads of 
the philosophical discussion coming together and fanaticism identified as both a psychologi-
cal and political pathology.18 Beyond the specific historical concerns motivating his position, 
Hobbes’s thought serves as a representative index of the long-standing philosophical posi-
tion regarding fanaticism and its associated terms. That is, he expresses anxieties and hesita-
tions with respect to fanatics, painting them as psychologically deranged, socially disruptive, 
and potentially violent. Because of these essential qualities, fanaticism must be policed, con-
tained, and ideally eliminated in the interest of a peaceful, stable political order. As envi-
sioned in Leviathan, Hobbes presents the absolute sovereign’s powers to determine a com-
munity’s epistemic field—assigning, for example, the meaning of language and the proper 
doctrinal contents of religion—as a means for disciplining perspectival differences as well as 
fanatical excesses. 
 Although abandoning Hobbes’ absolutist prescriptions, contemporary democratic 
theory continues to operate, by and large, within the set of assumptions and investments 
provided by modern liberalism when it comes to religious fanaticism. With only rare excep-
                                                
16 Hobbes, 328. 
17 In many ways Cromwell exists as the paradigmatic religious and political fanatic in the American political 
imagination; both Terry and Brown interpret themselves—and are interpreted by others in turn—with refer-
ence to Cromwell.  
18 Joel Olson offers an extended sketch of what he terms “the pejorative tradition” running throughout the 
canonical mainstays of western political thought in “The Freshness of Fanaticism” (2007). In his account of 
philosophical repudiation of fanaticism, Olson describes how this tradition of political thought presents fanati-
cism as facilitating oppression and terrorism and undermining liberal values such as reason and tolerance. 
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tions, for example, religious fanaticism has been associated with an anti-democratic ethos 
that counters the foundational requirements of deliberative engagement.19 If democracy is 
conceptualized as a dialogical process of reason giving and critical-rational discourse between 
equally positioned and reasonable interlocutors, fanatical modes of engagement and citizens 
with deep, uncompromising religious convictions undermine discursive exchange. Democ-
ratic theorists Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, for example, envision ideal delibera-
tive citizens as rational skeptics who “recognize that they may be wrong, and that their op-
ponents may be right” and act in the public sphere with due humility and generosity.20 Gut-
mann and Thompson, of course, are not alone in this normative position. The call for “rea-
sonable” citizens capable of bracketing their personal (and exclusionary) faith from their 
public contributions, advance claims through the use of broadly accessible reasons and rea-
soning, and exercise a reflexive self-awareness and self-constraint manifest also in John 
Rawls’s theory of political liberalism and Jürgen Habermas’ normative account of delibera-
tive democracy. Religious fanatics—who are seen as using their passionate, unreflective, and 
particularistic beliefs as the grounds for their public claims—violate the principles of public 
                                                
19 For examples of more contemporary indictments of religious fanaticism, see, e.g., William H. Simon, “The 
Three Limitations of Deliberative Democracy: Identity Politics, Bad Faith, and Indeterminacy,” in Deliberative 
Politics: Essays on “Democracy and Disagreement,” edited by Stephen Macedo (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999); Jason C. Bivins, The Fracture of the Good Order: Christian Antiliberalism and the Challenge to American Politics 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). 
20 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Har-
vard University Press, 1996), 41-44. Ideal deliberative actors should remain open-minded about the provisional 
truth of their own positions and beliefs and engage in reasonable, respectful deliberation in order to revise their 
positions and come to a consensual (and ideally more accurate or truthful) conception of the state of the world 
and the common good. In sum, the deliberative process requires (a) citizens who recognize the contingency 
and uncertainty of their own positions, (b) acting in accordance with an ethos of reciprocal respect, openness, 
and engagement, and (c) a shared language and criteria for reason and judgment.  
Gutmann and Thompson’s subsequent work similarly valorizes the principle of compromise and delibera-
tive generosity as a political practice, citizen ethos, and habit of mind. See, e.g., The Spirit of Compromise: Why 
Governing Demands It and Campaigning Undermines It (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
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engagement offered by the camp of liberal-deliberative theorists and thus, seemingly, should 
be excluded from democratic politics.21 
A number of subsequent theoretical works reverse the logic of such liberal-
deliberative moves to depoliticize religion and bracket passion, arguing that these techniques 
inspire rather than diminish fanaticism. Writing in this vein, Michael Sandel claims, “A poli-
tics that brackets morality and religion too completely soon generates its own disenchant-
ment. Where political discourse lacks moral resonance, the yearning for a public life of larger 
meaning finds undesirable expression… Fundamentalists rush in where liberals fear to 
tread.”22 In short, if liberals abstain from engaging religious traditions and questions of 
meaning, they forfeit these resources and dimensions of public life to those without such 
compunctions and with potentially anti-liberal and anti-democratic purposes. Bryan Garsten 
voices a similar view when he points to the frustration and alienation produced by the liberal 
framework for public reason that in turn results in “responses to modernity that are as dog-
matic and dangerous as the religious fanaticism that liberalism was meant to contain” and 
“forms of opinion more dogmatic and less prone to deliberative engagement than those they 
initially sought to displace.”23 In light of these inadvertent encouragements of strong religion, 
both Sandel and Garsten argue for a position of engagement and openness, rather than con-
tainment, with respect to religious discourse as an antidote to fundamentalism and fanati-
cism. 
                                                
21 For a discussion of how various flavors of liberalism all advocate a domestication of the passions and politi-
cal and religious convictions, see Michael Walzer, “Passion and Politics,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 28:6 
(2002): 617-33. 
22 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 
1996), 322. 
23 Bryan Garsten, Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2006), 17, 185. While I do not reject the upshot of these positions—that religious opinions and traditions 
should not be avoided in a robust democratic politics but rather acknowledged and engaged—I offer in this 
chapter an alternative understanding of the role of religious zealotry in American democratic politics that does 
not ground such practices on the formal regulation of religious language in the public sphere. Indeed, given 
that the United States has never exercised such exclusions or regulation, liberal disengagement with religion can 
hardly explain the fanatical practices of Brown, Terry, and others throughout American history. 
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Sandel’s and Garsten’s calls for a broad field of engagement tracks the position of 
agonistic theorists of democracy. This school of thought follows Bonnie Honig’s critique of 
“virtue” theories of politics that attempt to “remove politics from the reach of democratic 
contest” by elevating consensus and displacing substantial disagreements and decisions to 
administrative and judicial venues.24 By contrast to such philosophical evasions and attempts 
to narrow political disagreements, agonistic theories recognize fundamental conflicts and the 
play of power as unavoidable aspects of social life. Yet even as these theoretical frameworks 
broaden the legitimate field of political engagement beyond the frameworks offered by lib-
eral-deliberative theorists, agonistic thinkers continue to stress the tempering of political ac-
tion and contestation in ways that prevent fanaticism. The theory of “radical democracy” 
articulated by Chantal Mouffe, for instance, explicitly demands the domestication of contes-
tation so that antagonistic conflicts between enemies (with the attendant threat of existential 
negation and the possibility of violence) become agonistic struggles. Agonistic relations exist 
between adversaries who operate in a “common symbolic space” that enables them to dis-
agree while retaining a sense of mutual respect and avoiding the possibility of violent con-
frontation.25 The agonistic pluralism of William Connolly similarly calls for the cultivation of 
a “bicameral orientation” and “ethos of generosity” that prevent the certainty and potential 
resentment ascribed to religious fanatics. As Connolly argues, “[F]orbearance and modesty 
are presumptive virtues in pluralist politics.”26 The tendency of faith to work against these 
virtues and lead some persons to “punish, correct, exclude, or terrorize” those of different 
orientations constitutes what Connolly calls “the problem of evil.”27 Overcoming evil, Con-
                                                
24 Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 4. 
25 Chantal Mouffe, The Challenge of Carl Schmitt (New York: Verso, 1999), 5. See also Chantal Mouffe, On the 
Political (New York: Routledge, 2005); and Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993). 
26 William E. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 9. 
27 William E. Connolly, Pluralism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 19 
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nolly argues, demands the education of sensibilities and creeds within and across faith com-
munities so as to cultivate the capacities for tolerance and critical self-intervention. 
 Recent innovative theoretical work, however, enables a rapprochement—or at least 
re-engagement—of democratic theory and religious fanaticism. First, scholarship investigat-
ing the role of sentiments and the passions in political life challenges the premise that fanat-
ics are uniquely irrational or “madmen” as Hobbes claims. Second, a new wave of theorists 
has seized upon fanaticism as a tactical modality of public action within democratic politics. 
These two threads of scholarship, I argue, help clear the table for the re-imagining of relig-
ious zealotry outside the narrow confines set by the modern liberal framework. 
Against liberal notions of passion as conceptually outside and opposed to reason and 
agency, Cheryl Hall argues that passion and enthusiasm inevitably entwine human reason 
and provide the necessary commitment for political activity. Drawing on advances in cogni-
tive theory, Hall illuminates how reason is constantly involved in the process of passionate 
commitment (conceptualization, interpretation, evaluation, and formulation of purposive 
behavior). That is, built into passionate commitments are cognitive processes of interpreting 
a concept, judging it to be valuable, and forming intentions to pursue this goal. On the other 
hand, rational judgment inevitably involves some form of emotional investment. As Hall 
remarks, “Just as a passion for an object implies a reason for valuing that thing, a reason for 
choosing one thing over another implies at least some passion for the choice taken. In this 
way, reason and passion are inextricable.”28 From this basis, Hall pushes against the equiva-
lence of fanaticism with irrationality, insanity and agentic passivity: “Even those who have 
                                                
28 Cheryl Hall, The Trouble With Passion: Political Theory Beyond The Reign of Reason (New York: Routledge, 2005), 
17. For a similar claim that the passions are part and parcel of democratic politics, albeit with a distinctly differ-
ent normative stance, see Sharon R. Krause, Civil Passions: Moral Sentiment and Democratic Deliberation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008). Michael Frazer’s recovery of what he calls the sentimentalist stream of En-
lightenment era moral and political thought also works in this same vein by challenging purely rationalist ac-
counts of political reflection. Michael Frazer, The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice and the Moral Sentiments in the 
Eighteenth Century and Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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been called fanatics are thinking: the problem is not that their reason has been overtaken by 
their passion; the problem is that they are thinking and feeling very differently about the 
world than those who charge them with fanaticism.”29 In other words, fanatics are not so 
much unthinking as thinking and sensing in heterodox or novel ways; they are working and 
acting within frameworks apart and aside from those in mainstream liberal society.  
Besides insisting that fanaticism cannot be properly defined in terms of enthusiasm 
and the intensity of passionate beliefs, Hall’s analysis reveals how the concept of the fanatic 
hangs instead on the conspicuous transgression of a community’s common sense. That is to 
say, fanatics are those who publically refuse to act in accordance with the body of taken-for-
granted ideas, discourses, and modes of acting in the world that facilitate particular arrange-
ments of power. Therefore, the concept of the fanatic is necessarily, on the one hand, histori-
cal in the sense that it will vary qualitatively according to shifts in norms across time and 
place and, on the other, intersubjective since it hinges on public performance and reception 
rather than interior beliefs or psychology. 
 If fanaticism does not consist of a particular psychological makeup or ideological 
commitment, Joel Olson’s work provides a foundation for re-thinking it as a mode of politi-
cal action. In a recent series of articles, Olson develops a formulation of fanaticism as a par-
ticular political technique or approach that is compatible with an agonistic conception of 
democratic struggle. Using fanaticism synonymously with extremism and zealotry, Olson 
defines it as “the political mobilization of the refusal to compromise” in order to structure an issue in 
oppositional terms and establish adversarial and mutually exclusive “ethico-political frame-
works.”30 The “ethico-political framework,” as Olson refers to it, determines the field for 
                                                
29 Ibid., 20. 
30 Joel Olson, “Friends and Enemies, Slaves and Masters: Fanaticism, Wendell Phillips, and the Limits of De-
mocratic Theory” The Journal of Politics 71:1 (2009), 83. 
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political disagreements as much as it encompasses “the principles, rules, values, and norms 
that structure how members of a polity express and resolve differences with each other.”31 
To use Gramscian language, the framework is the hegemonic common sense that governs 
acceptability with respect to the taken for granted and acceptable protocols, grounds, and 
modes of claims making in a community. Zealotry explicitly challenges the ethico-political 
framework by making it an explicit point of division and contestation. Olson explains: 
Zealotry is an activity practiced not so much by disturbed temperaments as by collec-
tives working to transform relations of power by creating an “us” in struggle against 
a “them,” and by pressuring those in between to choose sides. Accordingly, zealotry 
is political activity, driven by an ardent devotion to a cause, which seeks to draw clear lines along a 
friends/enemies dichotomy in order to mobilize friends and moderates in the service of that cause.32 
 
Fanaticism, per Olson’s conceptualization, is not an ideology (a substantial set of beliefs or 
ideas) but rather a mode of political action—a distinct approach to politics—that entails a 
refusal to compromise, negotiate, or generally engage in deliberation. According to the logic 
of fanaticism, working within the established framework of political discourse and deliberat-
ing with opponents equates with a foundational capitulation and a betrayal of one’s com-
mitments and cause. Fanaticism agitates conflict and creates tension with a mind towards 
defeating opponents rather than coming to terms with them or accepting the operative terms 
of political disagreement.  
 Although attempting to upend the traditional understanding of the term, Olson’s 
conception of fanaticism as a strategy for contentious politics echoes other recent theoretical 
contributions. A similar definition, for example, underlies Alberto Toscano’s survey of the 
term in western philosophy. Fanaticism, Toscano explains, refers to “a refusal of compro-
                                                
31 Olson, “Friends and Enemies,” 84. 
32 Joel Olson, “The Freshness of Fanaticism: The Abolitionist Defense of Zealotry,” Perspectives on Politics 5:4 
(2007), 688; see also “Radically Democratic Extremism: An Interview with Joel Olson,” Revolution by the Book: 
The AK Press Blog, http://www.revolutionbythebook.akpress.org/radically-democratic-extremism-an-interview-
with-joel-olson/, accessed December 1, 2011.  
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mise and a seemingly boundless drive to the universal.”33 According to Toscano, fanaticism 
is an ambivalent political force that possesses the potential not only for violence and intimi-
dation but also for an emancipatory politics inasmuch as it brings together conviction-in-
practice and unconditional demands that can mobilize constituencies and, with an appropri-
ate strategy, achieve revolutionary institutional change. In that same vein, Suzanne Dovi ar-
ticulates what she calls a “division of moral labor.” As a part of her account, Dovi argues 
that both moral pragmatists who are willing to compromise their commitments and moral 
absolutists who refuse to compromise play crucial political roles, and a vibrant democracy 
requires the presence of both types of political actors.34 Specifically, moral absolutists serve 
two primary functions: 
First, they serve as moral exemplars who, by living out their commitments to moral 
principles, strengthen other citizens’ commitment to their moral beliefs. Second, ab-
solutists can provide political cover that improves the negotiating positions of those 
who compromise their moral integrity for desirable political ends.35 
 
Both Toscano and Dovi are careful to stress the risks immanent to fanatical action—as in, 
for instance, cases where actors refuse or resist values central to democratic institutions and 
shared public life—but such worries frequently hinge on the content of these claims rather 
than the fanatical form itself.  
While taking these attempts to de-pathologize and politicize fanaticism as a point of 
departure, it is necessary to think about, on the one hand, the specificity of religious fanaticism 
and, on the other, how this particular mode of political claims making works within the 
                                                
33 Alberto Toscano, Fanaticism: On the Uses of an Idea (London: Verso, 2010), xii. 
34 Dovi’s theoretical framework dovetails with the more consequentialist-tactical argument for extremism of-
fered by Lewis Killian. According to Killian, these practices of extremism and the refusal to compromise can 
achieve certain tactical ends, including “(1) increase the bargaining power of moderate leaders; (2) provide a 
corrective to illusions of progress by (3) identifying unresolved issues and defining new ones; (4) radicalize a 
growing segment of the movement membership and increase the polarization between the movement and its 
opposition; (5) focus the attention of the opposition and the bystander public on new issues; and (6) evoke 
extreme repressive measures from the opposition.” Lewis Killian, “The Significance of Extremism in the Black 
Revolution,” Social Problems 20 (Summer 1972), 41. 
35 Dovi, 132. 
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American social order. Over the next two sections I examine John Brown and Randall Terry 
in order to flesh out and develop a conception of religious fanaticism as a mode of political 
action and address. My analysis attends particularly to how these radically divergent figures 
make use of specific religious repertoires in their confrontations with what they take to be 
social and moral injustices concealed by the dominant ethico-aesthetic regime. 
§ 2. The Penitent Violence of John Brown 
As evening fell on October 16, 1859, John Brown and his company of eighteen 
armed men made their way across the waters of the Potomac River into the hamlet of Harp-
ers Ferry. In seizing the West Virginia town and the federal arsenal within, the band hoped 
to begin a guerilla war sprawling down the length of the Appalachian Mountains, liberating 
slaves and bringing the battle against the institution of chattel slavery into the very heart of 
the South. The national politics of slavery, by contrast, was characterized by an ethos of eva-
sion. When the institutions of the federal government addressed the subject of slavery, such 
as in the Compromise of 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, or the Dred Scott v. Sanford 
decision (1857), they struggled not to resolve the issue but push it off the political agenda 
and maintain the precarious balance between regional interests. At that point in his career as 
an abolitionist warrior, Brown had already gained notoriety for his participation in the Free 
State campaign in “Bloody” Kansas where he led a violent raid on a settlement at Pottawa-
tomie Creek that ended in the gruesome killings and mutilations of five proslavery settlers. 
Rather than acting as a catalyst for a cascading slave insurrection, however, the raid on 
Harpers Ferry ultimately came to be the end of Brown’s war on the South’s “peculiar institu-
tion.” By delaying too long in the town, Brown gave enough time for a cadre of soldiers and 
militiamen under the command of Robert E. Lee to surround the town and decimate 
Brown’s raiders. Before Brown surrendered, ten of his men, including two of his sons, were 
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dead. The John Brown of Harpers Ferry is a familiar image in American history but its singu-
lar power draws attention away from his broader practice of religious fanaticism from which 
it emanated. 
To fully understand Brown’s brand of political action, it is necessary to trace the 
roots of Harpers Ferry back to Brown’s formative experiences with Puritan Christianity and 
his lifelong identification with the oppressed. His brand of antinomianism, which justifies 
the breaking of human law in the name of God and the divine law, combines the punitive 
theology of Jonathan Edwards and the warrior ethic of Cromwell.36 In contrast to the more 
liberal evangelical revivals of the Second Great Awakening, which cast the divine as loving 
and forgiving, Brown’s rhetoric featured a God who was distinctly Old Testament in de-
meanor and remarkable for His severity and wrathfulness. Brown, in turn, practiced this se-
verity in both his personal and political life. By numerous accounts, Brown was highly critical 
of his neighbors and frequently pointed out their slightest immoral behavior. Brown rejected 
the perfectionist notions of William Lloyd Garrison and his disciples. Men, according to 
Brown, were inescapably frail and prone to corruption; mere words, furthermore, were sim-
ply insufficient to prevent or correct such a state. According to Brown, the greatest manifes-
tation of the inborn tendency to wickedness was the institution of chattel slavery, which not 
only enabled a regime of personal violence and immorality but also systematically violated 
the divine principle of equality. The notion of divine equality emanates from Brown’s doc-
trinal notion of “sacred self-sovereignty,” which located God not in an otherworldly realm 
but rather within every person.37 This diffusion of the divine essence throughout all human-
                                                
36 See David S. Reynolds, John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked the Civil War, and Seeded Civil 
Rights (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 19; and F.B. Sanborn, The Life and Letters of John Brown, Liberator of 
Kansas, and Martyr of Virginia (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 247. 
37 John Stauffer, The Black Hearts of Men: Radical Abolitionists and the Transformation of Race (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 16. 
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ity not only grounds the full equality and right to self-determination of every human being 
but also binds persons together as constituent parts of a universal whole.  
Brown’s efforts to confront the denial of this universal equality by slavery entailed a 
performance that brought together piety and penitence. Historian Stephen Oates succinctly 
portrays this Puritan sensibility, writing, “And if imperfect human beings expected merciful 
God to grant them salvation they must strive both to ‘show piety’ and ‘do good,’ constantly 
struggling to overcome the inherent wickedness in themselves as well as to combat Satan’s 
treacheries from without.”38 By at once aspiring to “show piety” and “do good,” Brown 
joined the performance of religious obligations (the required actions that adhere to a relig-
ious practitioner) and social and moral duties (what is owed to one’s fellow persons). One 
domestic episode related by Brown’s son, John Brown, Jr., captures the interwoven logic of 
atonement, faithfulness, and solidarity that threads throughout Brown’s public actions. In 
this narrative Brown presented his son with a list of the boy’s sins and infractions—a moral 
ledger of remarkable precision and detail—and a calculation of the number of lashes de-
manded by each violation. After going over this list, Brown proceeded to thrash his son until 
he suddenly stopped, removed his own shirt, and commanded his son to lash him. Brown 
took the remainder of the lashes due himself, repeatedly demanding for his son to whip him 
harder. Reflecting on the episode later, Brown, Jr. came to understand his father as providing 
“a practical illustration of the Doctrine of Atonement,” wherein the blood of the innocent is 
shed for the salvation of the guilty.39 The sacrifice of the innocent in order to bring about the 
salvation and redemption of others manifests not only in his personal relations but also, as I 
will describe shortly, in his view of the political community. 
                                                
38 Stephen B. Oates, To Purge This Land With Blood: A Biography of John Brown (Amherst: The University of Mas-
sachusetts Press, 1984), 31. See also Mark S. Weiner, Black Trails: Citizenship from the Beginnings of Slavery to the End 
of Caste (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 165. 
39 Quoted in Sanborn, 22, 92-93. 
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Brown’s public enactment of penitence and faith-in-action springs from a foundation 
of deep recognition and identification. Per Brown’s model, identifying with the oppressed 
and recognizing one’s self in their plight necessarily demands positive action to change these 
conditions. The public presence Brown constructed through his speeches, letters, and ac-
tions can be read as a principled effort to propel white Americans to identify with blacks and 
acknowledge the unjust system of social relations in the country. One of the primary ways in 
which he tried to provoke this identification was through publically narrating his own path 
to racial egalitarianism. As Brown presents it, his identification with the oppressed seized 
him at an early age. Writing to Henry Stearns, the son of a business associate, Brown re-
counted an episode during the War of 1812 when he stayed in the house of a “very gentle-
manly landlord” who owned “a slave boy near [Brown’s] age very active, inteligent, & good 
feeling; & to whom [Brown] was under considerable obligation for numerous acts of kind-
ness.” While the landlord fawned over the young Brown, he brutalized the slave: 
the negro boy (who was fully if not more than [Brown’s] equal) was badly clothed, 
poorly fed; & lodged in cold weather & beaten before [Brown’s] eyes with Iron Shovels 
or any other thing that came first to hand. This brought [Brown] to reflect on the 
wretched, hopeless condition, of Fatherless & Motherless slave children: for such children 
have neither Fathers or Mothers to protect, & provide for them. [Brown] sometimes 
would raise the question: is God their Father? 
 
The moment of connection Brown narrates originates in a mutuality of care and the recogni-
tion of commonality. Brown admits that he is not only in the boy’s debt “for numerous acts 
of kindness” but also that they are both the works of the same creator or father. They are, in 
other words, of the same family, and there is no obvious principle by which one should suf-
fer deprivation, dehumanization, and violence and not the other. This episode, Brown ex-
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plains, made his younger self “a most determined Abolitionist: & led him to declare or Swear: 
Eternal war with slavery.”40  
 Brown positioned an empathetic awareness and capacity—as exemplified by the 
Christian Golden Rule articulated in Luke 6:31 and Hebrews 13:3—at the core of religious 
and political being. Brown mobilized accounts of the pain and suffering of blacks and their 
allies—such as the story of the slave boy—in order to inspire sympathy and, through this 
process of identification, catalyze a process of personal reflection and communal reforma-
tion.41 In his letters and his speeches, he continually returned to Hebrews 13:3, which im-
plores, “Remember them that are in bonds, as bound with them.”42 One upshot of these 
biblical passages is that civil bonds are simultaneously affective and aesthetic. Accordingly, 
the juridical statuses and relations constitutive of a civil community are only the formalized 
manifestations of a more fundamental set of relationships. That is, members of a society are 
embedded in a dense web of sensations and perceptions that orients them as fellow subjects. 
Building from his reading of Hebrew 13:3, Brown conceptualized a righteous, penitent polity 
as one organized so as to affectively unite citizens and implicate each individual in the suffer-
ing of any other. The suffering of one member necessarily flowed throughout the entire so-
cial network. As Louis Bennett Jr. explains, Brown practiced this empathetic citizenship to 
the point of feeling solidarity with the oppressed and becoming, in his case, effectively black: 
                                                
40 Louis Ruchames, A John Brown Reader: The Story of John Brown in His Own Words in the Words of Those Who Knew 
Him and in the Poetry and Prose of the Literary Heritage (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1959), 38. 
41 See Franny Nudelman, “’The Blood of Millions’: John Brown’s Body, Public Violence, and Political Com-
munity,” in The Afterlife of John Brown, edited by Andrew Taylor and Eldrid Herrington (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 29. 
42 Consider this exchange from the interview following Brown’s arrest in Harpers Ferry: 
Bystander: Upon what principle to you justify your acts? 
Brown: Upon the Golden Rule. I pity the poor in bondage that have none to help them: that is why I am 
here; not to gratify any personal animosity, revenge, or vindictive spirit. It is my sympathy with the op-
pressed and the wronged, that they are as good as you and as precious in the sight of God… I want you 
to understand that I respect the rights of the poorest and weakest of colored people, oppressed by the 
slave system, just as much as I do those of the most wealthy and powerful. (Ruchames, 121-22) 
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There was in John Brown a complete identification with the oppressed. It was his 
child that a slaveowner was selling; his sister who was being whipped in the field; his 
wife who was being raped in the gin house. It was not happening to Negroes; it was 
happening to him. Thus it was said that he could not bear to hear the word slave 
spoken. At the sound of the word, his body vibrated like the strings of a sensitive 
violin. John Brown was a Negro, and it was in this aspect that he suffered.43 
 
Bennett’s metaphor of a violin string vibrating in resonance with another captures in a strik-
ing manner Brown’s model of penitent-empathetic citizenship where members are attuned 
to one another’s needs, interests, and rights in an embodied (and morally demanding) sense.  
The motif of suffering-in-solidarity manifests in Brown’s recurring invocation of 
blood. Blood in this instance indexes a logic of equivalence and unity, with a common blood 
coursing through the bodies of every human and thus confounding racial and political dis-
tinctions. Brown’s blood and those of the slaves are presented as one and the same, so that 
the shedding of one implicates and pains the other. According to Brown, this principle im-
plies not only the equality of all but also, as I will describe, the duty of the innocent to iden-
tify with the oppressed and work (and sacrifice) to eradicate relations of oppression. The 
most dramatic and violent episodes in Brown’s public life enacted this imperative to rescue. 
In Franny Nudelman’s felicitous phrase, the paramilitary action at Harpers Ferry was an in-
stance of “sympathy put into practice.”44 In light of his skepticism of the efficacy of rhetori-
cal pleas and moral suasion (which I will elaborate on in a moment), Brown took these em-
pathetic actions in order to fulfill his right and duty to interfere and, thus, not only save indi-
vidual slaves but also sway his fellow citizens to realize the horror of slavery.45 
 Brown’s enactment of empathy manifested both in spectacular moments, such as 
Harpers Ferry, and in the quotidian commitments and practices of daily life. Brown lived his 
                                                
43 Quoted in Reynolds, 504. Stauffer discusses a similar imperative among Brown and his political allies, includ-
ing Gerrit Smith and Frederick Douglass, to rid the “heart of whites” of their racial superiority and status and 
become capable of identifying with blacks. See also Olson, “The Politics of Protestant Violence.” 
44 Nudelman, 30. 
45 For an elaborate discussion of Brown’s presentation of his actions in Harpers Ferry and elsewhere as inter-
ference rather than insurrection, see Turner, 459. 
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principle of racial equality, residing beside and working with former slaves and bringing visit-
ing blacks to sit with his family in their pew at church. He befriended a number of black fig-
ures in the New England abolitionist movement, becoming particularly close with Frederick 
Douglass. When antislavery author Richard Henry Dana Jr. stumbled upon Brown’s farm in 
1849, he was welcomed into the household but later published an essay in which he wrote 
disapprovingly of Brown eating at the same table as blacks and addressing them with titles of 
respect such as “Mrs.” and “Mr.”46 As evidenced by Dana’s baffled and rather frosty re-
sponse, Brown’s practice of interracial camaraderie and egalitarianism was extraordinary, 
even for those who were politically anti-slavery. Unlike Dana and any number of other anti-
slavery activists, Brown’s egalitarianism was not simply an intellectual proposition or an ab-
stract aspiration. Rather, Brown evinced a lived empathy that put Christian and republican 
principles into practice. 
Brown’s identification with the oppressed manifested publically (and somewhat 
bizarrely) in “Sambo’s Mistakes.” An essay that appeared serially in an antislavery newspaper 
from January 1847 to June 1848, “Sambo’s Mistake” featured Brown taking on the persona 
of a black man reflecting back on the errors of his life and offering advice to younger Afri-
can Americans. Among his numerous points of advice, Brown presses the need to cultivate 
knowledge of “sacred & profane history” and to not be consumed by the desire to please 
and submit to whites. Rather, he advises a policy of “nobly resisting [whites’] brutal aggres-
sions from principle & taking my place as a man & assuming the responsibilities of a man a 
citizen, a husband, a father, a brother, a neighbour, a friend as God requires of everyone.”47 
Additionally, Brown advises his readers to ignore ideological and religious differences and 
                                                
46 Richard Henry Dana Jr., “How We Met John Brown,” Atlantic Monthly 28 (July 1871), 6-7. See also Oates, 68-
69. 
47 Ruchames, 63. 
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form anti-slavery coalitions and alliances. These latter points reflect Brown’s own developing 
tolerance for other religious views and a willingness to work with believers of different 
faiths, and they suggest a change from his earlier habits of being too critical of the faults and 
differences of others.48 While remarkably pedantic in its tone, Brown’s essay is illuminative 
not only in the content of the advice and its strategy of standing together but also in its 
authorial enactment of solidarity through Brown’s ready assumption of black identity and 
embrace of his “colored brethren.” 
The notion of solidarity-in-practice appears in a more rigorous and formalized man-
ner in Brown’s “Word of Advice to the United States League of Gileadites,” which he wrote 
in January 15, 1851 in order to mobilize a mutual support group of freedmen. In this docu-
ment, Brown advises members of the organization to join together if a single member is ar-
rested under the auspices of the Fugitive Slave Law and work in concert to free the prisoner. 
Together these members should perform a “rescue” by intervening to free the captured man 
quickly and, if need be, violently. Do not delay, Brown suggests, for “you will lose all your resolu-
tion if you do” and “make clean work of your enemies”; afterwards, if pursued, “go into the houses of 
your most prominent and influential white friends with your wives” in order to compel them to work in 
solidarity with you.49 Here again, Brown advocates the necessity of violence and identifica-
tion—citizens must realize the shared precariousness of their liberty and security and recog-
nize this same vulnerability in others, and then act in light of this fact.50  
                                                
48 See Oates, 59-60. 
49 Ruchames, 76. 
50 Brown, it should be said, was not alone in advocating the duty to rescue. Fellow abolitionist Lysander 
Spooner echoed this imperative to identify and intervene, albeit without providing the license for violence and 
murder advocated by Brown. According to Spooner, it is the “duty of bystanders to go to his or her rescue, by 
force, if need, be [when] a human being is set upon by a robber, ravisher, murderer, or tyrant of any kind.” 
Lysander Spooner, “A Plan for the Abolition of Slavery,” in Antislavery Political Writings, 1833-1860: A Reader, 
edited by C. Bradley Thompson (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 261. 
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 Besides marking this dimension of human commonality and the standing possibility 
of identification, Brown’s invocation of blood also underscores his stress on violent con-
frontation as a potential tactic for political transformation. In his last written words, which 
he gave to a jailer as he was being led to the gallows, Brown explained, “I, John Brown, am 
now quite certain that the crimes of this guilty land: will never be purged away; but with Blood. 
I had as I now think: vainly flattered myself that without verry much bloodshed; it might be 
done.”51 Brown’s words are prophetic in two senses: first, inasmuch as they both identify the 
guilt of the political community in the hopes of inspiring a change in practices and, second, 
by their anticipation of the devastating losses of the Civil War. In both senses, he identifies 
the necessity of violence and suffering in the process of eliminating slavery. As Brown un-
derstood it, the deep roots of slavery in the social mores and institutions of the nation would 
inevitably thwart any attempt at peaceable reform or transformation. Akin to Garrison, 
Brown perceives the modes and manners of American society to be bound up with slavery, 
so that the ideas, feelings, and imaginations of citizens are shaped by the system of racial 
privilege and exclusion at work in slavery. Because of these diffuse but potent effects of 
slavery, Brown foresees institutional politics and the mechanisms of law as functionally con-
strained in their potential to bring slavery to an end. Overthrowing the institution of slavery, 
this logic holds, entails reconfiguring the subterranean order of investments and sentiments 
that are slavery’s necessary conditions, and such a reconfiguration will ultimately demand the 
shedding of the blood of the guilty and the innocent. 
The confrontation of a polity’s common sense with and through the dramatic use of 
force manifests in two distinct forms during Brown’s abolitionist career. In the first mode 
Brown acts as the righteous perpetrator of violence (the forceful subject) and, in the second, 
                                                
51 Ibid., 159. 
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he is the martyred victim of violence (the object of force). I analyze each of these forms in 
turn, beginning with his active use of violence. 
Consider Brown’s December 1858 raid into Missouri, where he freed eleven slaves 
and killed a slaveholder who attempted to prevent the band from liberating his slaves. Writ-
ing a letter to the editor of the New York Tribune, Brown explained his violence as, on the 
one hand, retaliation for a massacre of free-state settlers a year earlier and, on the other, nec-
essary since the murdered master “fought against liberation.” Reflecting on the death, Brown 
writes, “Eleven persons are forcibly restored to their ‘natural and inalienable rights,’ with but 
one man killed… All proslavery, conservative Free-State, and doughface men, and Admini-
stration tools, are filled with holy horror.”52 In his statement Brown poses two distinguish-
able understandings of his resort to violence. First, Brown ascribes his violent actions as in 
keeping with a religio-ethical practice. The violence thus works as a practical intervention 
against the evil of slavery, both in the sense of a retribution for earlier suffering inflicted by 
proslavery forces and a necessary act to rescue particular slaves from a resisting slave-master. 
The second understanding casts Brown’s actions in an overtly political-aesthetic light. The 
violence, by this light, operates as a spectacle—an event that inspires “holy horror”—and 
draws the aesthetic attention of the public not only to the violence itself but also the larger, 
structural violence that it counters. In this way it disrupts the usual practices of disavowal 
and denial that conceal slavery from the consciousness of most citizens. Thoreau’s reflection 
on the Harpers Ferry incident reflects this second understanding: “I say again that it affects 
me as a sublime spectacle. If he had had any journal advocating ‘his cause,’ any organ as the 
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phrase is, monotonously and wearisomely playing the same old tune, and then passing round 
the hat, it would have been fatal to his efficiency.”53 
Thoreau’s implicit condemnation of mere rhetoric echoes Brown’s own sensibilities. 
Indeed, Brown’s turn to violent action springs in no small part from his skepticism regarding 
the Garrisonian reliance on moral suasion and the efficacy of public discourse. Writing to 
Frederick Douglass, Brown states,  
I am too destitute of words to express the tithe of what I feel, and utterly incapable 
of doing the subject any possible degree of justice, in my own estimation. My only 
encouragement to begin, was the earnest wish that if I might express, so that it may 
be understood to all, an important fact, that you or some friend of God and the 
right, will take it up and clothe it in the suitable language to be noticed and felt.54  
 
No doubt Brown overstates his lack of rhetorical abilities—after all, his charismatic powers 
of persuasion were frequently remarked upon—but he nonetheless outlines a profound dis-
junction between the injustice of slavery and the communicative capacities of language. It is 
possible to read Brown here as expressing a profoundly anti-democratic sentiment that fore-
closes the potential for deliberation and replaces it with the play of sheer force.55 Yet in a 
more precise sense Brown is gesturing at an expressive deficit within both his own linguistic 
capacities and, implicitly, the larger field of dominant discourse. Specifically, Brown’s words 
                                                
53 Henry David Thoreau, “A Plea for Captain John Brown” in Reform Papers, edited by Wendell Glick (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 132. 
 Jack Turner builds from Thoreau’s reflections to construct an account of Brown as involved in “a politics 
of performing conscience.” As he explains, “The aim of the performance is to provoke one’s neighbors into a 
process of individual self-reform that will make them capable of properly vigilant democratic citizenship and 
conscientious political agitation.” Such a performance inspires a state of “aesthetic awe,” which 
is the sense of having one’s imagination captured by a story, spectacle, or scene notwithstanding one’s 
negative or positive judgment of its moral nature. Aesthetic awe is the state of having one’s attention held 
by an object. The moral and political value of Brown’s act derived not simply from its aim of liberating the 
slaves, which it ultimately failed to achieve, but additionally from the spectacular way it demonstrated con-
scientious moral commitment. The act’s aesthetic quality enabled it to hold the attention of the public even 
in the face of reflexive condemnation by political authority and majority opinion. 
In other words, the dramatic staging of these prophetic enactments—the theatricality and spectacular qualities 
of the interventions—attracts, perhaps even startles, the public imagination and casts the dilemma as a democ-
ratic morality tale. Jack Turner, “Performing Conscience: Thoreau, Political Action, and the Plea for John 
Brown,” Political Theory 33 (2005), 453, 465. 
54 Ibid., 85. 
55 See Balfour, 50. 
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claim the existence of a lack of sensuous veracity to language; discourse, in other words, falls 
short in tracking and engendering the profound feelings Brown associates with slavery. How 
might the myriad evils of slavery be rendered so that “it may be understood to all” not just in 
a manner of intellectual recognition (“noticed”) but also an aesthetic realization with visceral 
pull (“felt”)? The answer Brown provides is that the injustice must not only be announced 
and proclaimed but also challenged in practice so that a principled critique catches hold too 
in the sensual imagination of an audience.56 
 After the failure of his efforts at liberation, Brown quickly and purposefully took up 
the mantle of the martyr. Throughout his life, Brown possessed a keen ability to manufac-
ture a particular public image, so that, as Lewis Hyde remarks, the “people who know him 
ended up speaking of him in the terms he himself had invented.”57 The image of Brown pro-
jected in his trial speeches and jailhouse letters was a compelling combination of Christ and 
Jefferson, concocted through an alchemy of religious language, acceptance of fate, and a 
consummate commitment to equality. The assumption of this role and the attendant framing 
of his death as the dramatization of the injustice of slavery defines Brown’s epistolary per-
sona following the failed siege on Harpers Ferry. Writing a letter from his jail cell on No-
vember 1, 1959, Brown states,  
You know that Christ once armed Peter. So in my case, I think he put a sword in my 
hand, and there it continued, so long as he saw best, and then kindly took it from 
me…I wish you could know with what cheerfulness I am now wielding the ‘Sword 
of the Spirit’ on the right hand and on the left. I bless God that it proves ‘mighty to 
the pulling down of strongholds.’58 
                                                
56 Christianity’s union of action, word, and feeling is one of the major virtues Brown finds in the religion. In his 
letter to his family (November 30, 1859) Brown speaks of this unique power: “I must yet insert a reason for my 
firm belief in the Divine inspiration of the Bible: notwithstanding I am (perhaps naturally) skeptical. (certainly 
not, credulous.) I wish you all to consider it most thoroughly; when you read that blessed book; & see whether you 
can not discover such evidence yourselves. It is the purity of heart, feeling, or motive: as well as word, & action which 
is every where insisted on; that distinguish it from all other teachings; that commends it to my conscience: whether my 
heart be ‘willing, & obedient’ or not” (Ruchames, 157). 
57 Hyde, 137. 




In this passage Brown narrates the transition from armed confrontation to martyrdom. Simi-
lar language appears throughout the letter exchanges of the period, with Brown saying, “To 
me it is given in behalf of Christ, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for his sake.”59 
Indeed, Brown frames his execution as a greater contribution to the end of slavery than his 
earlier attempts at liberation, writing, “I also humbly trust that my death will not be in vain. 
God can make it to be a thousand times more valuable to his own cause than all the miser-
able service (at best) that I have rendered it during my life.”60 The scaffold is the stage upon 
which Brown performs his empathetic sacrifice. In so doing, Brown becomes the embodi-
ment of righteous resistance—wielding, as he says, the “Sword of the Spirit”—against an 
unjust order.  
In his conjuring of a Manichean world divided between the forces of good (freedom) 
and evil (slavery), Brown creates himself as at once a warrior struggling against evil, a 
prophet calling for communal judgment, and a martyr willing to shed his righteous blood for 
the cause of redeeming the nation. Brown speaks to the common aim of all three of these 
roles—that is, the concomitant moral and political alteration of the United States—in one of 
his final letters. Brown writes, “I go joyfully in behalf of Millions that ‘have no rights’ that 
this ‘great, & glorious’; ‘this Christian Republic,’ ‘is bound to respect.’ Strange change in morals 
political; as well as Christian; since 1776. I look forward to other changes to take place in ‘Gods 
good time;’ fully believeing [sic] that ‘the fashion of this world passeth away.’”61 Brown under-
stood himself to be crucially involved the transformation of American social mores—or, as 
he says, the change of “morals political” in “this Christian Republic.” Yet, as his words and ac-
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tions make clear, such a transformation of sedimented habits and sensibilities relies on radi-
cal—fanatical—forms of political engagement.  
In order to further develop my account of religious fanaticism, I move next to the 
case of Operation Rescue founder Randall Terry (and with him, the violent anti-abortion 
activism performed by Paul Hill). As with Brown, Terry’s Christian religion is not simply the 
justificatory discourse for these actions but supplies the terms of intelligibility for his anti-
abortion interventions and him as a public figure. His political legibility is enabled and con-
stituted through Christian language and ritual. 
§ 3. Rescue as Prophetic Action 
Randall Terry’s antiabortion project at first appears analogous to Brown’s abolition-
ism. They are, after all, both calling for the inclusion of a particular group within the body of 
protected persons in the American community. So too, the direct objects of Brown’s and 
Terry’s criticism—slavery and abortion, respectively—are understood as the most overt 
manifestations of systemic injustices. Yet whereas Brown can be read as using Christian ma-
terials to challenge a system of racial subordination, Terry’s project takes Christianity not 
only as a means of claims making but also the aim of its efforts. Akin to other members of 
his cohort of Christian public actors, including Jerry Falwell and Joseph Scheidler, Terry per-
ceived the Christian faith to be in a state of decline and losing its social prominence and he-
gemony in the United States. Challenging abortion, then, figures as only one flashpoint in a 
larger attempt at Christian retrenchment that involves, among other elements, re-establishing 
traditional gender roles, policing sexual morality, curtailing the welfare state, and pruning 
away economic regulation.62 As I will develop in my analysis, rescues are instances of “pro-
                                                
62 Kristin Luker argues that anti-abortion activists after Roe v. Wade are actually interested in preserving tradi-
tional gender roles and especially the meaning of motherhood. See Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of 
Motherhood (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), especially chapter 8. In a similar vein, Blanchard 
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phetic action” (to use a phrase of Terry’s) calling Christian citizens not only to end the prac-
tice of abortion but also to re-assert Christian sensibilities on the culture and institutions of 
American democracy.  
The practice of antiabortion rescues predates Operation Rescue. In the wake of the 
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade,63 a nationwide wave of anti-abortion activity and 
mobilization sprang into being. This first wave of organized anti-abortion activists were vet-
erans of the antiwar movement who brought together the political approaches of Thoreau, 
Gandhi, and King with the Catholic understanding of the sanctity of life. The father of the 
anti-abortion concept of rescue, John O’Keefe, took up the tools of civil disobedience that 
had been used in the civil rights movement and the campaign against the Vietnam War—
including sit-ins, arrests, and building takeovers—in order to cure what he perceived to be 
the blindness of Americans who did not see abortion as the killing of unborn children.64 As 
O’Keefe conceptualized them, rescues served a dual purpose by bringing public attention to 
the issue of abortion and actually saving individual lives by interfering in the routine opera-
tion of abortion clinics. The practice of civil disobedience and the attendant sufferings of 
demonstrators showed “a solidarity with the child” and catalyzed a process of personal and 
political redemption. As O’Keefe described in a pamphlet entitled A Peaceful Presence: “It is 
not enough to change people’s minds; we are engaged in a struggle to change people’s 
hearts. We are engaged in a process of metanoia—conversion, repentance.”65  
Though O’Keefe’s incarnation of the rescue movement eventually petered out when 
it was unable to win substantial support from either conservative Christians or the Left, his 
                                                                                                                                            
argues that Operation Rescue is not motivated chiefly by “concern for the human status of the fetus” but 
rather a “cultural fundamentalism” that seeks to reassert traditional practices and morality against cultural 
change (40-47). I adopt a similar perspective in this section and the next. 
63 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
64 James Risen and Judy L. Thomas, Wrath of Angels: The American Abortion War (New York: BasicBooks, 1998), 
58. 
65 Quoted in ibid., 66. 
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conceptualization of rescues as simultaneously ethical interventions and political actions pre-
figures Terry’s mobilization of Operation Rescue. Building on O’Keefe’s notion of rescue, 
Terry began Operation Rescue in 1986 with a mind towards politicizing evangelical Protes-
tants.66 The name and mantra of the organization reflected a militarized take on Proverbs 
24:11, which states: “Rescue those who are unjustly sentenced to death; don’t stand back and 
let them die.” Equipped with an ethos of refusing to let innocents die, Terry advocated a 
number of aggressive and confrontational methods, including curbside counseling, picketing, 
sit-ins, and blockades of clinics. As Philip Lawler, a sympathetic historian of the Rescue 
movement, reports, Terry “constantly sought more direct, aggressive approaches to stop kill-
ing.”67 The principal method of Operation Rescue involved the blockading of abortion clin-
ics and the aggressive confrontation, if not outright intimidation, of clinic employees and 
potential clients. As understood by O’Keefe, such action achieves two related ends: it physi-
cally intervenes in the act of abortion and creates a symbolic protest that captures public at-
tention and has the potential to catalyze a moral conversion. While Terry recognizes these 
                                                
66 Beginning in November 1987 with the blockade of the Cherry Hill Women’s Center in Cherry Hill, New 
Jersey by 400 demonstrators, Operation Rescue held major actions—what Terry, following O’Keefe, called 
rescues—in New Jersey, New York, Georgia, Kansas, and other locations across the country. According to the 
National Abortion Federation, over 600 blockades occurred between 1977 and 1993, with the majority of these 
the result of Terry’s Operation Rescue. Over the course of its seven-year existence, Operation Rescue resulted 
in the arrest of approximately 70,000 people. The organization eventually collapsed due to a number of factors, 
including internecine battles for organizational control, sizable court-imposed costs, Terry’s organizational 
mismanagement (partly resulting from his serving a prison sentence for rescue-related charges), and the passage 
of the Federal Freedom of Clinics Entrance Act (FACE), which vastly increased the fines levied for blocking 
abortion clinics. The demise of Operation Rescue brought about, on the one hand, the birth of a number of 
regional rescue movements and, on the other hand, an increase in violent anti-abortion activity, including the 
murder of seven clinic employees from 1993 to 1998.  
 National Abortion Federation, “NAF Violence and Disruption Statistics,” National Abortion Federation, 
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_abortion/violence_statistics.pdf, 
accessed on November 1, 2011. 
 While Operation Rescue frequently earned criticism from women’s rights groups and the American Civil 
Liberties Union for its use of intimidation and coercive methods, its collapse closed a primary outlet for non-
violent—though still aggressive—political expression and activity on the question of abortion. See Christopher 
P. Keleher, “Double Standards: The Suppression of Abortion Protestors’ Free Speech Rights,” DePaul Law 
Review 51 (Spring 2002), 844-46; “Note: Safety Valve Closed: The Removal of Non-violent Outlets for Dissent 
and the On-Set of Abortion Related Violence,” Harvard Law Review 113 (March 2000), 1209-20. 
67 Philip F. Lawler, Operation Rescue: A Challenge to the Nation’s Conscience (Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visi-
tor, Inc., 1992), 23. 
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dual purposes, he insists on the primacy of the practical intervention over and above the po-
litical effects: 
When they block entry to an abortion mill, pro-life activists are not trying to make a 
political point; they are not asking for government action; they are not seeking public-
ity for their cause. A successful Rescue might bring about all those effects, but they 
are secondary to the real Rescue mission. The goal of a Rescue is to stop abortions—
not by influencing legislation, or swaying the courts, but by preventing the particular 
killings that were scheduled on that specific day at that specific facility.68 
 
Terry’s diminishment of the political dimensions of rescue activities is complicated by the 
movement’s explicit concern with provoking self-reflection and a transformation in citizen 
commitments. As Lawler claims in his history of the organization: “Rescuers prick the na-
tion’s conscience, nudging politicians and nonpoliticians alike to reexamine their moral pre-
cepts.”69 In Lawler and O’Keefe’s understanding, the spectacle of Christian citizens engaging 
in pious action and practicing their faith places an implicit demand on spectators to reexam-
ine and inhabit their own moral principles. 
The notion that the practice of rescues hails fellow Christians to act in accordance 
with their faith appears elsewhere in Terry’s formulization of the mission of Operation Res-
cue. Indeed, the first of his three goals for the movement centers on inspiring Christian piety 
and penitence. According to Terry, Christian Americans and others of good faith must re-
pent for having failed to act to prevent abortion. Out of a desire to avoid conflict or pre-
serve their public reputations, he claims, Christians have eschewed political activity and thus 
allowed unjust conditions to persist throughout the country. Repentance, as Terry explains it, 
involves recognizing this complicity. He writes, “We have to acknowledge before God that 
we are part of the problem, and that we all share in the guilt of this innocent blood.”70 Terry 
here charts a trajectory of ethical development, with the recognition of guilt and desire for 
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69 Ibid., 75, 136. 
70 Randall A. Terry, Operation Rescue (Binghamton, New York: Whitaker House, 1988), 183. 
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atonement as the first steps in the formation of an uncompromising Christian ethos that 
works on, rather than within, the existing social order. Moderation in the face of evil be-
comes a sin that must be repudiated in both word and deed. Terry takes the profound stakes 
involved in this issue—stakes that he frames in provocative terms of genocide, holocaust, 
and murder—as reason to not shy from “say[ing] confrontational things, and perhaps 
do[ing] radical deeds.”71 Rather than embrace the moderation of other Christian social critics, 
Terry speaks boldly and aggressively. As he explains, “Language is often used to lull us into 
sleep when we should be alert and watchful. If by language I can, in turn, awaken people to 
the atrocities occurring daily in our country and sharpen the issues enough to spur people to 
action, then I will have accomplished one of my major goals.”72 Terry understands partisan 
and institutional politics as similarly dulling the critical edge and reformative potential of 
Christian subjects. In response to acts of compromise by more moderate Christian organiza-
tions, Terry spoke out against “selling out the law of heaven” in a Washington Post editorial. 
He writes, “[N]ow certain ‘Christian leaders’ are ‘inspiring’ droves of Christians to the ‘big 
tent’ of the Republican Party—a happy tent housing child-killers and sodomites…We will 
not auction away the eternal, flawless law of heaven for temporary, flawed political gains.”73  
                                                
71 Ibid., 15. Terry and Operation Rescue leaders self-consciously presented themselves as a contemporary paral-
lel to the abolitionist movement. The 1991 “Summer of Mercy” campaign in Wichita was one such instance 
where anti-abortion activists constructed an analogy between their own efforts and the Bleeding Kansas of the 
antebellum period. As Lawler writes, “The furies unleashed in Kansas illustrated what the Civil War proved: 
that an issue such as slavery, which involves irreconcilable moral differences, could not be settled peacefully 
within the American constitutional tradition. Over a century later, during the summer of 1991, Kansas again 
became the testing ground for a moral dispute which has resisted all efforts at compromise.” See Lawler, 29, 
138. 
72 Randall A. Terry, Accessories to Murder: The Enemies, Allies, and Accomplices to the Death of our Culture (Brentwood, 
Tennessee: Wolgemuth & Hyatt, 1990), xi. 
73 Randall A. Terry, “Selling Out the Law of Heaven,” Washington Post, 18 September 1994. 
 The leaders of Operation Save America, an organization spawned in the aftermath of Operation Rescue’s 
demise, similarly rejected compromise and pragmatism as “the primary reason that we still have abortion in our 
land today. It has caused us to believe that we can legislate this evil out of our culture slowly but surely by edu-
cation, sound reasoning, and political maneuvering… The battle for the lives of children will never be won by 
educating and seeking common ground with those who refuse to see the truth.”  
 Operation Save America, “Incrementalism—A Lie from the Pit of Hell!,” Operation Rescue,  
www.operationsaveamerica.org/news/news/2001-04.thml, accessed on November 4, 2011. 
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The rejection of compromise and the inculcation of a penitent-pious Christian sub-
jectivity are the starting points for what Terry sees not only as the end of abortion but also a 
fundamental cultural reformation. In response to the Nation’s characterization of the abor-
tion controversy as a “civil war,” Terry eagerly agreed, saying, “It is a battle of ideologies, a 
battle for influence, a battle of allegiances, a battle for cultural dominance. There will only be 
one winner.”74 Against what he paints a secular humanist attempt to pry apart the realm of 
religious faith and political culture, Terry advocates for a return to a Christian hegemony. 
Terry subscribes to the principles of Christian Reconstructionism, which seeks to establish a 
God-centered government with laws derived from the text of the Bible.75 Terry claims that 
elements of the Christian religion must necessarily infuse how political life is thought, prac-
ticed, and criticized in the United States. Explaining his position, he writes,  
Let me say it clearly: We want a Christian nation… By ‘Christian nation,’ I don’t 
mean that everyone is forced to be a Christian or forced to go to church or to believe 
in God. People are free to be Buddhists or atheists. What I mean by a Christian na-
tion is a nation whose laws are self-consciously built on the laws and principles of 
the Bible.76  
 
According to Terry’s framing, the liberal tradition in America as articulated in the Declara-
tion of Independence is fundamentally Christian in its premises and sensibilities. Specifically, 
he argues that the Declaration acknowledges God to be the source of all inalienable rights 
and that “the authority of God and His Law” is the only basis upon which a people can chal-
lenge political authority.77 Indeed, Terry traces back all civil government to God. Rather than 
                                                
74 Quoted in Lawler, 55, 14. 
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House Publishers, 1993), 75, 
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being a human construct or the product of a social contract, government is a concept and 
structure given to humanity by God.78 As such, divine law necessarily trumps civil law and 
establishes the criteria and limits of legitimate governmental action.  
The second objective of Operation Rescue entails forging a performative fidelity 
among Christian citizens that erases the disjuncture between Christian ideals and political 
practices. According to Terry, “I saw that if we believed abortion was murder, then we 
needed to act like it was murder. The logical response when you or I see someone being 
killed is to do what we can to physically intervene and save them.”79 The gap that exists be-
tween rhetoric and action must be eliminated, and Christians must enact—not merely pro-
fess—their beliefs. Specifically, Christian Americans need to “declare war” on abortion and 
act accordingly in order to bring the entire nation into the conflict and resolve the issue.80 A 
recurring motif in Terry’s rhetorical mobilization is the profound disjunction between the 
words and deeds of opponents to abortion. “[O]ur actions betray our words,” he argues. 
“Christians and non-Christians alike who are adamantly against abortion refer to abortion as 
                                                                                                                                            
tion that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; it was a war founded on a belief 
in Higher Law.” Terry, Why Does a Nice Guy Like Me Keep Getting Thrown in Jail?, 28. 
 In Killing for Life, Carol Mason distinguishes between two anti-abortion schemas: pro-life politics and right-
to-life politics. Right-to-life politics use liberal principles of human rights that grant an individual fetus the right 
to live, to grow, and to be born. As Mason explains, “The right-to-life position is a fundamentally liberal con-
struction because it assumes…that the Constitution grants rights equally among citizens, who are ‘created 
equal’ and created as equals—as political equals.” The pro-life position, on the other hand, casts all persons, in-
cluded the collective unborn, as created equal (by God) while not requiring a fully egalitarian society. Mason 
argues that while the former is “based on a civil or human rights rationale,” the conservative pro-life approach 
“rejects liberal ideas of human rights and equality.” The thought and practice of Terry and Operation Rescue 
fail to fall within either of these two broad categories since they unite a concern for the individual fetus and the 
collective unborn. Terry consistently struggles to demonstrate the humanity of fetuses, both through his rhe-
torical evocations the human features of the unborn and his presentation of images of aborted fetuses, which 
tracks Mason’s characterization of the right-to-life position. While distancing himself from the aim of a fully 
egalitarian society, Terry nonetheless emphasizes the political and civil equality of the unborn and that they 
have an equal claim in collective decision-making and on the protections of the political community. Carol Ma-
son, Killing for Life: The Apocalyptic Narrative of Pro-Life Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 16-17, 19, 
24. 
78 Ibid., 25-26. 
79 Ibid., 22. 
80 Ibid., 183. 
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murder, but we do not act like it’s murder. Our cries of ‘murder!’ go unheard because our actions 
are so far removed from our rhetoric.”81  
The moral gravity of abortion, Terry claims, is belied by its operation in the world of 
abstractions. The fetus exists as a figure of speech—an entity alive in discourse alone—and 
as such does not seize upon the moral sensibilities. In order to ground these ethical claims, 
then, Terry argues for the public practice of fetal personhood. Operating in the wake of Roe, 
wherein state protection hinged on the status of personhood, Terry sought to establish the 
fetus as a living being—a person—from conception and thus with natural and human rights 
that must be recognized and protected.82 As Terry writes, “Child-killing could never survive 
the bright light of truth; the vast majority of our nation’s people would reject it out of hand 
and demand its immediate end.”83 In order to make citizens recognize the humanness of the 
unborn and, concomitantly, the status of abortion as murder, Operation Rescue’s actions 
aimed to make present and visible the fetus. According to Terry, the invisbility of the unborn 
and their absence as a party or object in political discussions enables a willed disavowal of 
                                                
81 Ibid., 194. 
82 At its foundation, Terry’s struggle involves the long contested meaning of the fetus and the unborn in Amer-
ica. Particularly since the late nineteenth century, the question of when a fetus achieves the status of “human-
ness” has been a point of heated medical, theological, philosophical, and political debate. The paired Supreme 
Court rulings in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton both hinged state protection and interest on a determination of 
viability. In its decision in Roe, the Supreme Court held that, at least during the first three months of a preg-
nancy when the fetus was not viable, women possessed a constitutional right to an abortion and that a fetus 
was not a “person” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In its argument, however, the Court majority 
acknowledged that if the fetus was recognized as a “person” then the regulation and limitation of abortion by 
the state would be perfectly legitimate. 
 My account of the politics of fetal meaning throughout American history is, of course, only cursory; for a 
fuller treatment, see Sara Dubow, Ourselves Unborn: A History of the Fetus in Modern America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011).  
 The Catholic Church, for instance, has long advanced the position that “ensoulment”—God’s endowing 
of the body with a soul—as occurring at conception. Medical authorities at the end of the nineteenth century 
recognized human life as beginning with the “quickening,” when the fetus began to move in the fourth or fifth 
month of the pregnancy. The advent of new technologies such as ultrasound and shifts in popular understand-
ings have resulted in numerous competing conceptions of when the status of “personhood” is achieved, includ-
ing conception, viability of the fetus, first breath, and some marker in the parent-child relationship such as 
naming. See Dallas A. Blanchard, The Anti-Abortion Movement and the Rise of the Religious Right: From Polite to Fiery 
Protest (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 16-21; Risen and Thomas, 16-19. 
83 Terry, Accessories to Murder, 91. 
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their existence.84 He argues, “Because the tiny victims are concealed within the wombs of 
their mothers, people never hear their silent screams and rarely see their brutalized re-
mains.”85 In order to make present the fetus, Operation Rescue participants held placards 
with images of aborted fetuses outside clinics and Terry held press conferences in which he 
presented “Baby Roe,” the remains of an aborted fetus, to members of the media. 
What is necessary, Terry claims, is for those who believe abortion is the killing of 
humans to act as such. As performed by Operation Rescue, this entails physical interven-
tions and making every effort to intercede on behalf of the putative human victim. Anti-
abortion activists must act as if they are preventing murder—they must, through their ac-
tions, demonstrate and enact the personhood of the unborn. These two tactics—making 
present the fetal body and the enactment of the fetal person—continued to define Terry’s 
strategy even after he left Operation Rescue. Writing in the wake of the 2009 assassination of 
George Tiller, a physician in Wichita, Kansas who provided late-term abortions, Terry stated: 
Our rhetoric must bear witness to the truth: abortion is murder. Our actions must be 
equal to this crime: we must continue with vigorous (yet peaceful) actions such as 
have been used by every social revolution since America’s birth… We must continue 
to show the victims’ bodies that we have pulled out of dumpsters; we must not re-
treat a single inch from showing the decapitated heads of little boys and girls, the 
arms and legs that were suctioned or carved out of their mothers wombs; we must 
paint the picture of sewers and landfills being used as unholy graves for these holy 
victims.86 
 
                                                
84 He frequently comments on the purposeful absence of the unborn—what he terms “avoiding the victim” 
(Accessories to Murder, 202)—in the presentation of the abortion controversy by major media groups. “They 
don’t want the public to see who is being aborted (murdered). As long as they can reduce the child to dehu-
manized words and hence images (fetus, uterine contents), they can hide the reality” (Accessories to Murder, 110). 
85 Terry, Operation Rescue, 141. 
86 “Dr. Tiller’s Death: Randall Terry Releases Video for Pro-Life Leaders Concerning Dr. Tiller’s Killing,” 
Christian News Wire, available at: http://www.christiannewswire.com/news/7392310537.html May 31, 2009 
(accessed 3 July 2013). 
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At its extreme, Terry’s call for action in line with the conception of abortion as murder has 
found expression in the bombing of clinics and the killing of doctors who perform abortions 
(which I will briefly discuss at the end of this section).87  
The final goal of Operation Rescue involves political agitation. Besides the proximate 
goal of intervening to save the lives of specific fetuses, rescues would also “produce the so-
cial tension necessary to bring about political change.”88 Terry traces the politically produc-
tive or generative quality of tension and unsettling of the established social relations 
throughout American history, with particular attention to the civil rights movement and the 
theologically grounded philosophy of Martin Luther King Jr. In light of these examples, 
Terry argues, that it is necessary to bring about an atmosphere of crisis and dis-ease in order 
to bring due attention and consideration to a social injustice that the majority refuses to ac-
knowledge. “Civil tension and unrest force the authorities to face a controversial issue. This 
is part of the very core of the American process of self-government.”89 While undoubtedly 
elevating God as the source of government and political legitimacy, Terry hesitates to defer 
political judgment entirely to the divine. Indeed, to claim, as some believers might, that civil 
leaders are only answerable and accountable to God is profoundly problematic for Terry. He 
explains: 
This is dangerously out of balance. It denies the Biblical principle of representative 
government. The American people elected officials in our country. It is heartily 
agreed that elected officials are answerable to God, but they are also answerable to 
us. Why? Because God has given us a constitutional republic in which to live. The 
Constitution is the “ruler.” It is the law of the land under God’s law. Romans 13:1 
                                                
87 For broader accounts of anti-abortion violence, see Dallas A. Blanchard and Terry J. Prewitt, Religious Violence 
and Abortion: The Gideon Project (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1993); Jerry Reiter, Live from the 
Gates of Hell: An Insider’s Look at the Anti-abortion Underground (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2000); 
Stephen Singular, The Wichita Divide: The Murder of Dr. George Tiller and the Battle over Abortion (New York: St. Mar-
tin’s Press, 2011); Patricia Baird-Windle and Eleanor J. Bader, Targets of Hatred: Anti-Abortion Terrorism (New 
York: Palgrave, 2001). 
88 Terry, Operation Rescue, 27. 
89 Randall A. Terry, A Humble Plea to Bishops, Clergy, and Laymen: Ending the Abortion Holocaust (Washington, D.C.: 
Insurrecta Nex, 2008), 47. See also, Terry, Operation Rescue, 195. 
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should encourage us to be political activists because the higher power God has estab-
lished in America is a Constitution under which we are part of the government.90 
 
Thus, while Terry invokes higher law—specifically, a divine and biblical law—that serves as 
the foundation and measure of man’s law, it is political actors and citizens who must carry 
out this criticism and perform judgment. With respect to the issue of abortion, Operation 
Rescue catalyzes a process of political judgment in which citizens are charged with measur-
ing existing practices against their religious and political commitments. As Lawler argues, 
“Who can say when a cause justifies defiance of the law? Who decides when the time for 
compromise has ended and the time for battle has begun? The answer to all those questions 
lie in the hearts of ordinary citizens. If Operation Rescue can pierce through the armor of 
complacency and convention, pricking the conscience of the American people, then the 
movement’s success is assured.”91  
 So understood, rescues are instances of “prophetic action” that not only proclaim an 
injustice demanding judgment but also propel attention through performance.92 The national 
guilt—a blood guilt—of abortion taints every American, Christian or not, and can only be 
dissolved through the recognition of the personhood of the unborn and a corresponding 
change in social policy.93 Looking to divine punishments of whole tribes and cities in the Old 
Testament, Terry claims that a similar generalized culpability awaits the United States:  
We must not be deceived, and we must not compromise. Abortion is nothing less 
than murdering babies. Because nearly five thousand children per day are being killed 
in America, our country is bearing the guilt of innocent babies… Besides the guilt 
borne by those who shed blood, a bloodguiltiness is imputed to entire nations where 
innocent blood is shed and unavenged.94  
                                                
90 Terry, Accessories to Murder, 189. 
91 Lawler, 136. 
92 Terry repeatedly makes the distinction between mere preaching and “prophetic action,” and chastises most 
contemporary Christians for believing the former effective enough to forgo the latter. See, e.g., Terry, Why Does 
A Nice Guy…, 24, 61. 
93 See Lawler, 66.  
94 Terry, Operation Rescue, 142. See also Randall A. Terry, The Judgment of God (Windsor, New York: The Re-




As with Brown, Terry returns again and again to the language of blood. Terry firmly believes 
that divine judgment is coming and will inevitably arrive regardless of what the nation does 
in the future. What remains to be decided, however, is the severity and duration of this 
judgment, which, he claims, “will, in part, be determined by our prayers, repentance, and en-
suring actions.”95 In this way he relocates the act of judgment from God to members of the 
political community—citizens will be the ones who either acknowledge or continue to deny 
the injustice in which they are complicit.  
Despite their uncompromising language and aggressive techniques, Terry and Opera-
tion Rescue never engaged directly in violent action such as clinic bombings or murder. In a 
Washington Post article, Terry explained he advocated against violent action not because of 
any ethical or normative consideration but rather because it was strategically ineffective. He 
remarked, “I believe in the use of force…I think to destroy abortion facilities at this time is 
counterproductive because the American public has an adverse reaction to what it sees as 
violence.”96 Yet even as Terry hesitates from using violence out of tactical considerations, 
other antiabortion activists, similarly invoking Christian religious elements, have made use of 
violence against medical professionals and facilities providing abortions. Before returning to 
the larger theoretical question of religious fanaticism, then, I turn briefly to one such per-
former of anti-abortion violence: Paul Hill. 
The logic of intervening in order to prevent a potential crime—in this case, mur-
der—manifests in the use of the “necessity defense” by anti-abortion activists who either 
destroy clinic equipment or use violence against those who participate in abortion proce-
                                                
95 Terry, Accessories to Murder, 251. Hill would later seize upon this notion of “blood guiltiness,” writing in a let-
ter, “Our tiny planet is saturated with the blood of the innocent. The blood guilt that hangs over our head is 
unspeakably staggering. Yet few seem to notice and fewer still take a stand.” Quoted in Risen and Thomas, 
362. 




dures.97 While largely unsuccessful as a legal defense, this position is articulated in the “De-
fensive Action Statement,” which was first composed in 1993 by antiabortion activist Paul 
Hill in response to the murder of Dr. David Gunn by Michael Griffin and periodically re-
released with subsequent killings of abortion providers: 
We, the undersigned, declare the justice of taking all godly action necessary to defend 
innocent human life including the use of force. We proclaim that whatever force is 
legitimate to defend the life of a born child is legitimate to defend the life of an un-
born child. We assert that if Michael Griffin did in fact kill David Gunn, his use of 
lethal force was justifiable provided it was carried out for the purpose of defending 
the lives of unborn children. Therefore, he ought to be acquitted of the charges 
against him.98 
 
Twenty-eight other individuals signed Hill’s document. The logic of the “Defensive Action 
Statement” traces Terry’s logic to its extreme consequence. That is, if the unborn are for all 
moral purposes persons and it is necessary, both religiously and politically, to act as such, 
then there attaches to every citizen a duty to intervene and even to kill to save that life.  
A year after he circulated the “Defensive Action Statement,” Hill killed Dr. John 
Britton and his bodyguard, James Barrett, in Pensacola, Florida. Though he was barred from 
entering an affirmative defense in his trial, Hill circulated a similarly minded manifesto on 
the website of Army of God, a Christian anti-abortion organization that explicitly sanctions 
the use of violence. Hill’s manifesto, Mix My Blood with the Blood of the Unborn, tracks the fa-
miliar logic of Terry’s call to rescue. Hill writes: 
Abortion remains legal, in part, because Christians and pro-life advocates have not 
harnessed the horse to the cart. The moral obligation to defend the unborn with the 
means necessary should be the force that pulls the pro-life movement along. This 
compelling duty should provide both the logical ground and the moral impetus for 
all anti-abortion activities, including direct intervention, as well as educational and 
legislative efforts.99 
                                                
97 See Lawler, 116. 
98 Paul J. Hill, “Defensive Action Statement,” Army of God, accessed June 12, 2013, 
http://www.armyofgod.com/defense.html.  





A robust Christianity, Hill claims, demands more than mere professions of faith; faith must 
be manifest in and through action. Faith is something that must be inhabited and performed, 
or else it is nothing. The Christian faith invoked by Hill centers on the “Moral Law” of God, 
which enjoins all practitioners to protect the innocent. This divine command—or “moral 
impetus”—is absolute and inviolable, regardless of any countervailing laws established by the 
state or the common sense and consensus of the community. Strains of Christianity that ac-
commodate state law and do not demand positive action to protect the unborn, Hill claims, 
are “corrupt…tasteless and lukewarm—fit for nothing but to be spewed out and washed 
down the drain.”100  
By contrast, the “strength and beauty” of Christianity, properly understood, is found 
in its resolute performance—its uncompromised enactment—both in the bearing witness to 
truth (and sin) and the willing violation of unjust laws. Hill describes the potential political 
power of his zealotry as follows:  
I realized that many important things would be accomplished by my shooting an-
other abortionist in Pensacola. This would put the pro-life rhetoric about defending 
born and unborn children equally into practice. It would bear witness to the full hu-
manity of the unborn as few things could. It would also open people’s eyes to the 
enormous consequences of abortion—not only for the unborn, but also for the gov-
ernment that had sanctioned it, and those required to resist it. This would convict 
millions of their past neglect, and also spur many to future obedience. It would also 
help people to decide whether to join the battle on the side of those defending abor-
tionists, or the side of those defending the unborn.101 
 
In this short passage Hill makes his case for both the ethical and political value of engaging 
in violent action. Though much of his manifesto details the biblical foundation for claiming 
abortion as murder, disobeying unjust laws, and killing in the name of protecting the inno-
cence, Hill here explicates the intertwining of his religio-ethical practice with a political pur-





pose and dovetails with the arguments of Terry. Specifically, Hill stresses the imperative to 
translate the principles of Christian piety into practice. The logic of such a practice is simul-
taneously ethical and political. For not only does it satisfy the religious commitments of the 
individual actor but, in its realization of piety, the performance engenders among fellow 
Christian subjects a moral perception of the unborn that is otherwise impossible. Hill readily 
recognizes that some will view his actions as repugnant, yet he reads such a recoiling as gen-
erative in so far as it organizes the field of social conflict in a way that polarizes the issue and 
compels an acute struggle over abortion. 
While differing in their approaches, both Terry and Hill offer an account of uncom-
promising public action emanating from a religious duty. The performance realizes the moti-
vating religious commitment and, importantly, radiates outward to call forth or activate the 
faith of those bearing witness and fracture the social field along an oppositional logic.  
§ 4. Reimagining Religious Zealotry in America 
I take Brown and Terry (as well as anti-abortion activists such as Hill who turned to 
violence in the wake of Operation Rescue) as performing what I refer to as religious fanati-
cism. Having examined the actions and words of Brown and Terry, I want to return, 
equipped with these interpretations, to the conceptualization of religious fanaticism and the 
theorization of its place in a democratic order. To re-establish the standing questions: What 
is religious zealotry? What work is religion doing here? And how can these practices of relig-
ious fanaticism be understood as relating to democracy as a social and cultural order? 
It is necessary to first recognize the significant differences between Brown and Terry. 
As I have mentioned, Brown’s fanatical efforts were directed at ushering in an unprece-
dented interracial community, while Terry twined his religious zealotry to a project of Chris-
tian reclamation over and against what he perceives to be the undermining effects of secular 
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modernity. Between the two religious actors there is not only a sharp distinction in their pro-
jects but also, undergirding that, a shift in the social place and power of Christianity. Brown’s 
abolitionist efforts were embedded in a public sphere stamped by the potent evangelical 
Christian sensibilities of the Second Great Awakening.102 By contrast, it is precisely a sense 
of the retreat of Protestant Christianity from socio-political life—and the concomitant loss 
of a common Christian sensibility—that motivates Terry’s anti-abortion activities.  
In parsing this difference between Brown and Terry it is helpful to introduce a dis-
tinction between two concepts that are frequently lumped together under the broad umbrella 
of so-called “strong religion”: religious fundamentalist and religious fanaticism.103 Per relig-
ious studies scholar Martin Riesebrodt’s formulation, fundamentalism can be understood as 
a reactionary social-political movement motivated by a sense of crisis regarding “society’s 
desertion of eternally valid, divinely revealed, and textually literal received principles of order, 
which had once been realized in an ideal community—the ‘Golden Age’ of original Chris-
tian, Islamic, or other communities.”104 Religious fundamentalism, per Riesebrodt’s defini-
                                                
102 Cf. John D. Carlson and Joanthan H. Ebel, “John Brown, Jeremiad, and Jihad,” in From Jeremiad to Jihad: 
Religion, Violence, & America, edited by John D. Carlson and Jonathan H. Ebel (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 2012). Specifically, Carlson and Ebel describe John Brown as challenging “the premises of secular or 
religiously minimalist societies” (7). To make such a characterization, however, requires a necessary abstraction 
of Brown from his evangelical—or, to use Bruce Lincoln’s terminology—religiously maximalist historical mo-
ment. Understood within the context of his place and time, Brown can be more clearly seen to not as drawing 
on a common reservoir of references, rhetorics, and practices rather than challenging any operative secular 
premise of the public sphere. 
 To be clear, Lincoln advances a distinction between two ideal types: maximalists hold “the conviction 
that religion ought to permeate all aspects of social, indeed of human existence” while minimalists “restrict 
religion to an important set of (chiefly metaphysical) concerns, protect its privileges against state intrusion, but 
restrict its activities and influence to this specialized sphere.” Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion 
after September 11 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 5. 
103 Habermas, for instance, implicitly runs the concepts together in discussing terrorism in the twenty-first cen-
tury. He says, “No doubt today’s Islamic fundamentalism is also a cover for political motifs. Indeed, we should 
not overlook the political motifs we encounter in forms of religious fanaticism.” Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy 
in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2003), 33. 
104 See Martin Riesebrodt, Pious Passion: The Emergence of Modern Fundamentalism in the United States and Iran, trans-
lated by Don Reneau (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 16. See also Karen Armstrong, The Battle 
for God, (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001); and Bruce B. Lawrence, Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt 
against the Modern Age (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1995). Cf. Mark Juergensmeyer, The 
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tion, describes a particular conservative or reactionary program aimed at preserving and ex-
panding traditional forms of religion—frequently literalist in their biblical hermeneutics and 
patriarchal in power structure—against processes of social transformation and the increasing 
marginalization of a formerly hegemonic mode of social arrangements. Put more concisely, 
fundamentalism is a religio-political project that brings together elements of anti-modernism 
and religious nationalism.  
To return to the cases at hand: the aims of Terry, as well his fellow Christian Recon-
structionists, are overtly fundamentalist. They explicitly seek a restoration of the hegemonic 
status of Christianity and the defeat of the forces—feminism, secular humanism, multicul-
turalism, etc.—that they identify as complicit in the overthrow of the nation’s traditional sa-
cred canopy. Brown, by contrast, is not oriented towards any sort of religious restoration. 
Indeed, his actions agitate for a radical innovation, namely, the end of slavery and institution 
of racial equality. Yet if Terry is a fundamentalist and Brown is not—if they are, in other 
words, distinct in terms of the context and content of their claims—what then unites them 
as religious fanatics? 
 Religious fanaticism consists of a particular mode of political resistance with and 
through religious materials. More precisely put, the concept of religious zealotry refers to an 
excessive and exacting enactment of faith—a way of being pious and penitent in the public sphere 
that purposefully eschews and subverts the operative norms of political discourse. Such en-
actments of faith are excessive in that they exceed what is considered acceptable and proper 
in a given place and time; they dramatically violate operative standards of public action. They 
are exacting (or demanding) not only in the sense of requiring effort and sacrifice by the per-
                                                                                                                                            
New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, Comparative Studies in Religion and Society (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993); Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God : The Global Rise of Religious 
Violence, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); and Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and Politics in the United 
States, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 297. 
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former but also in that they capture and challenge the attention of its audience. This duality 
tracks zealotry’s simultaneous status as, first, a religio-ethical practice undertaken by the ac-
tor for the purposes of fulfilling certain religious commitments and, second, an aesthetic-
political action intended to engender a transformation in one’s fellow citizens and, ultimately, 
the social-structural level of American society. 
As evidenced by Brown and Terry, their religious traditions endowed them with 
what can be thought of as an uncommon sense. Following Gramsci’s understanding, common 
sense is the subterranean foundation—the taken-for-granted arrangement of assumptions, 
habits, and sensibilities—for the play of interests, claims, and disagreements in a given soci-
ety. Such an arrangement organizes and delimits politics by pre-determining who and what 
can speak (and be spoken about), the acceptability of premises and logics, and the appropri-
ate modes and manners of interaction. In their distinctive ways, Brown and Terry both break 
with the operative common senses of their times, both in terms of their values and the man-
ner in which they claim these values in the public square. Furthermore, the disjuncture be-
tween each man and his society traces back to a religious source. Brown and Terry position 
themselves as agents of higher law derived from the Christian tradition, whether it is the di-
vine principle of equality or the biblical duty of protecting the innocent, against a putatively 
unjust arrangement of social institutions and practices. These articles of faith are the pro-
positional manifestations of a broader and deeper conception of the world structured by 
Christian meanings and commitments.  
Brown and Terry both understand ethical comportment and practice as dependent 
upon a proper aesthetic orientation. Aesthetics, as established in previous chapters, marks 
the sensuous perception, experience, and interpretation of the world. The implicit premise of 
Brown’s and Terry’s fanatical performances is that the configuration of what is sensed and 
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felt conditions the moral imagination and the gravity of ethical commitments. Their indict-
ments of hegemonic political discourse and the formal institutions of governance both cen-
ter on what they identify as a moral and aesthetic paucity. According to Brown and Terry, 
slavery and abortion exist as recognized sites of contestation and disagreement but only at a 
level of bloodless abstraction. This process of abstraction manifests most strikingly in the 
rendering of these questions into judicial questions, but Brown and Terry are equally dismis-
sive of political discourse and party politics more generally insofar as such institutions are 
seen as compromised and removed from the moral-aesthetic dimension involved. The sen-
suous subjects that each man understands to be at the heart of these debates—the slave and 
the unborn—are put under aesthetic erasure. As a consequence, the process of identification 
and empathy that they perceive to be the starting point for social change is circumvented.  
With a mind towards reorienting the sensuous attentions of their audience and, in so 
doing, cultivating the conditions for structural transformation, Brown and Terry perform 
conspicuous enactments of their faith. Faith, they insist, must be inhabited and performed to 
not only be real for the practitioner but also place a real pull on those who claim to believe 
yet do not act as such. Brown and Terry begin from the premises that blacks and the un-
born, respectively, are human beings due not only sensuous recognition but also political 
standing and moral consideration.105 Through their performances, they each stage a dramatic 
public conflict between two ways of political life—distinct ways of thinking, acting, and liv-
ing together in the world—compelling their audience to align themselves in response to their 
                                                
105 “Authority,” Shulman argues, “names not a truth we must justify but a commitment we must own and en-
act. For it is only by living out a god or first principle, a truth or table of values, that we ‘test’ its authority, both 
its capacity to elicit the assent of others and its generativity in life.” Shulman, American Prophecy, 245. See also 
George Shulman, “Thinking Authority Democratically: Prophetic Practices, White Supremacy, and Democratic 
Politics,” Political Theory 36 (2008): 708-734. Linda Zerilli’s recent work has also examined the possibility of, as 
she says, “speaking truth politically” (as opposed to philosophically). Her conclusion is appropriately ambiva-
lent: “Democratic politics can be endangered by comprehensive truth claims, but also enabled—there is no 
guarantee, one way or the other.” Linda M.G. Zerilli, “Value Pluralism and the Problem of Judgment: Farewell 
to Public Reason,” Political Theory 40:1 (2012), 15. 
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proffered values. Following W.E.B. DuBois, it might be said that Brown (as well as Terry) 
“did not use argument. He was himself an argument.”106  They declare in their words and 
deeds, as Kimberley Curtis puts it, “Here I am in relation to our world. I offer you an invita-
tion, a solicitation. Join me. I provoke you. I demand of you that you countenance me as I 
see our world. Respond.”107  
Understood in this way, religious zealotry is an ever-present possibility and cannot be 
excised from the practice of American democratic politics. A democratic order necessarily 
rests on a foundation of past settlements regarding, among other questions, institutional 
structures, the process of disagreement, makeup of the demos, and so on. As Bonnie Honig 
and other theorists have point out, any distribution of power or system of legal order inevi-
tably engenders a set of remainders, those resistances and exclusions that are typically unac-
knowledged, depoliticized, privatized, and naturalized.108 That which exceeds (or falls out of) 
the established modes of disagreement and conflict will necessarily invite excessive acts in 
order to compel its recognition as a fully rendered object of contestation. When coupled 
with, on the one hand, the culture of engaged citizenship and participation that a democratic 
order encourages and demands and, on the other, the fact that the United States is, as Walt 
Whitman says, a “religious Democracy” where Christianity (and increasingly other religious 
                                                
106 W.E.B. DuBois, John Brown: A Biography, 173. This squares with Jane Addams’ hagiographical portrait of Leo 
Tolstoy and how he inspired others through his “sermon of the deed.” Jane Addams, Twenty Years at Hull House 
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1912), 157. Echoes of this position can also be found in Simon 
Critchley’s reading of Oscar Wilde’s notion of Jesus Christ as an “artistic exemplar.” According to Wilde, 
Christ is simultaneously artist and work of art who transfigures and gives outward form to inward suffering. 
Quoting Wilde: “[Christ] is just like a work of art. He does not really teach one anything, but by being brought 
into his presence one becomes something.” Simon Critchley, The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political The-
ology (London: Verso, 2012), 6. 
107 Kimberley F. Curtis, Our Sense of the Real: Aesthetic Experience and Arendtian Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), 120. See also Kimberley F. Curtis, “Aesthetic Foundations of Democratic Politics in the Work of 
Hannah Arendt,” in Hannah Arendt and the Meaning of Politics, edited by Craig Calhoun and John McGowan 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 27-52. 
108 Honig, especially Chapter Five. 
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traditions) are part and parcel of how citizens make meaning and claims, religious fanaticism 
remains a ready prospect.  
Conclusion  
Speaking of John Brown shortly after his execution, abolitionist Wendell Phillips re-
marked, “Wait awhile, and you’ll all agree with me. What is fanaticism today is the fashion-
able creed tomorrow, and trite as the multiplication table a week after.”109 Writing a half cen-
tury after Brown’s failed raid on Harpers Ferry, DuBois came to the same conclusion, writ-
ing, “Today at last we know: John Brown was right.”110 Yet even if the moral claim of racial 
equality staked out by Brown has since been vindicated, his religious fanaticism remains a 
point of contention, particularly when it is brought into the company of other so-called relig-
ious zealots. For instance, historian David Blight inquires, “Can John Brown remain an 
authentic American hero in an age of Timothy McVeigh, Usama bin Laden, and the bomb-
ers of abortion clinics?”111 
By bringing together Brown and Terry (as well as Hill), I have pursued an altogether 
different question from the explicitly normative evaluative one posed by Blight. Mine is not a 
project of categorically redeeming fanatics or sifting out “good” fanatics from “bad” (what-
ever those adjectives would mean in this context). Instead, this chapter has articulated relig-
ious fanaticism as a mode of claims making that is capable of being used for multiple politi-
cal projects. Brown and Terry model both the productive and troubling dimensions of relig-
ious fanaticism. As a mode of political contestation, these religious fanatics seek to unsettle 
the terms of speech, thought, and practice. Through these excessive enactments of faith, 
                                                
109 Phillips, 287. 
110 W.E.B. DuBois, John Brown (New York: International, 1987). 
111 David W. Blight, “John Brown: Triumphant Failure,” American Prospect, November 20, 2002. Accessed at: 




Brown and Terry understood themselves to be disrupting the existing economy of senti-
ments and perceptions in American society and, in turn, creating the conditions for moral 
and political reformation. 
There are real dangers and risks to the practice of fanaticism that should never fall 
out of view. There is a troubling tension between religious fanaticism and what some may 
identify as the deliberative or intersubjective norms required for democratic life, and I do not 
want to dismiss or resolve this tension. Indeed, it is this very tension—the dramatic confron-
tation with and unsettling of the existing grammar of feeling, thought, and practice—that 
zealots leverage in order to draw attention to what they see as the limits and partialities of 




“THE TONGUES OF FIRE”:  
RELIGIOUS FAITH, AESTHETIC PRACTICES, AND THE CONSTRUCTION  
OF THE SOCIAL GOSPEL COUNTER-CULTUS 
 
 
“The tongues of fire will descend on twentieth century 
men and give them great faith, joy and boldness, and then 
we shall hear the new evangel, and it will be the Old Gos-
pel.” 
— Walter Rauschenbusch, 
“The New Evangelism”1 
 
“Democracy like any other of the living faiths of men, is so 
essentially mystical that it continually demands new formu-
lation.” 
— Jane Addams, 
The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets2 
 
In the generations since its dissipation as an active religious force, the Social Gospel 
has been primarily understood through the critical-analytical lens provided by one man: 
Christian theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. Although he came of age during the ascendency of 
the Social Gospel, Niebuhr eventually became one of the movement’s most forceful critics, 
charging that the effort suffered from an essential optimism in human nature and social pro-
gress that, in turn, dulled its capacity for political action. Proponents of social change, Nie-
buhr insists, must be willing to get their hands dirty if they seek to affect reform and trans-
formation. The problem with contributors to the Social Gospel, then, was that they failed to 
                                                
1 Walter Rauschenbusch, “The New Evangelism,” The Independent 56 (May 12, 1904): 1058. 
2 Jane Addams, The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets (New York: Macmillan Company, 1920), 146 
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recognize that the “establishment of justice always involves a certain degree of pressure, of 
claims and counterclaims, of pushing and shoving.”3 Writing elsewhere, Niebuhr states, 
[The Social Gospel] was wrong in the optimism which assumed that the law of love 
needed only to be stated persuasively to overcome the selfishness of the human 
heart. The unhappy consequences of that optimism was to discourage interest in the 
necessary mechanisms of social justice at the precise moment in history when the 
development of a technical civilization required more than ever that social ideals be 
implemented with economic and political techniques, designed to correct the injus-
tices and brutalities which flow inevitably from an unrestrained and undisciplined ex-
ercise of economic power.4 
 
Niebuhr opposes the Social Gospel to his own theological approach, which he calls “Chris-
tian realism” and which emphasizes the persistence of sin and the necessity of coercive force 
for establishing social justice. “The law of love,” which Niebuhr takes to be the central ideo-
logical strut of the Social Gospel, can compel at the level of the individual but such an ap-
proach to social-structural dilemmas betrays an impoverished understanding of both Chris-
tian theology and political struggle. 
There is merit to Niebuhr’s agonistic characterization of political action and trans-
formation. Challenges to the established system of social arrangements must inevitably con-
front the countervailing force of the beneficiaries and stakeholders in that social order; there 
will necessarily be struggle and conflict in multiple venues, including that of organized poli-
tics, law, and culture, with any attempt at social or political change. Resisting the dismissive 
force of Niebuhr’s critique, however, Cornel West argues for a more pragmatic and worldly 
interpretation of the Social Gospel, writing that Walter Rauschenbusch, one of its principal 
intellectual forces, “believed that the riches of the Christian tradition can be brought to bear 
on the social misery, spiritual vacuity, and political hypocrisy of our day—and that our very 
                                                
3 Reinhold Niebuhr, “When Will Christians Stop Fooling Themselves?,” in Love and Justice: Selections from the 
Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, edited by D.B. Robertson (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1992), 
41.  
4 Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935), 171. See also 
Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: Scribner’s, 1932). 
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future depends on this precious yet fallible effort.”5 Even if we recognize the public sphere 
as a place of “claims and counterclaims, of pushing and shoving,” West suggests, the Social 
Gospel demonstrates that religious traditions have a value and place in the skirmishes that 
make up democratic life. 
 But what are these “riches of the Christian tradition,” and what do they ultimately 
contribute to collective efforts like the Social Gospel? How are religious traditions such as 
American Christianity involved in the profound changes of thought, feeling, and imagination 
necessary for the transformation of politics and political identifies? Moreover, given this dis-
sertation’s overarching concern for the lived experience of religion, what roles do religious 
aesthetics and practices play in the mobilizing communities of conviction and action such as 
the Social Gospel?  
In order to address these questions and conceptualize the relationship of politics, 
aesthetics, and faith, this chapter examines the Social Gospel public of the 1890s and early 
1900s and the political work done by its repertoire of aesthetics and practices.6 Such an 
                                                
5 Cornel West, “Can These Dry Bones Live?,” in Christianity and the Social Crisis in the 21st Century, edited by Paul 
Rauschenbusch (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2007), [page number]. It must be said that Niebuhr’s characteriza-
tion of the Social Gospel as politically naïve requires some selective reading of Rauschenbusch and his cohort 
of thinkers and activists. In Christianizing the Social Order, for instance, Rauschenbusch is clear that “intellectual 
persuasion and moral conviction…would never by themselves overcome the resistance of selfishness and con-
servatism” (368). Elsewhere in that same text he writes, “Moral suasion is strangely feeble where the sources of 
a man’s income are concerned” (31). 
6 A preliminary note on terminology is in order.  
 First, as established in previous chapters, I use the term aesthetics along the meaning of the ancient Greek 
concept of aisthesis. Put differently, I mean to capture the intermeshing of sensation and perception with ways 
of processing and making sense and meaning of the world. 
 Throughout this chapter I use the terms the “Social Gospel” and the “Social Gospel public” interchangea-
bly. I specifically avoid the language of the “Social Gospel Movement” since it connotes a quality of coordina-
tion and organized collective action that is not in evidence in this particular case (as I discuss in Section 1 of 
this chapter). Even as it is frequently referred to in the singular as a movement or a coordinated coalition, the 
Social Gospel more precisely consisted of a variegated array of actors and organizations with disparate prescrip-
tive programs that ranged from progressive reform of social structures to conservative systems of private char-
ity. Given this fact, it may be more appropriate to speak of the Social Gospel as a religious public rather than a 
movement or coalition in as much as this phrasing better captures the diffuse and heterogeneous mix of groups 
and individuals that have particular intellectual, theological, and practical affinities. I discuss the concept of 
publics and religious publics at length in Section Four of the chapter. 
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analysis not only challenges Niebuhr’s disparaging characterization of the Social Gospel as 
socially utopian and politically misguided but also facilitates a richer understanding of the 
mutual cultivation of religious faith and a religious public. Rather than holding to the precept 
that “the law of love needed only to be stated persuasively” in order to engender social 
transformation, the Social Gospel demonstrates an understanding that “the necessary 
mechanisms of social justice” involve the cultivation and configuration of faith and/as ac-
tion. I argue that the Social Gospel crafted religious subjectivities disposed towards worldly 
activity and social justices with and through its body of aesthetic formations. These aesthetic 
formations, as well as the public activity of Social Gospel figures in the Progressive Party, 
labor unions, and settlement movement, composed a counter-public that attempted to dis-
lodge the liberal-individualist hegemony ascendant at the turn of the century. In developing 
this argument I elaborate on two key conceptualizations introduced in earlier chapters: first, 
the repertoire of pious forms and actions within a religious tradition, which I refer to as a 
cultus, and second, religious faith as the union of an orientation to the world and an atten-
dant comportment or mode of action. 
My analysis proceeds by interweaving a theoretical account of religious aesthetics 
with a historically grounded analysis of the Social Gospel. I begin by first providing a short 
historical and ideological sketch of the Social Gospel. Besides fleshing out the context and 
content of this particular religious public through the works of theologian Walter Rauschen-
busch, I use this sketch as a springboard to revisit and refine my account of religious faith 
and aesthetics. Rather than assuming an “expressive” account of religious aesthetics, wherein 
                                                                                                                                            
 The Social Gospel offers a fruitful site for such an analysis because of its decentralized architecture; given 
its formal detachment from the extant structures of religious authority and institutions, the Social Gospel oper-
ates as an insurgent religious public primarily constituted in and through a diffuse circulation of media and me-
diating practices. Though the Social Gospel reached its zenith at the turn of the twentieth century—and thus 
well before the ascendency of so-called new media—I take it up as a revealing (and curiously neglected, at least 




liturgical practices and forms are imagined as passive vehicles for some preexisting religious 
content, I present an account of how religious traditions are dynamic technologies that help 
give shape to emergent political subjects and communities. Through a critical engagement 
with Charles Clayton Morrison, I develop a theoretical account of the cultus and briefly sur-
vey materials within the counter-cultus of the Social Gospel. I close my discussion by draw-
ing out how this cultic configuration contributes to the formation of the Social Gospel 
counter-public through its cultivation of a disposition towards practical, public action such 
as that exemplified by the socio-political activity of Hull House co-founder Jane Addams. 
§ 1. A Practical Guide to 
Immanentizing the Eschaton 
 
The closing decades of the nineteenth century were, as historian Arthur Schlesinger, 
Sr. described, “a critical period in American religion.”7 During this time period, strains of 
Christianity in the United States confronted the myriad problems associated with the emer-
gence of modernity, most especially the acute social dislocations and perturbations caused by 
the advancing forces of industrialization and urbanization. These economic and sociological 
developments, which had begun in earnest in the 1850’s, ushered in a new constellation of 
conflicts and dilemmas, including a precipitous increase in class antagonism and poverty. 
Walter Rauschenbusch, a Baptist minister and perhaps the best-known theologian affiliated 
with the Social Gospel, described these issues as follows: 
We have the incredible paradox of modern life. The instrument by which all human-
ity could rise from want and fear of want actually submerged a large part of the peo-
ple in perpetual want and fear. When wealth was multiplying beyond all human 
precedent, an immense body of pauperism with all its allied misery was growing up 
                                                
7 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., A Critical Period in American Religion 1875-1900 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967). 
Fellow historian Richard Hofstatder echoes this characterization of the monumental character of the period, 
calling it “a phase in the history of the Protestant conscience, a latter-day Protestant revival.” Richard Hofstat-
der, The Age of Reform (New York: Knopf, 1955), 152. For a general account of how Protestant institutions re-
sponded to the particular shocks and pressures of this time period, see Henry F. May, Protestant Churches and 
Industrial America (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949). 
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and becoming chronic… [W]hile the nation was attaining unparalleled wealth and 
power, many of its people were horribly destitute and degraded.8 
 
With the rise of corporations, the capitalist class (especially the so-called “robber barons”), 
and organized labor unions, a number of Protestants including Rauschenbusch came to feel 
that Christian institutions had lost traction with the this-worldly issues of the day and risked 
alienating the sizable bulk of working class parishioners.9 The sting of the resulting critique 
was remarkably broad, finding fault with the institutional order of American society. While 
the structures of capitalism were identified as exploitative, dehumanizing, and impoverishing, 
the various levels of government were seen as morally compromised by the pull of self-
interest and capital. Given the apparent complicity of religious authorities with an unjust 
economic order and a system of government that was only nominally democratic, contribu-
tors to the Social Gospel argued for the need to re-make and revivify the Christian tradition. 
 Although they were united by a shared sense of catastrophe, the particular manner 
by which members of the Social Gospel conceptualized the present crisis and the solutions 
they proposed varied sharply. The heterogeneity of these networks and the lack of any cen-
tralized institution or coordinating authority allowed for a spectrum of political stances rang-
ing from a revival of Victorian social values to more radical arguments for Christian-socialist 
remedies.10 As numerous scholars have argued, American Christianity’s confrontation with 
the transformative effects of modernity at this time set the stage for the division of Ameri-
can Christianity into overtly liberal-progressive and conservative-fundamentalist partisan 
camps that persist into the twenty-first century. This historical moment figures prominently 
                                                
8 Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis (New York: Macmillan, 1907), 217-18. 
9 See Robert T. Handy, A Christian America: Protestant Hopes and Historical Realities, second edition (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1984); Charles A. Briggs, “The Alienation of Church and People,” Forum XVI (1893): 
366-78; Arthur T. Pierson, “Christian Cooperation and the Social Mission of the Church,” Missionary Review of 
the World XVII (1894): 163-65; James O. Fagan, “The Cheapening of Religion,” The Atlantic CVI (1910): 455. 
10 Ronald C. White, Jr. and C. Howard Hopkins, The Social Gospel: Religion and Reform in Changing America (Phila-
delphia: Temple University Press, 1976), xviii; and C. Howard Hopkins, The Rise of the Social Gospel in American 
Protestantism, 1865-1915 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 319. 
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in the historical narrative of American religious and partisan development referred to as “the 
two-party thesis.” As popularized by historian Martin E. Marty, this theory posits a vision of 
“two-party Protestantism” that features a split between a public or progressive Protestan-
tism, which is oriented towards social reform, and a private or pietistic Protestantism that is 
more concerned with individual salvation. 11 The majority of the members of the Social 
Gospel, however, were moderately progressive in their political agenda, arguing that struc-
tural reforms rather than fundamental revolutionary transformations were necessary to alle-
viate the conditions wrought by industrial capitalism while accommodating the continued 
existence of the capitalist system into the foreseeable future. Thus, the most common sug-
gestions for practical transformation included extending the efforts of the church and the 
state to provide welfare services for the poor and destitute, regulating labor conditions and 
curbing the excesses and vicissitudes of industrial capitalism, reorienting religious institutions 
and theology to the felt needs and anxieties of parishioners, and the regulation, even crimi-
nalization, of morally problematic or repellant practices such as prostitution, child labor, and 
alcoholism.12  
 Of course, since the Social Gospel is, as H. Richard Niebuhr (Reinhold’s brother) 
says, a “multifarious thing,” my aim here are not to attempt any comprehensive account of 
it. 13 Rather I want to use the theological writings of Rauschenbusch (as well as other affili-
                                                
11 Martin E. Marty, Righteous Empire: The Protestant Experience in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). See 
also Robert Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) for a 
similar historical account. For attempts to locate this shift into realignment theories of American political de-
velopment, see Richard J. Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1896 (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1971); and Paul Kleppner, Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnouts, 1870-1980 
(New York: Praeger, 1982). 
12 Robin W. Lovin, Religion and American Public Life: Interpretations and Explorations (New York: Paulist Press, 
1986), 7-28; and James A. Morone, Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2003), 348. 
13 F. Richard Niebuhr, The Kingdom of God in America (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937), 183. He elaborates 
this further in another work, writing, “There is a vast difference between the social gospels, let us say, of 
Rauschenbusch and Peabody, an even greater difference between Shailer Mathews and Harry Ward.” H. Rich-
ard Niebuhr, “The Social Gospel and the Mind of Jesus,” Journal of Religious Ethics 16 (1988): 115. 
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ated thinkers) in order to highlight one—arguably, the—dominant ideological thread in the 
broader fabric of the Social Gospel. From that account of Rauschenbusch’s progressive 
formulation of social Christianity, begin to develop a theoretical framework that attends to 
the constitutive aesthetic dimensions of the Social Gospel and religious publics in general. 
According to Rauschenbusch, the variegated activities and efforts of the Social Gos-
pel—which included activity in the settlement movement, charitable service, and advocacy 
for social justice—were directed towards what he refers to as the Christianization of the so-
cial order. In his articulation of this objective, Rauschenbusch was at pains to clarify that it 
does not involve “putting the name of Christ into the Constitution of the United States” or 
“making Christian belief and worship a compulsory duty of citizenship.”14 It is not, in short, 
a matter of establishing a Christian theocracy in the United States wherein the institutions of 
church and state are fused together. Shailer Mathews, another prominent figure in the Social 
Gospel, characterized this mission to Christianize American society as “the application of 
the teaching of Jesus and the total message of the Christian salvation to society, the eco-
nomic life, and social institutions such as the state [and] the family, as well as individuals.”15 
The moral principles extolled and performed by Jesus Christ thus stand not only as the aspi-
rational measure of individual behavior but also social, political, and economic arrangements.  
The Christocentric account offered by proponents of the Social Gospel such as 
Rauschenbusch and Mathews accomplishes this shift in focus from the individual to the 
level of social structures by de-centering the figure of Christ as a martyr suffering for salva-
tion and instead emphasizing that of the social reformer and political revolutionary. The 
Christ of the Social Gospel is remarkable in that he sought to dismantle existing systems of 
                                                
14 Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianizing the Social Order (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2010), 124. 
15 Shailer Mathews, “Social Gospel,” in A Dictionary of Religion and Ethics, edited by Shailer Mathews and G.B. 
Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 416-17; quoted in Edwards and Gifford, “Introduction,” 2. 
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power and erect in their place “a new spirit plus new forms and customs and institutions.”  
Rauschenbusch depicts Christ in terms strikingly similar to that of Gramsci’s organic intel-
lectual disrupting the hegemonic order. Rauschenbusch writes, “Such a reversal of values 
presupposes sweeping changes in the general conceptions and judgments prevalent in hu-
man society, and necessarily also in the social and political institutions in which these con-
ceptions and judgments find their embodiment.”16 To act as Christ would—that is, to be a 
Christian in a fully realized sense—demands more than a modulation of individual morality 
and behavior; the Christian subject must necessarily be socially engaged and politically active, 
for it is only through collective action that the community can be remade and rendered just. 
 The Christianization of the polity would simultaneously achieve the end of social 
salvation, the elimination of structural sin, and the materialization of the Kingdom of God. 
As distinct from the conventional imagining of the Kingdom of God as located in an other-
worldly or transcendent realm, Rauschenbusch re-defines the Kingdom of God as a mode of 
social being that is at least partially realizable on earth. While this is unusual in itself, the So-
cial Gospel’s Kingdom is curious in two other respects. In the first place it is not, properly 
speaking, a Kingdom; for while the Christian God figures as a nominal monarch, the King-
dom is radically democratized. Indeed, Rauschenbusch declares, “We must democratize the 
conception of God” so that the Christian imaginary is not captured by the framework of 
“despotic governments.”17 The first duty of Christian subjects is not to “bow to the royal 
will” but exercise an ethic of care and recognition that embraces all one’s fellow beings. Ac-
cording to Rauschenbusch, democracy must be the measure and model for all institutions, 
                                                
16 Walter Rauschenbusch, “The Righteousness of the Kingdom,” in White and Hopkins, 41. 
17 Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel (New York: Macmillan, 1917), 48. Shailer Mathews 
speaks similarly of the need for a “religion for democracy” that democratizes God. He writes, “Our inherited 
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is already with difficulty appreciated and understood by men…of democratic ideals.” Quoted in Susan Curtis, 




including those in the domains of the economy and religion. Second, and related to this first 
aspect, unlike the messianic narrative that casts the coming of the Kingdom as a matter of 
“divine catastrophe” that involves the abrupt and direct intercession of God into the tempo-
ral world, Rauschenbusch’s vision of the Kingdom is resolutely organic and the product of 
collective action. It arises not from the singular will of a divine sovereign but must be the 
product of a joint effort of humanity and God. In developing this notion, Rauschenbusch 
relies on his account of Jesus Christ as political actor: 
While [Jews under Roman rule] were waiting for the Messianic cataclysm that would 
bring the kingdom of God ready-made from heaven, [Jesus] saw it growing up 
among them. He took his illustrations of its coming from organic life. It was like the 
seed scattered by the peasant, growing slowly and silently, night and day, by its own 
germinating force and the food furnished by the earth… He was seeking to displace 
the crude and misleading catastrophic conceptions by a saner theory about the com-
ing of the kingdom.18 
 
The “saner theory” of the Kingdom of God that Rauschenbusch draws from his reading of 
Christ moves from the model of the eschaton, or final movement of human history, as an 
exogenous action done to society to an endogenous process that arises—percolates—out of 
political action and democratic struggle within society. It is not so much a matter of an im-
manentizing rupture that brings about the eschaton, as the messianic imagination would 
have it, but an asymptotic progression that builds gradually towards a goal that it can per-
petually move closer to yet never reach. The Kingdom of God on earth is always a Kingdom 
to come, since human structures and actions will always fall short of the aspirational ideal of 
justice and equality. “We ask for no Utopian delusion,” Rauschenbusch writes. “We know 
well that there is no perfection for man in this life: there is only growth toward perfection.”19 
                                                
18 Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis, 59. 
19 Ibid., 420. Earlier in this same text, Rauschenbusch again rejects the viability of the full actualization of the 
Kingdom of Heaven on the mortal or profane plane of existence, stating, “Even a Christian social order cannot 
mean perfection. As long as men are flesh and blood the world can be neither sinless nor painless” (126). 
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 The Social Gospel’s emphasis on the inherent communal or collective nature of sal-
vation bears, at least at first glance, a resemblance to the prophetic models of judgment dis-
cussed in prior chapters. As discussed in another chapters, the political performances of the 
Christian abolitionists William Lloyd Garrison and John Brown as well as that of late-
twentieth century anti-abortion activist Randall Terry all relied on a motif of collective guilt. 
According to the narrative logic of the jeremiad, a society that countenanced or condoned 
injustice, whether it was slavery or abortion, was subject to the judgment of God for those 
sins unless it worked to redeem itself through the negation of those immoral institutions and 
practices. The model offered by the Social Gospel tracks a similar logic of generalized re-
sponsibility so that society rather than the individual becomes the level of critique and trans-
formation. Rauschenbusch explains, “The kingdom of God is still a collective conception, 
involving the whole social life of man. It is not a matter of saving human atoms, but of sav-
ing the social organism. It is not a matter of getting individuals to heaven, but of transform-
ing the life on earth into the harmony of heaven.”20  
Yet while this concern for the social order echoes the prophetic rhetoric of the pre-
vious generation of evangelical abolitionists (and also similarly breaks from the dominant 
Protestant stress on individual salvation), the Social Gospel shifts emotional registers from 
one of fear to one of hope. The potentiality posed by the Social Gospel is not the one 
evoked by Garrison—and two hundred years before him, John Winthrop—of a vengeful 
God judging American society and punishing it for its errancy if it does not act to redeem 
itself. The rhetoric of sinfulness, it should be said, persists. “The great sin of men,” 
Rauschenbusch argues, “is to resist the reformation of predatory society.”21 Indeed, struc-
tural evil and corporate sin figure prominently in the discourse of the Social Gospel, yet the 
                                                
20 Ibid., 65. 
21 Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, 184. 
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language of collective sin is not paired with a narrative of a fall and a potential divine judg-
ment. Rather than the fear of any imminent punishment, Rauschenbusch invokes a hopeful 
repentance that, through collective efforts, can be the handmaiden of social salvation. 
 So far I have followed more or less the traditional account of the Social Gospel, 
which presents it as, first and foremost, an historical flashpoint in the development of lib-
eral-progressive theology in the United States.22 In approaching and defining the Social Gos-
pel as an ideological or theological movement, however, we risk the exclusion of salient as-
pects and elements that are not captured by these categories. One obvious consequence of 
such a narrow sense of the Social Gospel, for example, is the occlusion of the contributions 
of racial minorities and women who were active in efforts associated with the broader socio-
political project but not involved in the production of theological knowledge.23 The neglect 
of these actors and activities is especially ironic since Rauschenbusch and other advocates 
for the Social Gospel argued that, as Susan Lindley states, “practice and experience precede 
and are more consequential than theory.”24 The privileging of practical action resounds 
throughout Rauschenbusch’s work, even as he is most remembered for his campaign to cod-
ify the Social Gospel in theological discourse. He consistently presents the role of himself 
and other theologians as trying to give intellectual systematicity to something already present 
and active in the social world. “We have a social gospel,” he writes at the outset of A Theology 
for the Social Gospel. “We need a systematic theology large enough to match it and vital enough 
                                                
22 This is reflected, for example, in the title of Gary Dorrien’s three-volume history of the period, The Making of 
Liberal Theology: Imagining Progressive Religion (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001). 
23 There have been recent efforts at correcting these oversights. See, e.g., Gender and the Social Gospel, edited by 
Wendy K. Deichmann Edwards and Carolyn De Swarte Gifford (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003); 
Ralph E. Luker, The Social Gospel in Black and White: American Racial Reform, 1885-1912 (Chapel Hill: The Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1991); and Gary Scott Smith, The Search for Social Salvation: Social Christianity and 
America, 1880-1925 (New York: Lexington Books, 2000).  
24 Susan Lindley, “‘Neglected Voices’ and Praxis in the Social Gospel,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 18:1 (1990): 
75. White and Hopkins strike a similar note in their remarking that the Social Gospel “coalesced more around 
action than belief” (xvi). 
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to back it.”25 Yet even as he musters a case for the importance of—indeed, the “need” for—
constructing a theological articulation and complement for the Social Gospel, Rauschen-
busch also speaks dismissively of this enterprise, describing theology as “the esoteric thought 
of the Church” that perpetually risks “senility.”26  
The implication of Rauschenbusch’s presentation of theology is that the Christian 
tradition, properly understood, is a living faith, a praxis, that operates not singularly through 
ideology but also, dialectically, through the performances of Christian subjects. For its part, 
theology marks the attempt to give intellectual coherence to the meanings and practices at 
any given historical moment within a specific tradition. The task of a religious public such as 
the Social Gospel, then, is to reconfigure the body of accepted discourses and practices, so 
as to maintain some connection with the existing tradition while also remaking it. “That is in 
fact,” according to Rauschenbusch, “the process with every great, creative religious mind: 
the connection with the past is maintained and the old terms are used, but they are set in 
new connections and filled with new qualities.”27 The Social Gospel and other attempts at re-
creating a tradition are thus practical efforts at threading together innovation and continuity. 
Furthermore, understanding religion as a matter of worldly activity, members of the Social 
Gospel actively worked to cultivate Christian subjects oriented towards performing their 
faith in the public sphere. 
To take up Rauschenbusch’s invitation to think more expansively and inclusively 
about what constitutes the Social Gospel entails considering not just these theological-
                                                
25 Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, 1. Rauschenbusch’s account of theology as necessary but also 
derivative tracks a distinction that can be made between first-and-second-order religious languages. Philosopher 
of religion John Hick explains these different categories as follows: “First-order religious language, as we find 
in prayer and prophecy and proclamation, in the confession of sin and the spontaneous utterances of love and 
joy, and awe in the presence of the Lord, is the expression of faith. The language of theology, on the other 
hand, is a second-order language which treats the first-order expressions of faith as data to be interpreted in 
systematic theories.” John Hick, “Foreword,” in The Meaning and End of Religion, xi. 
26 Ibid., 15, 12. 
27 Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis, 57. 
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ideological formulations. Analysis must attend to the practical dimensions of religious faith 
and the aesthetic formations that cultivate these performative capacities, including the body 
of novels, sermons, periodicals, hymnals, prayer books, essays, and pamphlets that make up 
the Social Gospel public. Historians Ronald White and C. Howard Hopkins evoke the scope 
and intensity of this public of letters, images, and music, writing: 
The ideas and hopes [of the Social Gospel] thus generated were portrayed in fiction; 
at least one such tract in which religiously-motivated reform was depicted, borne on 
a slender plot with a sentimental romance, rivaled the Bible itself in popularity. Doz-
ens of magazines, Sunday School lessons, home missionary courses, and Christian 
socialist papers all sought to reach the church-going public. Denominational presses 
published their own materials while church federations emphasized the values of co-
operation. The more sensitive religious leaders realized that the social gospel would 
lack emotional drive until it became an accepted part of the Christian cultus, so men 
like Walter Rauschenbusch and Frank Mason North wrote prayers and composed 
new hymns often set to old tunes.28 
 
In opening up the category of the Social Gospel and recognizing contributions and compo-
nents that fall outside the typical theological account, however, there is an attendant need to 
re-think what political work is being done by these works and practices. Together with 
Rauschenbusch’s foregrounding of the social practices of Christianity, White and Hopkins’s 
gestures towards the cultural and practical infrastructure of the Social Gospel offer the 
foundation for constructing a more nuanced account of the political mechanics of the Social 
Gospel. In the next section I provide a theoretical articulation of the relationship between 
aesthetics and religious faith that I will then use as an analytical lens for the specific case of 
the Social Gospel in Section Three. 
§ 2. The Aesthetics of Faith 
 
                                                
28 White and Hopkins, 130. See also Curtis, 4-5. In a statement reflecting their central concern with gender, but 
that nevertheless resonates with the expansive view articulated by White and Hopkins, Edwards and Gifford 
write, “The definition [of the Social Gospel] should be informed not only by theological treatises, sermons, and 
philosophical monologues, but also by minutes of meetings and other publications produced by women’s home 




Faith is ubiquitous throughout human societies. Although this is most certainly true, 
the language of ‘faith,’ at least inasmuch as it indexes a common sense understanding of re-
ligion as a matter of holding certain beliefs, risks returning any theoretical project to the nar-
row Protestant Christian conception of religion discussed in the Introduction. As mentioned 
in earlier chapters, I understand religious faith to be an orientation or sense of the world that 
is constructed with and through practice. Recall that Antonio Gramsci defines religion as “a 
unity of faith between a conception of the world and a corresponding norm of conduct.”29 
Built into the conception of religion is the notion that faith is enacted, and religious subjec-
tivities fashioned, principally through the inherited forms and idioms that make up religious 
traditions. In this light, religious traditions necessarily involve technologies and techniques of 
mediation that are used to engender relationships with the sacred or divine and that, in turn, 
shape the minds and bodies of religious subjects. 
As analyzed in the Introduction, the prevailing understanding of religion in the West 
is marked by a recognizably Protestant Christian stress on the unmediated nature of the rela-
tionship between individual believer and divinity in which the religious experience is princi-
pally a matter of dematerialized spirituality and interior belief.30 Such a sensibility manifests 
                                                
29 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, translated by Quintin Hoare and Goeffrey Nowell Smith 
(New York: International Publishers, 1971), 326. 
30 The field of religious studies scholarship has been host to a remarkable surge of interest regarding the inter-
section of religion and media over the past two decades. Motivated in large part by the increasing incorporation 
of new media and mass media forms into the practice of religious worship, work in this subfield has precipi-
tated a transformation in how these two concepts are seen as relating to one another. In the traditional (and still 
quite common place) understandings of the terms, religion and media are figured as operating in incongruous 
and oppositional ontological realms. So imagined, media consists of materiality, technology, and instrumental-
ity, whereas religion is correspondingly conceived as involving systems of abstract beliefs regarding the sacred 
and the transcendental. The two concepts seemingly work at cross-purposes: media commodifies, cheapens, 
and disenchants through a process of publicizing and disseminating to a broad, often open-ended audience 
while religion proffers the resources for a supposedly authentic personal experience and knowledge of the 
cosmological order. Further, media, particularly mass media, appears in this narrative as the avatar of the mod-
ern public sphere that aided in the ostensible privatization of religion. One consequence of this line of thinking 
is that the mediatization of religion—that is, the increasing reliance on popular media forms such as television, 
advertisements, and the Internet as a means and logic of religious communication—is frequently interpreted as 
a process of profanation and secularization. To intertwine religion and aesthetics/media, it would seem, entails 
an inevitable vitiation of religion and religious traditions. 
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in the work of comparative religious scholar Wilfred Cantwell Smith, who attempts to avoid 
essentialist definitions of ‘religion’ but nonetheless articulates a conception of religious faith 
as a prior inner state that “must eventuate in faith-inspired practice.”31 The theory of religion 
that Smith develops in The Meaning and End of Religion abandons the ambition of articulating a 
unitary concept of ‘religion’ built around some universal essence. Instead, Smith distills a 
model that involves two interrelated concepts: religious faith and religious traditions (what 
Smith refers to as “cumulative traditions” since they are the cumulative results of the sedi-
mentation and alteration that occurs throughout history). The first of these concepts, faith, is 
inexorably personal and interior; it is “an inner religious experience or involvement of a par-
ticular person; the impingement on him of the transcendent, putative or real.”32 Religious 
                                                                                                                                            
 For illustrative examples of such scholarship, see, e.g., Religion and Media, edited by Hent de Vries and 
Samuel Weber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Key Words in Religion, Media and Culture, edited by 
David Morgan (New York: Routledge, 2008); Rethinking Media, Religion, and Culture, edited by Stewart M. Hoo-
ver and Knut Lundby (London: Sage Publications, Inc., 1997); Practicing Religion in the Age of Media: Explorations 
in Media, Religion, and Culture, edited by Stewart M. Hoover and Lynn Schofield Clark (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002); and Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere, edited by Brigit Meyer and Annelies Moors 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). Even as this coterie of anthologies might suggest an explosion 
of scholarship investigating religion and media, there continue to be suggestions that the religion-media nexus 
remains significantly understudied. See Daniel A. Stout and Judith M. Buddenbaum, “Genealogy of an Emerg-
ing Field: Foundations for the Study of Media and Religion,” Journal of Media and Religion 1:1 (2002): 5-12; Judith 
M. Buddenbaum and Daniel A. Stout, “Religion and Mass Media Use: A Review of the Mass Communication 
and Sociology Literature,” in Religion and Mass Media: Audiences and Adaptations, edited by Daniel A. Stout and 
Judith M. Buddenbaum (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996): 12-34. 
 For genealogical accounts of the move to a spiritualized rather than materialized conception of religion, 
see Matthew Engelke, “Material Religion,” in The Cambridge Companion to Religious Studies, edited by Robert Orsi 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 209-29; Peter J. Pels, “The Modern Fear of Matter: Reflections 
on the Protestantism of Victorian Science,” Material Religion 4.3 (2008): 264-83; and Webb Keane, Christian Mod-
erns: Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). 
31 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 179.  
32 Smith, 156. Smith’s logical and analytical prioritization of faith is far from idiosyncratic in scholarship on 
religion. A similar individualistic conception of religion informs the philosophical work of William James, who 
defines religion as meaning “the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they 
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they consider divine.” William James, The Varieties of 
Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Penguin, 1982), Lecture 2.  
 Max Weber’s sociological investigations of religion offer yet another analytical framework that de-
emphasizes the mediatic and aesthetic dimensions of religious traditions. In “Religious Rejections of the World 
and Their Directions,” Weber establishes an evolutionary trajectory from earlier, “lower” religious traditions in 
which outward forms were foregrounded to more recent religious formations that center on salvation and ra-
tional ethics. Writing on his normatively charged evolution of religiosity, Weber states, “All sublimated religions 
of salvation have focused on the meaning alone, not upon form, of the things and actions relevant for salva-
tion. Salvation religions have devalued form as contingent, as something creaturely and distracting from mean-
ing” (341). When salvation religions do make use of mediating forms and aesthetic media, Weber argues, they 
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traditions, by contrast, are the products of human creativity and struggle that provide an 
ideological or symbolic apparatus for giving outward form and expression to this personal 
experience. Traditions are assemblages that change over time but retain a functional utility in 
that they are “device[s] by which the human mind may rewardingly and without distortion 
introduce intelligibility into the vast flux of human history or any given part of it.”33 Smith’s 
model posits a necessary gap or disjunction between inner belief (inside) and external ex-
pression (outside), with the interior dimension of faith operating as the driving engine of re-
ligious formations. Following the familiar Protestant-liberal demarcation between public ex-
pression and private belief, Smith characterizes religious traditions as the mere outward and 
“always imperfect” expression—“a channel, and at worst a substitute”34—for the transcen-
dent and internal stuff of religious faith. Smith repeatedly characterizes religious traditions as 
a coterie of epiphenomenal “expressions” dependent on a prior religious faith for their exis-
tence and persistence over time. The materials of religious traditions are nothing more than 
the media through which internal faith becomes actualized and manifested publically. 
Yet, contra Smith, religious traditions can be conceptualized as not singularly expres-
sive of faith but also as formative of that faith and the subjectivity of the religious practitio-
ner. This complication of Smith’s inner belief/outer expression model forms the crux of Ta-
lal Asad’s critique of The Meaning and End of Religion. Asad writes, “[T]he man or woman of 
faith is not a split subject (as Smith has it) living, on the one hand, in a pressured, imperfect, 
particularized world and, on the other hand, always linked through his or her faith to another 
                                                                                                                                            
are typically employed for the purposes of “emotional propaganda” (343). Max Weber, “Religious Rejections of 
the World and Their Directions,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright 
Mills (London: Routledge, 1970). Cf. Birgit Meyer, “Aesthetics of Persuasion: Global Christianity and Pente-
costalism’s Sensational Forms,” South Atlantic Quarterly 109:4 (2010): 744-46; and Bernice Martin, “The Aesthet-
ics of Latin American Pentecostalism: The Sociology of Religion and the Problem of Taste,” in Materializing 
Religion: Expression, Performance, and Ritual, edited by Elizabeth Arweck and William Keenan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2006), 141. 
33 Ibid., 169. 
34 Ibid., 129. 
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world transcending this. Faith is inseparable from the particularities that inhabit it.”35 Rather 
than a compartmentalized model of subjectivity that positions traditional practices as exte-
rior to and derivative of faith, Asad suggests a holistic model, wherein faith and practice are 
interdependent and co-productive. If an integrated subject is the point of departure, the con-
ceptual relationship between faith (that is, the sense of experiencing the transcendent and the 
feelings, desires, and attitudes that spring from that experience) and tradition becomes dia-
lectical rather than unilateral. Faith can no longer exist as a logically or phenomenologically 
pre-given element or essence that results (“eventuates”) in the creation, adoption, or revision 
of an expressive tradition. Instead of this unidirectional relation, Asad advances a possibility 
that the forms and practices that make up a religious tradition can “constitute the precondi-
tions of faith among humans” and can have the capacity to “fashion faith.”36  
Asad’s inversion of Smith’s conceptual ordering echoes Pascal’s axiom on the me-
chanics of faith: “[W]e must kneel, pray with the lips, &c., in order that proud man, who 
would not submit himself to God, may be now subject to the creature.”37 While of course 
differing in many significant respects, Asad and Pascal overlap in identifying religious subjec-
tivity as conditioned on practice and form. Such a dynamic is most pronounced perhaps in 
the phenomenon of conversion, wherein an addressee of religious rhetoric and participant in 
liturgical practices experiences a fundamental re-orientation of her sense of the world and 
                                                
35 Talal Asad, “Reading a Modern Classic: W.C. Smith’s ‘The Meaning and End of Religion,’” in Religion and 
Media, edited by Hent de Vries and Samuel Weber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 139. 
36 Ibid., 140. 
37 Blaise Pascal, Thoughts, translated by W.F. Trotter (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909-14), Section IV: Of 
the Mean of Belief, § 250. Louis Althusser’s gloss on this passage is even more on point: “Pascal says more or 
less: ‘Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe.’” Althusser invokes Pascal as a means of ar-
ticulating how ideology infuses and informs practice, endowing ideology with a material existence that, by being 
performed, continually instantiates individuals as subjects. See Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation),” in Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays, translated by Ben 
Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 127-188. 
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imagined her place in it. The process of conversion dramatically illuminates how, through an 
encounter with religious traditions, faith can be created, remade, and potentially lost. 
A religious tradition, per Asad’s reformulation, is an existential complex in as much it 
gives possibility and form to religious (or numinous) experience. In a remarkable passage 
that prefigures much of Asad’s criticism, Smith remarks that “even so careful a thinker as 
Aquinas would at different times apply [religio] to at least three different things: the outward 
expression of faith; the inner motivation towards worshipping God, and that worship itself; 
and…the bond that unites the soul with God.”38 What Smith writes off as an instance of in-
tellectual carelessness, however, Asad characterizes as the manifold nature and effects of re-
ligious practice—what fellow religious scholar R.R. Marett calls “the organic complex of 
thought, emotion, and behaviour” that makes up “religion as a whole.”39 Indeed, Asad takes 
issue with Smith’s general avoidance and slighting of practices and aesthetic forms as consti-
tutive components of religious traditions:  
[Smith’s conception of] tradition is thought of as a cognitive framework, not as a 
practical mode of living, not as techniques for teaching body and mind to cultivate 
specific virtues and abilities that have been authorized, passed on, and reformulated 
down the generations. Concrete traditions are not thought of as sound and visual 
imagery, as language uttered and inscribed (on paper, wood, stone, or film), or re-
corded in electronic media. They are not thought of as ways in which the body learns 
to paint and see, to sing and hear, to dance and observe… Yet such matters cannot 
be separated from the force and function of religious traditions—and thus of relig-
ious experiences.40 
 
With such an expanded sense of what is entailed by a religious tradition, it is possible to con-
ceptualize these traditions as technologies of the self, that is, an assemblage of discourses 
and practices capable of being used to shape the mind and body of a religious practitioner. 
All of these components provide the foundation and framework for knowing and sensing 
                                                
38 Smith, 32. 
39 R.R. Marett, Threshold of Religion (London: Methuen & Co., 1914), x. Quoted in Meyer, “Religious Sensations,” 
708. 
40 Asad, 141. 
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the sacred—for, in a phrase, possessing a religious experience and inhabiting religious faith. 
The particular configurations of social structures, corporeal techniques, aesthetic forms, 
creeds, and ritual practices that constitute historical religions make faith possible as a dimen-
sion of life. 
Liturgical forms and aesthetic practices are encompassed by religious traditions and 
enable subjects to locate themselves in an order of the world, fashion their identity, and in-
teract in a meaningful manner with elements in the temporal and transcendent worlds.41 
Given its radical remove from the temporal (or profane) world, the transcendent or sacred 
can only be made present through some manner of mediation. In order to think, speak, or 
act upon the sacred, a religious practitioner must use media or mediating practices, including 
“written texts, ritual gestures, images and icons, architecture, music, incense, special gar-
ments, saintly relics and other objects of veneration, markings upon flesh, wagging tongues 
and other body parts.”42 Religious experience, per Asad’s reformulation, is not just facilitated 
or expressed by these forms but ultimately constituted and realized through a repertoire of 
mediating practices, and these practices of mediation entail materiality, embodiment, and 
aesthetics. To speak of “mediated religion,” then, is redundant, for religion cannot exist nor 
should be analyzed “outside the forms and practices of mediation that define it.”43 Such a 
conclusion echoes the chapter’s epigraph from Hent de Vries in which he stresses that atten-
                                                
41 This move to expand the notion of media/mediation resonates with Roy Rappaport’s broad reading of 
‘communication’ with respect to ritual. On this point he writes, “[T]o say that ritual is a mode of communica-
tion is surely not to say that it is interchangeable with other modes of communication nor, necessarily, to deni-
grate its uniqueness. It is, rather, to accept an expanded notion of communication, one that includes the 
achievement of effects through the transmission of information rather than through the application of matter 
and energy. Communication, this is to say, not only includes ‘saying,’ but certain sorts of ‘doing’ as well.” Roy 
Rappaport, “The Obvious Aspects of Ritual,” in Ecology, Meaning, and Religion (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 
1979), 179. 
42 Jeremy Stolow, “Religion and/as Media,” Theory, Culture & Society 22 (2005): 125. 
43 Birgit Meyer and Annelies Moors, “Introduction,” in Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere, 7. 
 
 165 
tion must be paid to the processes of mediation “without and outside of which no religion 
would be able to manifest itself in the first place.”  
 But if religious traditions provide the terms of intelligibility for addressing and inter-
acting with the sacred and fellow religious practitioners, how are these conventions estab-
lished and maintained? The work of cultural anthropologist Birgit Meyer is particularly in-
sightful here. Meyer examines how particular religious forms induce and generate experi-
ences of the sacred and transcendental. These “sensational forms,” as Meyer calls them, are 
“relatively fixed, authorized modes of invoking and organizing access to the transcendental, 
thereby creating and sustaining links between believers in the context of particular religious 
regimes.”44 Sensational forms are the principal means by which religious subjects encounter 
and experience the transcendental. Crucially, the forms themselves function as vanishing 
mediators, for in closing the distance between divine and practitioner or between fellow 
practitioners, they become invisible to members of the religious tradition. If fully accepted 
and performed properly, these encounters can then activate an array of emotions, such as 
awe, fear, or terror associated with the sacred.  
To be effective, however, religious mediations must be recognized and taken up by 
practitioners as legitimate modes of addressing and relating to the sacred and to an audience 
of their fellows. As discussed in earlier chapters, the traditions that give shape to communi-
ties of religious practitioners are the fruit of historic relations of power and struggles for 
authority. “Aesthetics,” Meyer points out, “is not outside of power structures but enmeshed 
with them.”45 The apparatus of religious traditions, including formalized institutions, dis-
courses, and practices, is a condensation of power that works to shape and discipline sub-
                                                
44 Meyer & Verrips, “Aesthetics,” 27. See also Meyer, “Religious Sensation.” 
45 Meyer, “Aesthetics of Persuasion,” 754. For a more developed account of the link between aesthetics and 
politics, see Jacques Ranciere, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible, translated by Gabriel Rockhill 
(London: Continuum, 2006). 
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jects in particular ways. There is, as it were, a politics of social-aesthetic formations within 
each tradition that involves struggles and settlements over the proper forms of religious ad-
dress and performance. The order of sensational forms within a given tradition exists as a 
hegemonic structure that is iteratively performed and cited in religious practice, becoming 
and forming the taken-for-granted modes of interacting with the divine and keeping faith. As 
Raymond Williams explains of Gramscian hegemony, “It does not just passively exist as a 
form of dominance. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It 
is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not all its own.”46  
 What is at stake in this contest over religious mediating practices is not just the forms 
themselves but also the formation and disciplining of religious subjects that is made possible 
through and with those forms.47 The receivers of media and the practitioners of mediating 
activities are not simply passive objects or blank slates. The addressees of religious media 
(who may well also be practitioners of religious mediations) are always-already subjects. As 
Meyers states, “Most of the people addressed by sensational forms are already constituted as 
particular religious subjects with certain desires and doubts.”48 Given this pre-constituted 
state, addressees of such forms bear with them the traces and effects of the religious regimes 
                                                
46 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 113.  
47 Modes and practices of worship, William Connolly argues, “do not simply represent beliefs or desires already 
there; they also educate the senses in specific ways; they accentuate some modes of conduct as they damper 
others; and they help to compose embodied public virtues.” William E. Connolly, “Some Theses on Secular-
ism,” Cultural Anthropology 26:4 (2011): 649. 
 As scholarship in media studies has argued, the political significance of media is not exhausted by its ideo-
logical contents. That is, the generativity of media and media practices is not a product simply of their didactic 
role in sharing information but also their demiurgic potential to alter the desires, sensibilities, and dispositions 
of consumers. Media scholar Marshall McLuhan captures this notion in his pithy axiom “The medium is the 
message.” Beyond the substance of any communication, McLuhan claims, a mediating form affects receivers by 
shaping their capacities to perceive and understand the world: “The effects of media do not occur at the level 
of opinions or concepts, but alter sense ratios or patterns of perception steadily and without any resistance.” 
Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Corte Madera, CA: Gingko, 1994), 31. Cf. Jack 
Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). My argument here 
follows Goody in holding that, while modes of mediation can have implications and effects on the content 
being communicated, the meaning of a message cannot be reduced to the medium. 
48 Meyer, “Aesthetics of Persuasion,” 756, 
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with which they were interpellated. To be effective—that is, to be received as authentic or 
felicitous modalities of relating to the transcendent and, thus, hail them into a new orienta-
tion to the world—novel formations must build from this established foundation of sensi-
bilities and ideologies. The success of these attempts to cultivate a particular configuration of 
subjectivities is ultimately contingent and will depend on the vicissitudes of reception and 
uptake that are beyond the unilateral control of the media producers. 
 With this understanding of the formative role of religious aesthetics in the configura-
tions of faith, I move to the specific case of the Social Gospel in order to, first, articulate my 
conceptualization of a cultus and, second, attend to how the components of the Social Gos-
pel cultus nourished and facilitated a mode of Christian subjectivity attuned to structural in-
justice and prone towards empathetic activity. 
§ 3. “The Equipment of the Soldiers 
of the Kingdom of Heaven” 
 
For the sake of conceptual clarity and simplicity, I refer to a religious public’s body 
of religious expressive styles, liturgical practices, and aesthetic forms as a cultus. According to 
the Oxford English Dictionary, the term ‘cultus’ refers to “an organized system of religious wor-
ship or ceremonial.”49 Religion scholar Catherine Albanese provides a fruitful elaboration of 
this concept by locating it within her anatomy of religious systems: 
First, religion is expressed in creeds, or explanations about the meaning of human life. 
Such creeds take various forms, from highly developed theologies and sacred stories 
of origin to informal oral traditions and opinions that surface in casual conversation. 
Second, religion is expressed in codes, which are rules that govern everyday behavior. 
These may take the form of moral and ethical systems, but they may also be the cus-
toms that have become acceptable in a society. Third, religion is expressed in cultuses, 
which are rituals to act out the understandings expressed in creeds and codes. Such 
cultuses are not to be confused with small and intense religious groups sometimes 
pejoratively called cults (a term this text does not use). Rather, ritual cultuses, with 
their formal and repeated character, reinforce creeds and codes in complete religious 
                                                
49 “Cultus,” in the Oxford English Dictionary. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/45754?redirectedFrom=cultus& 
(March 1, 2013). 
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systems. Finally, religion is expressed in communities, groups of people either formally 
or informally bound together by the creed, code, and cultus they share.50 
At the risk of oversimplification, Albanese breaks down religious traditions into dimensions 
of ideology (creed or beliefs), ethics and customs (codes), practical forms of worship (cul-
tus), and a church or grouping (community). Albanese’s characterization of the cultus in her 
typology resonates with anthropologist Roy Rappaport’s conceptualization of what he terms 
a “liturgical order.”51 That is, the cultus includes the totality of external religious practice, 
which can potentially involve ritual behaviors; ceremonies and sacraments; the creation of or 
coming into relation with images, icons, and religious objects; listening to sermons; recitation 
of prayer; performance or consumption of religious music; the reading of scripture and relig-
ious texts; sacrifices and votive offerings; and devotional attendance at or visitation of sites 
of religious import. In emphasizing the formalized qualities of a cultus, though, Albanese’s 
framework should not be understood as delimiting the concept to official institutions or de-
nominational orders. A cultus is not necessarily coterminous with an organized sect such as a 
church; a cultus, for example, could be shared only by a particular subgroup within a larger 
denomination or it could include members of multiple denominations (with the latter being 
the case with the Social Gospel).  
Christian socialist Charles Clayton Morrison, who was by turns one of Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s benefactors and antagonists, offers a conceptualization of cultus that provides a 
productive starting point for thinking about religious aesthetic formations outside institu-
                                                
50 Catherine Albanese, America: Religion and Religions (Independence, KY: Cengage Learning, 2012), 8-9. Empha-
sis in original. 
51 See Roy Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999); and Rappaport, Ecology, Meaning, and Religion. Besides this nominal difference in terminology, though, my 
account differs from Rappaport’s in emphasizing the demiurgic capacities of the cultus—that is, the potential 
for cultivating particular subjectivities. Rappaport is similarly skeptical regarding the analytical utility of ‘belief’ 
and construes rituals as a special class of performative acts that produce commitments, trust, and moral obliga-
tions. According to Rappaport, the social efficacy of rituals in that they are publicly visible acceptances of a 




tionalized and authorized systems (even though, as I will discuss, his historical-empirical ac-
count of the Social Gospel is ultimately insufficient).52 According to Morrison, the concept 
of the cultus captures “the total cultural expression of a religion as an organic historical phe-
nomenon” and involves “the expression of certain specific aspirations, beliefs, emotions, in a 
body of recognized conventions, habits and organizations.”53 The expansiveness of Morri-
son’s notion of a cultus as a “total cultural expression of a religion” opens up the possibility 
for considering the myriad manners in which a religious tradition is performed and made 
public.  This capacious reading allows for an analytical consideration of aesthetic formations, 
cultural products, and expressive idioms that are not (yet) formally produced or authorized 
by recognized religious institutions but nonetheless emanate from and speak to particular 
traditions and communities.54 On the other hand, a broader reading of cultus also facilitates 
analysis of constituencies nominally within an existing religious tradition who develop alter-
native modes of discourse and practice. Such aspirational or counter-hegemonic efforts fea-
ture a set of novel aesthetic forms that are competing for recognition by religious subjects so 
                                                
52 For a historical account of the relationship between Niebuhr and Morrison, see Elesha J. Coffman, The Chris-
tian Century and the Rise of Mainline Protestantism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
53 Charles Clayton Morrison, The Social Gospel and the Christian Cultus (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1933), 28, 
30. I must note the recurrence in Albanese and Morrison of the expressive model of religious practice found in 
W.C. Smith’s theory of religion. For Albanese, the practical forms included in the cultus work to “act out” and 
“reinforce” ideology and custom, while Morrison also characterizes religious forms as “the expression” of 
seemingly pre-existing ideas, feelings, and sensibilities. As discussed in the previous section, religious media and 
mediating practices exceed mere expression. Beyond what I have already said, though, it is worth remembering 
that the Latin origins of the term cultus extend beyond the meaning of devotion. The practice of devotion in 
this original formulation of the concept is accompanied by a simultaneous sense of tending, caring, and culti-
vating. My conceptualization of religious practices and mediation in Section Two echoes this sensibility that 
devotional performance always involves the construction not only of the relationship between religious subject 
and divinity but also, in an important sense, the religious subject herself. 
54 Contemporary evangelical media, including the best-selling Left Behind series by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. 
Jenkins (which has inspired not only reading groups but also films and video games), is one visible instance of 
non-authorized “cultural expressions” reinforcing and contributing to an existing constituency.  See, e.g., Amy 
Johnson Frykholm, Rapture Culture: Left Behind in Evangelical America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). It 
is worth noting that contemporary conservative Christians in the United States figure prominently in the larger 
scholarship regarding religion and media. See also Heather Hendershot, Shaking the World for Jesus: Media and 
Conservative Evangelical Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004); and Media, Culture, and the Relig-
ious Right, edited by Linda Kintz and Julia Lesage (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). 
 
 170 
as to either transform the existing order or develop a new tradition. This is the case, I mean 
to claim, with the Social Gospel public. 
Members of the Social Gospel criticized prevailing strains of Protestantism for, on 
the one hand, providing an ideological reinforcement for liberal capitalism by virtue of the 
emphasis on individual and otherworldly salvation and, on the other, refusing institutional 
support to those rendered destitute by existing social structures. Yet the Social Gospel broke 
from mainstream Protestantism in the United States and offered not only a new ideological 
formation—a fundamental revision in the imagination of the Christian tradition and the po-
litical community—but also liturgical and aesthetic aspects that challenged those authorized 
by Protestant denominations in the United States. It involved, in a word, a counter-cultus, or 
a competing set of ways to inhabit and perform religious subjectivity. Rauschenbusch and 
other Social Gospel members explicitly acknowledged the insurgent nature of their efforts. 
“The social gospel,” Rauschenbusch writes, “does not need the aid of church authority to 
get hold of our hearts. It gets hold in spite of such authority when necessary.”55 Given its 
remove from the institutional authority within Protestant sects, the Social Gospel articulated, 
distributed, and embodied these modes of discourse and practice in and through texts and 
other media. As much as it projected itself as a continuation of the Christian tradition (and 
also as much as it sought to hail pre-constituted Christian subjects), these liturgical forma-
tions often involved appropriating existing aesthetic forms and reconfiguring them so as to 
cultivate a new array of ethico-political dispositions, sensibilities, and ideologies. In this way, 
the traditional forms of Christian worship, including prayers, rituals, sermons, and hymnals, 
were revised and combined with more popular media forms in the thriving print culture of 
the time, including newspapers, novels, and pamphlets.  
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Morrison’s work brings attention to a useful conceptual distinction in the roles relig-
ious traditions can play with respect to political mobilization. Specifically, Morrison writes 
that prophecy is only one face of religious traditions in the public sphere, and one that is, in 
the final analysis, insufficient by itself: 
It has been assumed that all we need is prophets, more prophets, great prophets, and 
Christianity will be able to meet the social crisis with power. This is our fallacy, and it 
is the explanation of the arrest of the social gospel. So far as the functioning of relig-
ion in the present social crisis is concerned, the prophet has taken religion as far as 
he can. He has compelled us to see that the systems of our society are confronting a 
momentous crisis, and that Christianity has a primary responsibility for the outcome. 
Thereby, the prophet has created a crisis within Christianity itself.56 
 
According to Morrison, prophetic modes of address, such as the jeremiad, are well suited to 
the purpose of precipitating a sense of catastrophe within a Christian audience. I attended to 
this dynamic in my previous analyses of William Lloyd Garrison, John Brown, and Randall 
Terry, who all relied extensively upon this general mode of claims making in order to create 
a productive dissonance and disquiet. While Morrison recognizes the power of prophecy, 
both in its biblical and contemporary American formations, he clarifies its social and political 
limitations. Most crucially, he argues that prophetic address is ill suited to the task of provid-
ing religious forms to direct and organize the resulting affective intensities associated with 
this perception of crisis over an extended period of time. A long-lasting and substantial 
transformation of the political or religious community requires the evolution of ephemeral 
prophetic impulses into a more robust fixture of habit and commitment.  
What is needed is what Morrison refers to as the office of the priest. The task of the 
priest, in effect, is to recruit and sustain these fugitive energies so as to sediment them into 
the values and identity of religious subjects. To be clear, the priest need not possess any 
status or position within an established ecclesiastical order or religious authority. The defin-
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ing quality of the priest as a religious figure is the act of providing structures and forms that 
are taken up by a religious community and that discipline social feelings towards certain 
ends. The priest, Morrison says, is the  
creative artist whose function is to give form to the cultus... He is seeking for ceremonial forms 
and rituals, for dramatic actions and modes of speech, for institutional structures, by 
which the living aspirations, convictions and emotions of his religion may be given 
objective communal expression.57 
 
As much as the cultus is what provides a religious public with a meaningful identity and the 
priest constructs the cultus, the priest can be seen as the architect or author of a religious 
public.  
Morrison’s contention that the social efficacy of a religious tradition is bound up 
with its cultus, which in turn is constructed through effort and struggle, resonates with this 
chapter’s argument regarding the significance of religious aesthetics—in short, a cultus—to 
the mobilization and maintenance of religious faith. Having developed this theoretical ac-
count of the mutual implication of religious mediatic forms and religious publics, I want to 
return more concretely to the aesthetic formations of the Social Gospel. In returning to the 
historical details of the Social Gospel, however, my analysis breaks from that offered by 
Morrison. According to Morrison, “the arrest of the social gospel,” or the failure of the relig-
ious project to embed itself completely in the institutionalized models of Protestant Christi-
anity, can be traced back to a lack of an operational cultus. On this score Morrison’s argu-
ment founders on empirical grounds, as I will demonstrate further through a brief survey of 
the Social Gospel cultus.58 While a comprehensive mapping of the Social Gospel counter-
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cultus is not feasible here, a brief survey is suggestive of the contours of the larger field and 
how these works were pitched at cultivating a Christian subjectivity hospitable to the over-
arching religio-political project. I concentrate my survey on select formations in two liturgi-
cal genres: prayers and hymns. 
Among its many innovations, the Social Gospel public featured new forms of prayer. 
Specifically, contributions in the genre worked to shift both the practice and content of 
prayer from a model overwhelmingly concerned with the individual to one centered on soci-
ety. “[T]he highest form of prayer,” fellow Social Gospel contributor Washington Gladden 
writes, “is not secret prayer, but social prayer.”59 Prayer, Gladden means, should be social 
not only in its content but also in its performance. The predominant mode of prayer in the 
Protestant repertoire at the turn of the century was formalistically and thematically individu-
alist. Within this paradigm, prayer is animated by and directed towards personal salvation. 
The text of these prayers typically involves the speaker seeking God’s guidance in how to 
comport herself as an individual so as to gain divine blessing and entry into the heavenly 
kingdom of God. According to Rauschenbusch’s understanding, the prevailing form of 
prayer consoles Christians into a this-worldly quietism by directing their attentions to the 
afterlife while simultaneously reinforcing the individualist ethos that undergirds the capitalist 
order and obscures (or at best, skews) consideration of social-structural issues.60 Both of 
these aspects drain the willingness and energy of Protestants from any effort to transform 
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the social order. By contrast, collections of Social Gospel prayers, including Rauschen-
busch’s For God and the People: Prayers for the Social Awakening (1909) and Francis G. Peabody’s 
Prayers for Various Occasions and Needs (1930), re-oriented attention to Christians’ this-worldly 
lives and obligations.61 For the purposes of this chapter’s analysis, I concentrate my analytical 
attention on Rauschenbusch’s collection. 
For God and the People features both original prayers and an opening essay that argues 
for a revised, social reading of “The Lord’s Prayer.” In the preface to this text, Rauschen-
busch makes a case for the use of prayer as an aesthetic form that can aid in the creation of 
“a new type of Christian man” with “new religious emotions” despite its seemingly 
“cling[ing] to the antique for the sake of dignity.”62 Given Rauschenbusch’s framing of the 
objective of the Social Gospel as a regeneration of what it means to be a Christian subject, 
the repetitive act of reading and speaking prayer appears as a crucial tool for this process. 
For Rauschenbusch, the performance of “The Lord’s Prayer” and other similarly attuned 
prayers is best understood to be a means by which a certain ethos (“social spirit”) and set of 
virtues can be deposited in a Christian subject’s character. These qualities, in turn, enable 
practices of self-scrutiny, pious behavior, and public action. In this same preface Rauschen-
busch also invokes the duality of religious creativity discussed in Section One. That is, at-
tempts at tactically transforming a cultus and its constituent forms entail simultaneous ges-
tures backward to the accumulated aesthetic archive of the religious tradition and forward to 
the perceived needs and projects of the moment. The combination of the old and the new—
infusing new meanings and aspects into accepted forms—performs transformation through 
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preservation, drawing on the accrued authority of inherited forms in order to cultivate new 
religious subjectivities.   
When traditional forms such as prayer are effectively reworked, Rauschenbusch 
claims, they can prepare the tempers of religious subjects so that they enter into political 
struggles with a “unity of thought and aim and feeling.” According to Rauschenbusch, such 
a mobilizing potential lies latent but purposefully suppressed in “The Lord’s Prayer.” He ex-
plains: “The Lord’s Prayer is a part of the heritage of social Christianity, which has been ap-
propriated by men who have had little sympathy with its social spirit. It belongs to the 
equipment of the soldiers of the kingdom of God.”63 In order to recover the prayer’s squan-
dered potential, Rauschenbusch performs a close reading of its text. Rauschenbusch specifi-
cally excavates how “The Lord’s Prayer,” which he refers to as the “great charter of all social 
prayers,” repudiates social isolation and “compels us to stand together.”64 Towards the end 
of the essay, Rauschenbusch writes, 
This prayer will not permit us to ask for God’s forgiveness without making us affirm 
that we have forgiven our brothers and are on a basis of brotherly love with all men. 
“Forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors.” We shall have to be 
socially right if we want to be religiously right.65 
 
In this reading, “The Lord’s Prayer” stands as an indictment of the atomistic imagining of 
salvation nurtured by the mainstream Protestant cultus. There can be no personal salvation 
without a concomitant effort at social salvation. Over the course of his introductory essay, 
Rauschenbusch illuminates similar locations in the prayer that articulate and inculcate a 
Christian practice of civic virtue that must be enacted as part of fulfilling one’s duty and ob-
ligation to God. 
                                                
63 Ibid., 17. 
64 Ibid., 20. 
65 Ibid., 21. 
 
 176 
 Following the line of analysis established by Rauschenbusch regarding the constitut-
ing power of prayer, the original prayers that Rauschenbusch composed for inclusion in his 
collection can be understood as the scaffolding for the formation of a socially oriented 
Christian subject. The language of Rauschenbusch’s prayers enlists the ethical sensibilities of 
the reader-reciter and works to evoke a particular body of responses, especially humility, re-
pentance, regret, hope, and empathy, that will facilitate a socially consciousness public actor. 
An active notion of civic virtue and solidarity courses through these pieces, manifesting in, 
according to Horton Davies, “[the prayers’] vividness of empathy, their challenging direct-
ness, the particularity of their concern, and the wide charity and inclusiveness.” 66  As 
Rauschenbusch describes at the outset of the collection, “We are one with our fellow-men in 
all our needs. We are one in our sin and our salvation.”67 The recognition of human (and 
more particularly, American) commonality forms the starting point for the text’s evocation 
of the spiritual and political bonds that unite all members of society. In light of this funda-
mental insight, it is far from surprising that well over half the collection’s contents are in sec-
tions titled “For Social Groups and Classes” and “The Progress of Humanity.” Included in 
the latter of these two sections is the prayer “For the Kingdom of God,” which reads in part: 
Make us determined to live by truth and not by lies, to found our common life on 
the eternal foundations of righteousness and love, and no longer to prop the totter-
ing house of wrong by legalized cruelty and force. Help us to make the welfare of all 
the supreme law of the land, that so our commonwealth may be built strong and se-
cure on the love of all its citizens… Show thy erring children at last the way from the 
City of Destruction to the City of Love, and fulfill the longings of the prophets of 
humanity. Our Master, once more we make thy faith our prayer: “Thy kingdom 
come! Thy will be done on earth!”68 
 
Here, as well as throughout the entire collection, Rauschenbusch avoids framing his prayers 
as supplications for divine intervention or litanies of theological doctrines. Following his 
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conception of prayer as enabling new formations of Christian agency, these pieces provide 
the outlines of Christian subjectivity as a particular social role that calls forth certain actions 
and performances.  
In this passage Rauschenbusch invokes a practice of penitent citizenship that de-
mands a critical social awareness, an ethos of solidarity, and a readiness for political action in 
the face of arrangements that transgress the demands of Christian love and generosity. Be-
yond evoking what it means to be a proper Christian subject, the prayers also act as perfor-
mative fortifications that equip the audience with a motivating relationship to the divine. The 
figure of God invoked in these prayers acts on the world in a mediated fashion rather than 
via direct action. It is only through human activity that the aspiration of a righteous order 
can be (always incompletely) achieved, so the power of the divine, such as it is, consists prin-
cipally in fashioning and sustaining the faith motivating human action. In a more practical 
sense, though, faith as an orientation and attitude is the condition and object of these 
prayers. That is, the prayers are premised on a nascent Christian faith in their addressees yet, 
at the same time, work to reshape—convert—this attitude. 
 A similar phenomenon can be seen in the devotional music of the Social Gospel. 
Working in parallel with the new crop of social prayers, contributors to the Social Gospel 
produced and disseminated “hymns of social aspiration.”69 The development of a Social 
Gospel hymnody was a concerted enterprise, propelled by Rauschenbusch and others who 
were dissatisfied with the existing corpus of liturgical music in the Protestant Christian tradi-
tion. Echoing his dissatisfaction with the state of Protestant prayer, Rauschenbusch writes, 
“The hymns are mainly individualistic, with the idea of coming to God, of recognizing one’s 
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own guilt; they call us from personal sins to a personal cross.”70 With a mind towards dis-
tributing hymns infused with a concern for the earthly community, organizations such as the 
Brotherhood of the Kingdom actively worked to encourage, assemble, and disseminate a 
Social Gospel musical repertoire. One of the Brotherhood’s members, Mornay Williams, 
compiled forty-four hymns in his collection Hymns of the Kingdom of God. This volume joined 
other publications, including Henry Sloane Coffin and Ambrose White Vernon’s Hymns of the 
Kingdom of God and Mabel Mussey’s Social Hymns of Brotherhood and Aspiration, in attempting to 
bring together religious songs infused with themes of solidarity and acting in and on tempo-
ral society. According to Davies, “These hymns of the social gospel are motivated by a de-
mand that all the energy of Christians be devoted to establishing a brotherhood on earth, 
with the help of humanity’s Elder Brother, the Master Carpenter of the human race.”71  
 Consider Mussey’s 1914 collection Social Hymns of Brotherhood and Aspiration, which 
Jon Michael Spencer identifies as “the paradigm” of Social Gospel hymnals.72 The text in-
cludes 111 pieces with music, many of which first appeared in the Social Gospel periodical 
The Survey. Endorsements of Mussey’s collection from established figures in the community 
stressed the utility of hymns within the larger campaign to remake American public life. 
Henry Atkinson, Secretary of the Social Service Commission of the Congregational Church, 
remarked that the Social Gospel “needs just such an expression as these hymns give it. When 
the churches begin to sing the social faith, things will be accomplished.” Social Gospel con-
tributor Josiah Strong wrote, “[Social Hymns] will serve not only to express, but to cultivate 
both the deepest religious feelings and the noblest social aspiration.”73 Strong’s effective 
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elaboration on Atkinson’s framing is noteworthy. Besides clarifying how, in Atkinson’s 
phrase, “things will be accomplished” with these hymns, Strong’s comments resonate with 
the larger argument of this chapter regarding the constructive, as opposed to merely expres-
sive, power of aesthetic forms. 
 Chief among the qualities cultivated by these hymns is a religious devotion to the 
national community. In a preface explaining the methodology of selection for the 
hymnbook, Mussey articulates an ecumenical sensibility aimed at cutting across denomina-
tional divides: “The editor’s first object was to find hymns that could be sung by all people 
in all places… Many hymns, therefore, were chosen which Jew and Gentile, Protestant and 
Catholic may sing with equal fervor.”74 Mussey’s intentional eschewal of religious parochial-
ism effectively diminishes the priority of denominational identity and instead foregrounds a 
commitment to a generic divinity as refracted through the nation and polity. The political 
community rather than particularized religious groups or church becomes the imaginary ob-
ject and stage of faith-in-action. When churches are invoked at all in these hymns they are 
imagined, first and foremost, as entities in dire need of renewal. More strikingly, though, 
formal religious institutions and authorities are significant and worthy of devotional concern 
only so far as they are the means and vehicles for a national transformation. This dynamic is 
reflected in the thematic arrangement of the collection, with hymns categorized into group-
ings such as “Liberty and Justice,” “Brotherhood,” “Labor and Conflict,” and “Patriotism.” 
Hymns in these sections, as well as several elsewhere in the collection, enfold religious devo-
tion and political belonging in such a way that civic service and political solidarity become 
religious virtues recognized and encouraged by the divine. 
                                                




 The twining together of Christianity as a social role and political action comes into 
focus in a number of the iconic hymns contained in Social Hymns. These classic songs in-
clude, for instance, William De Witt Hyde’s “Creation’s Lord, We Give Thee Thanks” 
(1903). The hymn opens with the following verse: 
Creation’s Lord, we give Thee thanks 
 That this Thy world is incomplete; 
That battle calls our marshaled ranks; 
 That work awaits our hands and feet…75 
 
Hyde’s hymn exudes a joyful hopefulness in the struggle for social transformation. The song 
celebrates both the opportunity to Christianize the social order and the often-trying effort 
entailed in bringing it into existence. There is a profound pleasure, the hymn states, in work-
ing to complete that which God has left purposefully unfinished, namely, the overcoming of 
social cruelties and inequities. This satisfaction accompanies and mirrors an implicit premise 
of Christian indebtedness. Christians, Hyde’s lyrics state, are simultaneously “friends who 
share the Maker’s plan” and “sons who know the Father’s will.” As both the creations and 
peers of the divine, Christians are implicated as primary actors in the drama of transforming 
the social world so as to embody fundamental virtues and values. Yet again, as with 
Rauschenbusch, Hyde foregrounds the impracticality of this goal. Per the fourth verse of the 
hymn: 
What though the Kingdom long delay, 
 And still with haughty foes must cope? 
It gives us that for which to pray, 
 A field for toil and faith and hope.76 
 
The object of prayer and devotion, Hyde implies, exceeds the arrival of the Kingdom, which 
is later described as a goal that “may ever shine afar.” What faith requires and calls forth is a 
field for struggle—a social space in which Christian subjects can enact their commitments 
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and potentially bring the polity into closer alignment with what they understand to be the 
principles of their religious tradition. Seen in this way, the hymn imparts an ethos of joyful 
resistance that hails subjects into political action while staving off the frustration, resent-
ment, and attrition that can result from failures to change existing structures. 
 The Social Gospel hymnody, of course, was not monolithic with respect to its tones, 
themes, or values. To suggest some of this internal diversity, it is helpful to compare Hyde’s 
piece with the earliest recognized hymn of the Social Gospel, Washington Gladden’s “O 
Master, Let Me Walk with Thee” (1879), which is also included in Mussey’s Social Hymns 
compilation. The hymn foregrounds the value of performing for others—walking “in lowly 
paths of service”—and radiates a resilient optimism regarding the future of human society 
(“In hope that sends a shining ray/Far down the future’s broadening way”).77 The theme and 
message of the piece is ultimately one of endurance, with the prayer as a plea to God for aid 
in bearing the stresses of physically demanding labor and persevering until the arrival of a 
more righteous social order. The third stanza of the hymn is particularly striking in this re-
spect: 
Teach me Thy patience; still with Thee 
In closer, dearer company, 
In work that keeps faith sweet and strong, 
In trust that triumphs over wrong…78 
 
The God imagined by Gladden (and who appears as the diegetic addressee of the hymn’s 
invocations) is similar to that of Rauschenbusch’s prayers in that the hymn does not presume 
the divine can directly intercede so as to act in the temporal world. The hymn’s speaker calls 
upon God less to change the world for the better and more to act on the personality and 
character of the speaker so that she can more ably face the world as it is. But this ostensibly 
                                                
77 Washington Gladden, “O Master, Let Me Walk with Thee,” in Mussey, 56. 
78 Ibid., 56. 
 
 182 
familiar feature also marks a crucial break with Rauschenbusch’s prayerbook and other 
hymns of the Social Gospel. Unlike those other texts, Gladden’s hymn principally works to 
nurture qualities of patience and trust so as to bear the wrongs of American society, whereas 
what is necessary, Rauschenbusch remarks, is “a religion of action which will annihilate the 
wrong.”79 Faith should not be reflexively placed in an abstract truth to win out on its own; 
rather, faith must be cultivated and shaped so that it becomes the engine for social action. 
In the section that follows, I bring my theoretical framework regarding the aesthetic 
aspects of religious traditions into dialogue with the literature on the public sphere and pub-
lics in order to address the union of cultus and conduct that defines a religious public. This 
theoretical discussion then facilitates a turn to the social and political activity of religious 
subjects shaped by the Social Gospel cultus as exemplified by Jane Addams. 
§ 4. Public Religion & Religious Publics 
 
Because of its capacity to help shape subjectivities (the dispositions, sensibilities, and 
desires of religious subjects), religious aesthetics are implicated in the activation and mobili-
zation of persons as public and political subjects. “After all,” Jeremy Stolow inquires, “where 
does religious mediation happen if not on the terrain of sociability among friends and 
strangers, patrons and clients, leaders and followers, insiders and outsiders, that we think of 
as a public sphere?”80 An analysis of the power of public religions in a democratic society 
logically entails attending to the power of religious publics, since it is principally through the 
mobilization of citizens’ collective action that religious traditions affect changes in govern-
mental structures and social arrangements. This begs the question, though, of what exactly 
distinguishes and constitutes a religious public. In approaching this seemingly simple question, 
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it is helpful to begin with some quick ground clearing regarding the concepts of the ‘public 
sphere,’ the ‘public,’ and ‘publics’ as they figure into a discussion of modern politics.  
Contemporary debates regarding the ‘public’ can be traced back to Jürgen Haber-
mas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. In an account that brings together em-
pirical-historical and normative-philosophical registers, Habermas depicts the civic culture of 
eighteenth-century Europe as a discursive space distinct from the domains of the state, the 
economy, and the family. 81 Though Habermas’s historical narrative emphasizes how this so-
cial space was short-lived, it nonetheless was crucial in so far as it was the site of rational-
critical debate regarding the common good, critical evaluation of the state, and the emer-
gence of a politically active bourgeoisie. According to Habermas, these dynamics ultimately 
fostered the liberal democratic conditions that checked and resisted the established monar-
chical regime. That is, Habermas illuminates the interstitial space that exists between and be-
side the apparatus of the state and the domain of the economy and that forms the stage for 
social interaction and critical political activity.  
Subsequent work drawing on Habermas’s framework has emphasized the multiplicity 
of publics and counter-publics constituting the public sphere. The theoretical elaborations 
offered by Michael Warner and Charles Hirschkind are particularly helpful for the present 
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Vanantwerpen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 3. 
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analysis in illuminating the interlacing of aesthetics and practices that broadly defines pub-
lics.82 
 According to Warner, a public comes into being in and through a circulation of 
words and bodies, and thus it is potentially open-ended in its audience. He explains: 
By this I mean not just that it is self-organizing, a kind of entity created by its own 
discourse, nor even that this space of circulation is taken to be a social entity, but 
that in order for this to happen all discourse or performance addressed to a public 
must characterize the world in which it attempts to circulate, and it must attempt to 
realize that world through address.83 
 
The claims at play in a counterpublic, Warner argues, are not the expressions of preformed 
identities or instances of purely representational discourse. Appearing in public involves a 
performative dimension, a “poetic world making,” wherein discourse and action are put to 
the task of creating the (presented) self and the world. What distinguishes a counterpublic 
for Warner, then, is not principally the content of the claims being produced. Counterpublics 
are never just constituencies of “subalterns with a reform program.”84 The essential quality 
of a counterpublic is that it is “structured by different dispositions or protocols from those 
that obtain elsewhere in the culture, making different assumptions about what can be said or 
what goes without saying.” He goes on, saying, “The conflict extends not just to ideas or 
policy questions, but to the speech genres and modes of address that constitute the public.”85 
In other words, cleavages between publics (and counterpublics) track divergent imaginaries 
                                                
82 See also Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
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83 Michael Warner, “Publics and Counterpublics,” Public Culture 14:1 (2002), 81. 
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of the public and the people—the framework of associational life and the ways in which that 
association is inhabited and practiced—within a national public sphere. 
 The anthropological examination of cassette sermons in Egypt undertaken by 
Hirschkind provides a complementary elaboration of the concept of counterpublics. The 
liberal-deliberative conception of a public that can be traced back to Habermas, Hirschkind 
argues, remains blind to the material conditions of discursive production and “the pragmat-
ics of its speech forms.” By this latter category, Hirschkind means “the genres, stylistic ele-
ments, citational resources, gestural codes, and so on that make a discourse intelligible to 
specific people inhabiting certain conditions of knowledge and learning.”86 While a public 
can be embodied in certain institutional and material forms, it is not reducible to these in-
stantiations. What defines a public is a particular way of imagining community and the as-
sortment of discourses and practices that enable and make up that imaginary. For Hirsch-
kind, a counterpublic is “a domain of discourse and practice that stands in a disjunctive 
relationship to the public sphere of the nation and its media instruments.”87 A counterpublic 
brings together an alternative basis for social relations and a new practice of community; 
they feature a mutual implication of content and form. Emergent within a counterpublic is a 
new notion of the public and, with this, a revision of the subject as a member belonging to 
and participating in that public.  
 Lets gather up the threads of this discussion so far. Religious publics, as with publics 
more generally, are not defined or given shape by some common body of propositional be-
liefs or policy preferences held by their members (as is in the case of the common sense no-
tion of faith-based groups). Similarly, while they can produce or be involved in the produc-
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tion of formalized codes and institutions, these elements are not necessary conditions. What 
distinguishes a religious public from other publics—as well as from other religious publics—
is its forms of address, its modes activity, and its corresponding conception of the public. 
More specifically, a religious public draws its pragmatic forms—its aesthetic, discursive, and 
performative elements—from a religious tradition, even as it may simultaneously revise and 
rework that which it cites and enacts. The performance of these religious idioms and motiva-
tions, in turn, sets the religious public against a cultural horizon dominated by a different 
body of discursive forms, dispositions, and habits.  
As discussed in Section Three, the primary purpose of the aesthetic formations of 
the Social Gospel was to reorient Christian subjects—to reconfigure, in other words, the 
sense and practice of Christian faith so as to infuse it with a sense of social consciousness 
and solidarity as well as a tendency towards positive action that would trouble and disrupt 
the prevailing forms of Protestantism as well as existing liberal-capitalism. Willis D. Weather-
ford, a student secretary of the YMCA, spoke at the 1914 Southern Sociological Congress 
and characterized the larger Social Gospel effort as directed at precisely this re-imagining of 
the Christian faith: 
We are fast getting away from religion as creed or as a mechanical system. We are 
coming to feel more and more that religion is life and life is relationship. To be relig-
ious is to be rightly related to all persons, God and men. Or to put it differently, to 
be religious is to be a friendly son of God and a brotherly friend of men. Life and re-
ligion are not therefore simply orthodoxy… [N]o! life and religion are right relation-
ship toward all persons.88 
 
Weatherford construes the Social Gospel as primarily an effort at re-orientation. Not only is 
the Social Gospel itself an exercise in re-configuring the Christian tradition but also the 
Christian faith, indeed all religious faith, is conceptualized as an orientation, and being rightly 
aligned and related with the world and other beings. The most popular Social Gospel journal 
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in the final decade of the nineteenth century, The Kingdom, articulated its mission statement in 
strikingly similar terms. According to that publication, its motivating interest in “applied 
Christianity” meant that the journal “will aim to cultivate in its readers a proper temper of 
mind regarding all questions of social reform rather than to insist upon a particular method 
as being the only and infallible course to be taken.”89 The task, in other words, is to cultivate 
in the audience a particular set of attitudes and dispositions—a state of being prone to a cer-
tain interpretation and bearing in the world—as opposed to imparting specific policy prefer-
ences.  
All structural transformation, this logic holds, must find its foundation in a change in 
a subject’s sensibilities, commitments, and desires. In this respect, the Social Gospel can be 
seen as in line with my account of Garrison and the moral suasion efforts of evangelical abo-
litionists during the antebellum period (see Chapter One). Rauschenbusch explicitly identi-
fies this aim, stating, “The social gospel seeks to bring men under repentance for their col-
lective sins and to create a more sensitive and more modern conscience.”90 He describes the 
objective of fashioning “a regenerated personality” at length in Christianity and the Social Crisis: 
Such a [regenerated] man will in some measure incarnate the principles of a higher 
social order in his attitude to all questions and in all his relations to men, and will be 
a well-spring of regenerating influences… [I]f any new principle is to gain power in 
human history, it must take shape and life in individuals who have faith in it. The 
men of faith are the living spirits, the channels by which new truth and power from 
God enter humanity.91 
 
Similar articulations of the movement’s purpose crop up in the work of other Social Gospel 
thinkers. Fellow theological figurehead Washington Gladden, for instance, describes the ef-
forts of the Social Gospel as a conversion process by which an individual is hailed into the 
“law of love” and transforms his perception so that he “comprehends his social relations 
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and strives to fulfill them.”92 The production of this “consciousness of solidarity” (to use 
another phrase of Rauschenbusch’s) would enable Christian subjects to recognize the myriad 
sufferings, injustices, inequalities, and exclusions that occur as a result of structural and insti-
tutional arrangements rather than their individual behavior or direct action.93 This ethos of 
social responsibility and solidarity would, in turn, activate these subjects to political action 
and call into being a constituency that would work through (and on) the system of govern-
mental institutions in order to develop a just social order.  
 This mode of being in public is exemplified by the activity of Jane Addams. A co-
founder of Hull House in Chicago and one of the most vigorous proponents of the settle-
ment movement in the United States, Addams fought for the extension of social resources, 
educational opportunities, and legal protections to members of the working class, particularly 
immigrants, women, and children. As articulated in its mission statement, Hull House was 
founded “to provide a center for a higher civic and social life, to institute and maintain edu-
cational and philanthropic enterprises, and to investigate and improve the conditions in the 
industrial districts of Chicago.” In addition to her anti-poverty work with the settlement 
movement, Addams was a member of the Progressive Party and an active advocate for fe-
male suffrage and peace. Although intended to distill the meaning and motivation of her ef-
forts with Hull House, her essay “The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements” evinces 
the formative role she assigns religious traditions as a part of efforts to socialize democracy 
in the United States.  
 While Addams repeatedly rejected the formal doctrines and institutions of organized 
religion, including those of Christianity, she nonetheless traces her social activity and efforts 
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at political transformation to a religious source. Specifically, Addams articulates a religious 
faith with a distinctive horizontal orientation—one that finds its fulfillment in the connec-
tions between persons rather than between individual religious subjects and God. In a man-
ner that resonates with the Weatherford’s stress on Christianity as a matter of right relations 
and action throughout society, Addams finds in religion the materials necessary to cultivate a 
powerful sense of human interdependence and solidarity as well as an attendant ethical prac-
tice of mutual care.94 Addams also echoes the sensibility that Christianity is principally a 
praxis, writing: 
Christianity has to be revealed and embodied in the line of social progress is a corol-
lary to the simple proposition, that man’s action is found in his social relationships in 
the way in which he connects with his fellows; that his motives for action are the zeal 
and affection with which he regards his fellows.”95  
 
The fulfillment of Christianity, then, is not in the achievement of individual salvation—an 
end that can easily be folded into a capitalist-liberal imaginary—but rather in a conviction 
that alters and improves the conditions of general well-being in a community. A religious 
subjectivity, in turn, must be oriented outwards and actualized in the transformation of social 
institutions.  
Addams attributes the burgeoning impulse to engage in social activity such as the set-
tlement movement and YMCA campaign to the Social Gospel, which she refers to as “a cer-
tain renaissance going forward in Christianity.”96 In her essay Addams describes at length 
how Christians shaped by the Social Gospel avoid the traditional Protestant concern with 
internal or spiritual salvation of the individual and embrace the notion that “action is the 
only medium man has for receiving and appropriating truth.” She explains: 
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[Young persons influenced by the Social Gospel] resent the assumption that Christi-
anity is a set of ideas which belong to the religious consciousness, whatever that may 
be. They insist that it cannot be proclaimed and instituted apart from the social life 
of the community and that it must seek a simple and natural expression in the social 
organism itself. The Settlement movement is only one manifestation of that wider 
humanitarian movement…97 
 
Along with her refusal of an immaterial Christianity that is located entirely in a propositional 
edifice, Addams highlights the need for a foundational social transformation. The activity of 
Hull House and other similar projects, Addams insists, are not instances of philanthropy or 
charity. As Addams understands it, charity only serves to address the symptoms of a much 
deeper social maladjustment; in order to correct such a problem, an equally foundational re-
construction of society is required. Reflecting on this cultivation of a new form of public life, 
Addams writes, “[The Settlement movement] aims, in a measure, to develop whatever of 
social life its neighborhood may afford, to focus and give form to that life, to bring to bear 
upon it the results of cultivation and training.”98 
 Through her practice of socially-engaged Christianity and pious citizenship Addams 
models a new way of speaking and acting in public. Indeed, she enacts a novel formation of 
what the American public should be that challenges the existing array of Protestant-
capitalistic habits and dispositions. Her social activity, I mean to say, is an exercise in world 
making that accompanies the liturgical formations offered by the Social Gospel in the wide-
spread inculcation of democratic and Christian capacities.  
Conclusion 
 
In an article focused on the question of “why such movements [as the Social Gospel] 
need religion at all,” Christopher Lasch concludes that, while religion does not provide any 
unique moral insights unavailable in non-religious sources, it is valuable in as much as it sup-
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plies, on the one hand, a stave against resentment and, on the other, a sense of hopefulness 
not in social progress itself but rather being in general. Underlying both of these contribu-
tions, he says, is “a grateful disposition that enables opressed [sic] groups to claim their rights 
without at the same time claiming the right to revenge.”99 Yet this begs the further question 
of how religion in particular was able (or at least better able than any ostensibly secular tradi-
tion) to provide such a “disposition.” While Lasch locates the origins of this disposition in 
Christian beliefs and theological doctrines—most specifically the belief in a just cosmological 
order of being—this chapter argues that the mobilization and modulation of religious sub-
jects is not simply a matter of ideology. Against Lasch’s stress on the Social Gospel as ideol-
ogy and Niebuhr’s conception of the Social Gospel as anti-political utopianism, my account 
of the Social Gospel points to the aesthetic and performative dimensions that suffuse relig-
ious traditions and condition the mobilization of pious citizens who strive in public for the 
transformation of the social order. Social Christianity, in this way, supplies the motivations for 
and devices of claiming and counterclaiming that enable political subjectivities.  
 It is fitting, I think, to a return to the words of Rauschenbusch that served as the 
epigraph to this chapter. In a 1904 article on what he calls “The New Evangelicalism,” 
Rauschenbusch depicts the Social Gospel not as a radical break with the Christian tradition 
but rather as the return of that tradition’s original essence. He writes, “The tongues of fire 
will descend on twentieth century men and give them great faith, joy and boldness, and then 
we shall hear the new evangel, and it will be the Old Gospel.” Given the essay’s location 
within a context of theological struggle, Rauschenbusch’s assertion of the Social Gospel’s 
lineage, if not seamless continuity within the Christian tradition, is a canny tactic as in a cam-
paign to endow the movement with legitimacy. The image of tongues of fire, of course, fig-
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 192 
ures prominently in the Christian tradition, where it serves as the earthly manifestation of the 
Holy Spirit and the symbolic representation of religious enlightenment. Yet, the image of 
“tongues of fire” is open to another figurative, if less spiritual, reading as an agitating com-
munication. The image of the Pentecostal scene evoked by Rauschenbusch, after all, entails 
the mobilizing and activation of Christ’s disciples by the Holy Spirit—the divine avatar and 
vanguard of faith in Christian theology—as a unified social force for the spread of the good 
news to human society. The tongue of fire hails them into a new way of inhabiting faith and 
performing it in the world. So too, the tongues of fire of the Social Gospel—its styles of ex-
pressivity and manners of aesthetic mediation—brought it and its constituent subjects into 




“JERUSALEM’S FALL”:  
THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS MOURNING AND  
AMERICAN REFORMATION AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
 
 
“It is in some sort of ceremonial form—even if that form 
be hardly more than the recitation of a myth, the consulta-
tion of an oracle, or the decoration of a grave—that the 
moods and motivations which sacred symbols induce in 
men and the general conceptions of the order of existence 
which they formulate for men meet and reinforce one an-
other.” 
— Clifford Geertz, 
“Religion As a Cultural System”1 
 
“God can take what you do to try to hurt somebody to 
help a nation come to grips with truth, to help a nation 
come to grips with mis-education and to help a nation 
come to grips with things that we don’t like to talk about.” 
— Rev. Jeremiah Wright2 
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 constituted a “disjunctive event” in 
which hegemonic conceptions of the world, as well as the corresponding understanding of 
the American polity, were dramatically de-stabilized.3 Such moments of destabilization, rup-
ture, and crisis create the conditions in which existing ways of thinking and acting—in other 
words, the lived order of power and common sense—can be altered and transformed. In
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deed, George Sabine claims that major shifts in western political thought are “secreted in the 
interstices of political and social crisis. They are produced, not indeed by the crisis as such, 
but by its reaction on minds that have the sensitivity and the intellectual penetration to be 
aware of crisis.”4 Despite their momentary potential for transformation, disturbances in es-
tablished routines and social mores frequently become captured by the system of extant 
discourses and practices. As William H. Sewell, Jr. describes, “most ruptures are neutralized 
and reabsorbed into the preexisting structures in one way or another—they may, for exam-
ple, be forcefully repressed, pointedly ignored, or explained away as exceptions.”5  
In this chapter I interrogate the liminal moment following September 11 and how 
the shared loss of the attacks was given force and form, as well as shape and meaning, 
through religious rituals of mourning drawn from the Christian cultus. Given that religious 
traditions are among the most powerful “pre-existing structures” within American political 
culture and that they directly bear on the subjects of suffering and mortality, this chapter in-
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vestigates how the materials of these traditions become mobilized in public mourning to cre-
ate meanings and reform a wounded community. How do political actors make use of the 
Christian cultus in order to enable or foreclose political possibilities in the wake of Septem-
ber 11?6 Furthermore, how does the practice of different rituals and rhetorics of religious 
mourning work to establish structures of feeling that undergird particular modes of democ-
ratic citizenship and national identity? 
I argue that religious traditions, including formations of American Christianity, sup-
ply both a praxis and poetics of mourning. That is, they encompass manners of enacting grief 
in light of inherited conceptions of the cosmos and sacred (praxis) as well as modes of 
(re)producing meanings that render loss intelligible and endurable (poetics). When confronted 
by disjunctive events such as September 11, mourning rituals drawn from religious traditions 
can be used by members of the polity to register the event, locate it in a certain ordering of 
the world, and make it meaningful and thus make suffering sufferable. Even as it is an exer-
cise in recovery and repair, instances of religious mourning are also occasions for agonistic 
political reformation. Figures at multiple levels of American public life take up diverse relig-
ious forms and practices—including biblical narratives, sermons, lamentations, jeremiads, 
and funeral rituals—during moments of mourning and misfortune in a struggle to provide 
not only meaning to the experience of loss but also, through this, cultivate and sustain diver-
gent religio-political imaginaries. Key to this process is religious faith’s intertwining of the 
ideological and the affective—or, as religious studies scholar Clifford Geertz expresses in the 
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epigraph to this chapter, its linking of “conceptions of the order of existence” and “moods 
and motivations.”  
 I begin my analysis of public mourning and religious traditions by turning to George 
W. Bush’s address on the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance after the September 11 
attacks. Though curiously neglected by scholarship discussing Bush’s mode of presidential 
discourse, this address provides insight not only into how Bush began to construct his post-
September 11 rhetorical presence with and through religious materials but also into how to 
conceptualize a polity in mourning. From this foundation I then engage the established lit-
erature on the politics of mourning and develop a theoretical account of the religious politics 
of mourning as it figures into the reformation of a democratic community. I flesh out my 
theoretical account through close readings of the performances of Reverends Jerry Falwell 
and Jeremiah Wright after September 11. I draw on these cases in order to, on the one hand, 
suggest (without exhaustively canvassing) the repertoire of grief in American Christianity 
and, on the other, bring into focus two distinct models of religious mourning and how they 
work to cultivate penitent citizen-subjects disposed to particular political activity.7 
§ 1. Divining the Kinship of Grief 
(Or: On Bush at the Cathedral) 
Substantial scholarly attention has focused on the content and style of Bush’s post-
September 11 rhetoric, including his controversial use of evocative Evangelical Christian 
language and metaphors.8 The growing number of such analyses is, of course, understand-
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able given the institutionally-privileged rhetorical position of the president in the contempo-
rary political landscape of the United States and the role presidential discourse can play in 
the reorientation of citizens and, thus, in American political development. As Jeffrey Tulis 
states:  
Rhetorical power is a very special case of executive power because simultaneously it 
is the means by which an executive can defend the use of force and other executive 
powers and it is a power itself. Rhetorical power is thus not only a form of ‘commu-
nication,’ it is also a way of constituting the people to whom it is addressed by 
furnishing them with the very equipment they need to assess its use—the metaphors, 
categories, and concepts of political discourse.9 
 
Tulis’s assessment of the rhetorical resources of the executive resembles the characterization 
common to entries in the literature on American civil religion, which paint the president as a  
“pontifex maximus,” the “principal prophet, high priest, first preacher, and chief pastor of 
the American nation.”10 Analyses in this vein examine how Bush leveraged the rhetorical 
authority of his office to frame the events of September 11 within a melodramatic, 
Manichean narrative with the United States as the crisply defined victim-hero and terrorists, 
as well as any who would materially aid them, as villains. Bush reinforced this binary with 
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the democratic authorship of policies, announces positions with religiously-inflected certainty, and shuts down 
the possibility of dissent. Like any other actor using religious idioms, however, Bush’s rhetorical authority is 
ultimately dependent on his audience recognizing and assenting to his bid for divine authority. To claim knowl-
edge of God’s will in no way evades the process of democratic judgment but rather invites it; such a statement 
necessarily places the question before the audience in order for them to either affirm or rebuff the speaker’s 
claim. 
9 Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 203; see also Karlyn 
Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990); and Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leader-
ship from John Adams to Bill Clinton (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1997). 
10 Richard V. Pierard and Robert D. Linder, Civil Religion and the Presidency (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Academie 
Books, 1988), 25. As discussed in chapter one, Robert Bellah developed his notion of American civil religion 
primarily through a reading of presidential inaugural addresses. See also Roderick P. Hart’s characterization of 
“official” civic piety and civil religious discourse as located most significantly in the executive in Hart and John 
L. Pauley II, The Political Pulpit Revisited (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2005). 
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religious resonances that cast the United States as not only an agent of righteous retribution 
but also the vanguard of liberal-democratic values.11  
Yet to point to the president’s commanding rhetorical powers does not mean that 
the office enjoys a monopoly on the rhetorical and political space within American culture or 
that it is paradigmatic of how religious resources are marshaled during moments of public 
mourning. Analyses of the presidential use of religious rhetorical and performative idioms, 
such as those in the civil religion literature or the critical readings of Bush’s post-September 
11 language, problematically bracket the larger political field and the competing narratives, 
actors, and meaning-making practices within it. As a result of this singular focus, political 
theorists risk constructing an account of public mourning that fails to adequately attend to 
the vital dimensions of religious practice and struggle in such moments. The product of this 
neglect is a flat rendering of religion as an instrument for control and domination, with pow-
erful figures like Bush wielding providentialist language and evangelical registers of voice to 
de-authorize the people, ground an anti-political claim of certainty, and liquidate the space 
for dissent. Largely because of this focus on the presidency, such analyses re-articulate the 
Machiavellian civil religion position that the political use of religious registers of action and 
voice, especially in the wake of collective trauma, is principally a manipulative, authoritarian 
and, ultimately, counter-democratic tactic (see Chapter One). 12 
                                                
11 As a part of a larger project interested in melodrama as a genre of political rhetoric and thought, Elisabeth 
Anker argues that not just the Bush Administration but also the national news media advanced a melodramatic 
presentation. See Anker, “Villains, Victims and Heroes: Melodrama, Media, and September 11,” Journal of Com-
munication 55:1 (2005): 22-37. 
12 One of the more theoretically nuanced and promising entries in this literature is Paul Christopher Johnson, 
“Savage Civil Religion,” Numen 52 (2005). Johnson’s analysis of the civil religious responses to the attacks on 
the World Trade Towers stands out by introducing a welcome measure of nuance and distinguishing between 
what he calls “organic civil religion” and “instrumental civil religion.” The former marks the relatively sponta-
neous practices of group mourning that occurred most dramatically in the ad hoc memorials of bric-a-brac—
clothing, balloons, stuffed animals, and candles—surrounding Ground Zero. Instrumental civil religion, by 
contrast, consists of a calculated attempt by political elites to channel such potent and open-ended feeling and 
sentiment towards particular policies through speeches and ceremonies. It is, Johnson writes in a Machiavellian 
turn of phrase, a “process of symbolic hijacking.” Johnson’s phrasing here echoes the position of Sheldon 
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With a mind to bridging from these analytical treatments of Bush’s evangelical dis-
course to a more nuanced account of the religious politics of mourning, I begin with a 
reading of Bush’s National Day of Prayer and Remembrance address, which was given three 
days after the events of September 11. This address offers an illuminating point of entry into 
this chapter’s discussion not only because it sets the ground for Bush’s later rhetorical con-
structions, which more subtly incorporate religious materials, but also because his vivid 
depiction of the figure of the polity-in-mourning—what Bush refers to as the “kinship of 
grief”—serves as a foundation for thinking more rigorously through the religious politics of 
mourning. After examining Bush’s speech, I briefly consider Abraham Lincoln’s “Gettys-
burg Address” as an alternative mode of presidential mourning that also incorporates 
Christian tropes but ultimately breaks from the model of Bush by imparting an ethos of 
atonement as the proper response to shared loss. 
At the most basic level, Bush’s address works to hail citizens into a specific relation-
ship with the divine and the nation-state. The theme of religio-political orientation is 
established in the speech’s opening lines. Standing before the cathedral’s marble altar, Bush 
declares, “We are here in the middle hour of our grief. So many have suffered so great a loss, 
and today we express our nation’s sorrow. We come before God to pray for the missing and 
the dead, and for those who love them.”13 In these first sentences Bush establishes a triangu-
                                                                                                                                            
Wolin who is similarly wary of the capacity of religion to be used for the purposes of the powerful. Writing 
during the ascendency of Christian Conservatism, Wolin narrowly defines civil religion as “the incorporation of 
religious practice into the system of governance and control.” See Sheldon Wolin, “America’s Civil Religion,” 
Democracy 2 (1983): 7-17. As much as Johnson’s analysis offers a more complex account of the post-September 
11 dynamics of religion and politics—particularly in pointing towards the diffuse but pronounced emotional 
intensities flowing throughout the citizenry and finding expression in material practices—it ultimately repeats 
the orthodox concern with presidential rhetoric and the resulting conception of religious language (at least in its 
overt manifestations) as a means for political elites to exercise social control. 
13 George W. Bush, “President’s Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance,” The White House, Sep-
tember 14, 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-2.html 
(accessed May 7, 2012). All future quotes from the address are taken from this transcript. 
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lar relationship between the American political community (“we”), public loss, and the relig-
ious that he will return to and elaborate over the course of the address. Speaking 
simultaneously to the audience in the cathedral—a collection of politicians and members of 
the military and police—and a national audience made virtually present through the medium 
of television, Bush positions a generalized and homogenous “we” both temporally and spa-
tially. According to Bush, the national “we” exists temporally in the midst of a shared 
mourning, suspended between injury and resolution, and spatially—or perhaps more pre-
cisely, cosmologically—in the presence of fellow citizens and the divine. To mourn publicly, 
he implies, involves a process of not only turning to one’s peers—joining together with 
one’s fellow citizens and sufferers—but also turning to a higher, transcendent power 
through the use of religious rituals and practices. By supplying the means of expression and 
communication, the materials of religion becomes the mediating term in this network of re-
lations that unites God, nation, and individual.  
 Moving swiftly to the source of the nation’s common mourning, Bush recalls the hu-
man losses of September 11, including those who perished in the buildings, those who 
resisted in the airplanes, and the rescuers who responded to the attacks. In conjuring the in-
nocence and courage of those killed in the attacks, though, Bush opens the theodicean 
question of why—why these people were killed, and why a just God would allow such violent 
                                                                                                                                            
 Bush’s use of religious materials tracks what historian Martin Marty calls the “priestly” tradition. Through 
this mode of address, Bush “comforts the afflicted” and affirms the virtue of the nation’s political and social 
institutions. Martin E. Marty, Religion and Republic: The American Circumstance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 82. 
 In interviews after he left Bush administration, Michael Gerson, speechwriter for President Bush and the 
likely composer of his address during the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance, makes explicit this goal of 
giving consolation, saying that religious language was used in presidential speeches during the Bush Administra-
tion in order to offer “comfort in grief and mourning.” In such circumstances, Gerson claims, “a president 
generally can’t say that death is final, and separation is endless, and the universe is an echoing, empty void. A 
president offers hope—the hope of reunions and a love stronger than death, and justice beyond our under-
standing.” Michael Gerson, “Religion, Rhetoric, and the Presidency: Remarks of Michael Gerson, Speechwriter 
and Policy Advisor to President George W. Bush,” Ethics and Public Policy Center, online at 
http://www.eppc.org/publications/pubID.2237/pub_detail.asp, December 6, 2004, 2, accessed February 10, 
2012. 
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and catastrophic acts to occur.14 To the latter question, Bush invokes the inscrutability of the 
Judeo-Christian God: 
God’s signs are not always the ones we look for. We learn in tragedy that his pur-
poses are not always our own. Yet the prayers of private suffering, whether in our 
homes or in this great cathedral, are known and heard, and understood. There are 
prayers that help us last through the day, or endure the night. There are prayers of 
friends and strangers that give us strength for the journey. And there are prayers that 
yield our will to a will greater than our own. This world He created is of moral de-
sign. Grief and tragedy and hatred are only for a time. Goodness, remembrance, and 
love have no end. And the Lord of life holds all who die, and all who mourn. 
 
Bush’s account of the divine meaning of the attacks identifies and attempts to dissolve a 
problematic dissonance: the order of the world is figured as just and moral due to the be-
nevolent will of God, and yet the human experience of the universe—especially in light of 
the present tragedy—is one of profound and seemingly arbitrary pain and suffering. The key 
to resolving this apparent contradiction, Bush suggests, is to first recognize the limits and 
fallibility of human awareness. God’s plan can confound human expectations and senses of 
justice but this fact alone does not point toward an immoral or chaotic universe; instead, 
given the presupposition of a moral order to the world, the capacities of human intelligence 
and mastery must be called into question. At the same time, Bush stresses the inexorable in-
tersubjective quality of suffering and mourning with private prayer implicated in a complex 
web of relations between visible and invisible others. Bush elevates religious spaces (such as 
the National Cathedral) and religious forms, including shared memorial services, lamenta-
tions and private prayer, as privileged means by which both individual and community 
                                                
14 Of course, Bush is not the first person to reflect on these questions and dilemmas. The numerous theological 
and philosophical works categorized as theodicies engage the overarching question of how to reconcile the 
existence of evil, deprivation, and suffering in a world created by a benevolent and just divinity who is both 
omniscient and omnipotent. Why, put simply, do good people suffer, evil people prosper, and God does noth-
ing? The term, which compounds the Greek works for “God” and “justice,” was coined in 1710 by G.W. 
Leibniz in Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Men, and the Origin of Evil, translated by E.M. Hug-
gard, edited by Austin Farrer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952). On the category of theodicy more 
generally, see William Fulton, “Theodicy,” Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 12, edited by James Hastings 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1961), 289. 
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reckon with loss, thus making it manageable and meaningful without ever fully understand-
ing it. In this way, these modes of action and speech help reproduce a unified political 
collectivity still reeling from a traumatic dispossession by staging its lingering connections to 
those who have been lost while replenishing the social bonds amongst those who remain. 
 Yet, as Bush departs from his attempt to locate a divine reason for the event and con-
tinues to develop this image of American society, these post-September 11 social bonds are 
ultimately revealed to be, in Wendy Brown’s phrase, wounded (and wounding) attachments.15 
The connections of grief, Bush begins, cut across the divides of religious difference and par-
tisanship that typically fracture the social field:  
In these acts, and in many others, Americans showed a deep commitment to one an-
other, and an abiding love for our country. Today, we feel what Franklin Roosevelt 
called the warm courage of national unity. This is a unity of every faith, and every 
background. It has joined together political parties in both houses of Congress. It is 
evident in services of prayer and candlelight vigils, and American flags, which are 
displayed in pride, and waved in defiance. Our unity is a kinship of grief, and a stead-
fast resolve to prevail against our enemies. And this unity against terror is now 
extending across the world. 
 
While shared communal losses inevitably involve personal dimensions, Bush presents public 
mourning as a crucial moment for the emergence and (re)assertion of the unity and integrity 
of the political collective. The rituals of public mourning operate as the expression and re-
enactment of foundational political identifications. They give form and force to what Bush, 
in a striking phrase, calls “a kinship of grief.”16 Bush does not merely describe the American 
community but also reconstitutes the people in relation to their injury. He calls forth a con-
figuration of “the people” as the object and audience of his address with the ultimate aim of 
                                                
15 See Wendy Brown, States of Injury (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
16 Bush’s notion of a “kinship of grief” echoes Mark Seltzer’s prescient characterization of America in the late 
1990s as being marked by a “sociality of the wound” with its self-representations consisting of “a culture of 
suffering, states of injury, and wounded attachments.” See Seltzer, Serial Killers: Life and Death in America’s Wound 
Culture (New York: Routledge, 1998), 278, 254. Lauren Berlant has similarly argued that American citizenship 
and senses of belonging have historically been constructed through affective regimes of suffering and grief. See 
Berlant, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature 70 (1998): 635-68. 
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determining how the intense emotional energies and deep sense of fellow feeling—akin in 
many ways to the state of collective effervescence described by Émile Durkheim17—
activated by the communal trauma should be directed. The solidarity of Bush’s “kinship of 
grief,” however, is forged not only from the identification of members with one another as 
they recognize their common injury but also against those who authored that injury and who 
must be opposed, punished, and violently dispatched. The alliances of mourning, as Bush 
invokes them, are ultimately predicated on the designation of a common enemy. 
 Bush’s performance initiates the process in which he ascribes the political meaning 
of the September 11 attacks and establishes the narrative elements that would reappear 
throughout the duration of his administration. “Just three days removed from these events,” 
Bush says, “Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to his-
tory is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.” By way of two 
sentences, Bush asserts that the country lacks both sufficient factual data and the cool ra-
tionality required to make intellectual sense of the events of September 11, but it is still 
possible to construct the meaning of the event and, from that, the proper response of the 
political community. According to Bush, the mission of the United States entails the preser-
vation and dissemination of liberal democracy and its bundle of individual liberties, as well as 
the destruction of those who attacked America and, concomitantly, its political, economic, 
and religious traditions. In a September 20 address before a joint session of Congress, Bush 
clarifies the nature of this struggle, saying, “The course of this conflict is not known yet its 
outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we 
know that God is not neutral between them.”18 The commitment to justice and liberal rights 
                                                
17 See Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, translated by Karen E. Fields (New York: The 
Free Press, 1995). 
18 For an extensive discussion of the rhetorical binaries and dualisms used by Bush, see Lincoln, 19-32. 
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joins the United States and God, so that America becomes an avatar of the divine interest in 
disseminating liberal-democracy. As Bush states in a January 28, 2003 speech, “the liberty we 
prize is not America’s gift to the world; it is God’s gift to humanity.”  
Although taking a novel form, Bush’s invocation of a uniquely American historical 
obligation resonates with a number of sedimented rhetorical constructions in the country’s 
political culture, including the Puritan notion of an errand in the wilderness, the expansion-
ary impulse of Manifest Destiny, and the Cold War imperative to combat anti-religious 
communism. At their core these images of America cast it as the instrument of God with a 
divinely ordained duty in and to the world to spread, respectively, the Protestant Christian 
religion, the virtuous institutions of liberal government, and the system of capitalism. Bush 
echoes these earlier formulations while imagining a national past that sustains the image of 
the American people as pacific and innocent. Indeed, he stresses the victimhood of the 
country while staving off any sense of responsibility or resignation. “This nation is peaceful, 
but fierce when stirred to anger,” he states in his National Day of Mourning address, casting 
peace as the default state and preference of the country while simultaneously positioning re-
tributive violence as the necessary and legitimate course of action.19 A week later, during his 
September 20 speech before Congress, Bush would return to the theme of American moral 
and political goodness, saying, “Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what 
we see right here in this chamber—a democratically elected government. Their leaders are 
self-appointed. They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, 
our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.” The attacks on the United 
                                                
19 This mobilizing trope of the pacific American nation reappears frequently in Bush’s public addresses. See, for 
example, his October 7, 2001 “Address to the Nation”: “We’re a peaceful nation. Yet, as we have learned, so 
suddenly and so tragically, there can be no peace in a world of sudden terror. In the face of today’s new threat, 
the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten it.” Mark Brandon illuminates how this particular 
national ethos, which frames the United States as essentially peaceful and only warlike when injured, recurs in 
American politics during times of war; see Brandon, “War and the Constitutional Order,” in The Constitution in 
Wartime: Beyond Alarmism and Complacency, edited by Mark Tushnet (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005). 
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States are thus presented as the fruits of ideological resentment and the hostility of a closed, 
heteronomous culture, rather than the result of America’s past policies and actions on the 
international stage.  
 It is illuminating to briefly compare Bush’s address on the National Day of Prayer 
and Remembrance to Abraham Lincoln’s “Gettysburg Address,” which was also occasioned 
by a moment of dramatic loss. In a similar fashion to Bush, Lincoln insists on speaking in a 
first person plural, evoking a national “we” that has suffered loss and remains in a state of 
struggle. Lincoln asserts in his opening sentence that the origins of this nation are not found 
in the Constitution—the document that begins “We the people of the United States”—but 
rather the Declaration of Independence. By elevating the Declaration as the foundational 
articulation of the American community, Lincoln privileges its explicit commitments to free-
dom and equality over and above the compromised technical-legal language of the 
Constitution. In a telling shift, however, Lincoln characterizes the principle of equality as a 
“proposition”—by definition a point introduced for consideration and acceptance as a 
course of action—rather than, as Thomas Jefferson writes in the Declaration, as among 
those “truths” held “to be self-evident.” Lincoln transforms the status of equality from a 
taken-for-granted premise of government to an aspiration that must be enacted and fought 
for by the nation’s citizenry in the “testing” of the Civil War. Lincoln therefore alters the 
mission of the Union from simply reinstating the antebellum legal-institutional order to one 
of struggling to preserve and better actualize the nation’s constitutive commitments. 
 The concise address Lincoln offers at Gettysburg performs this re-orientation of na-
tional purpose through a particular configuration of what Bush calls the kinship of grief. The 
reformation of social bonds and collective understandings plays off of the underlying pur-
pose of the day’s event, namely, the sanctification of the dead. Lincoln states: 
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[W]e can not dedicate—we can not consecrate—we can not hallow—this ground… 
It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that 
from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they 
gave the last full measure of devotion…that this nation, under God, shall have a new 
birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, 
shall not perish from the earth. 
  
Over the course of the last paragraph of his speech, Lincoln subtly alters the object of ac-
tion. Whereas he begins with the prospect of the assembled audience sanctifying Soldiers’ 
National Cemetery, he concludes this is not possible for the blood of Union soldiers has al-
ready consecrated it. What is necessary, he claims, is for the audience not to dedicate the 
grounds of the cemetery but rather dedicate themselves to the lingering struggle. Further-
more, Lincoln inflects the political and military struggle of the moment with religious 
meaning. In rejecting the notion that the living may dedicate the ground of Gettysburg, Lin-
coln evokes a chain of equivalences between dedication, consecration (to set apart as sacred), 
and hallowing (to make holy or sacred). When Lincoln performs his rhetorical turn wherein 
the audience becomes simultaneously the subject and object of the dedication, the residue of 
this discursive chain and its attendant gesture towards the transcendent remain so that the 
struggle for equality becomes invested with a holy or sacred significance.20  
 While Lincoln’s sacralization of the nation in mourning and the principle of equality 
resonates with Bush’s performance at the National Cathedral, the two presidents’ invoca-
tions of God and the resulting relationship between the divine and the polity diverge. Bush, 
it should be remembered, situates the United States as an avatar of the divine, combating the 
forces of heteronomy and evil and disseminating the righteous good of freedom. Lincoln’s 
address ascribes no such partiality to the divine. Indeed, the one overt reference to God in 
                                                
20 The liturgical sensibility that infuses Lincoln’s address manifests in the responses of the audience. According 
to one reporter’s account, the end of Lincoln’s address inspired one openly weeping captain to exclaim, “God 
Almighty bless Abraham Lincoln,” while other members of the audience responded to the speech by saying 
“Amen.” See Gabor Boritt, The Gettysburg Gospel: The Lincoln Speech that Nobody Knows (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2006), 118. 
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the address is strikingly ambivalent. In presenting the United States as “this nation, under 
God,” Lincoln establishes the divine as a consistent presence that stands in judgment of the 
United States. The figure of God as judge becomes even more pronounced when this ad-
dress is read in conjunction with Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address, in which he offers the 
possibility that the Civil War is a process of divinely ordained attrition through which the 
United States atones for its practice of slavery. Given over two years after the address at 
Gettysburg, Lincoln’s Second Inaugural speech recognizes the competing claims by both 
North and South on and in the name of the Christian God. Following this identification of 
the common religious roots and assertions of the two regions, Lincoln states: 
The Almighty has His own purposes. “Woe unto the world because of offenses; for 
it must needs be that offenses come, but woe to that man by whom the offense 
cometh.” If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, 
in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through 
His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and 
South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we 
discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a 
living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that 
this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue 
until all the wealth piled by the bondsman’s two hundred and fifty years of unre-
quited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be 
paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it 
must be said the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether. 
 
The Second Inaugural departs from Bush’s rhetorical construction—and supplements Lin-
coln’s own words at Gettysburg—by instilling atonement as an ethos of grief and political 
reformation. If the Gettysburg Address consecrates and sacralizes the American people as 
stewards of a divine principle of equality, the Second Inaugural overlays that mission and the 
losses of the war with a sense of historical culpability and an imperative to repent the sins of 
failing to practice the divine duty of equality. 
The invocation of honored dead and the presence of the divine in the performances 
of both Lincoln and Bush serve the purposes of inculcating an imperative to act as a com-
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munity. Put differently, Lincoln and Bush can be understood as cultivating the conditions 
for certain modes of collective action. Lincoln’s simultaneous gesture to sacralize equality 
and cast the war in terms of attrition and atonement recruits subjects into a campaign to ful-
fill the refurbished promise of the Declaration of Independence. By contrast, Bush works to 
establish finite attachments of belonging and delimited mutuality—sufferer to sufferer—that 
bind the nation together in an aggressive response to a shared state of injury. While still far 
from specific institutional transformations, Bush’s performance of public mourning contrib-
utes to the formation of an aesthetic and discursive environment that closes the possibility to 
certain political developments (such as self-critique) while increasing the likelihood of others 
(a bellicose and expansionary foreign policy). 
In order to get beyond the presidential politics of religious mourning, I use the next 
section to develop a theoretical account of, first, the politics of public mourning and, second, 
the crucial place occupied by religious traditions in this process of responding to loss and 
reforming political society.  
§ 2. The Religious Politics of Mourning  
and Political Reformation 
 
 In response to the events of September 11, theorists have increasingly turned their 
attentions to the dynamics of public mourning. These scholarly works and reflections pro-
vide a foundation for understanding the political entanglements and significance of public 
mourning. As I go onto discuss, it is necessary think beyond these works insofar as they do 
not attend to the religious dimensions of public mourning in the United States.  
The attendant practices and rituals of mourning supply meaning to loss. If, on a per-
sonal level, death often inspires an experience of disorientation—a lack of direction, 
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understanding, and purpose21—mourning practices provide a framework for confronting 
this shock and disorientation while constructing a narrative that ascribes meaning to the 
event of death and offers a bearing for future action.22 A similar dynamic occurs in instances 
of communal loss. Traumatic events such as experiences of public violence and mass death, 
Jenny Edkins explains, disrupt the status quo and open the social field to transformation: 
“Something happens that doesn’t fit, that is unexpected—or that happens in an unexpected 
way. It doesn’t fit the story we already have, but demands that we invent a new account, one 
that will produce a place for what has happened and make it meaningful.”23  
Simon Stow, Judith Butler, and Heather Pool, among others, highlight the political 
dimension of public mourning. Analyzing the modes of mourning in Thucydides’ rendering 
of Pericles’s funeral oration and Lincoln’s “Gettysburg Address,” Stow writes: “Public cere-
monies and the stories told there shape policy… [T]he public stories told about the dead 
affected the politics of the living.”24 According to Stow, the rhetorical performances of Peri-
cles and Lincoln both featured epainesis (praise for the fallen) and parainesis (advice for the 
living), but to different political effects. By taking into consideration these divergent effects, 
Stow identifies two broad types of public mourning practices. The first of these, romantic 
public mourning, is pointedly uncritical and oriented towards a goal of reconciliation and 
consensus. As reflected in Pericles’ celebration of an idealized Athenian democracy in his 
                                                
21 Butler grippingly depicts this experience as follows: “There is losing, as we know, but there is also the trans-
formative effect of loss, and this latter cannot be charted or planned. One can try to choose it, but it may be 
that this experience of transformation deconstitutes choice at some level… I think one is hit by waves, and that 
one starts out the day with an aim, a project, a plan, and finds oneself foiled. One finds oneself fallen. One is 
exhausted but does not know why. Something is larger than one’s own deliberate plan, one’s own project, one’s 
own knowing and choosing” (“Violence, Mourning, Politics,” 11). 
22 See Geoffrey Gorer, Death, Grief, and Mourning (New York: Arno Press, 1977). Understood in this way, it 
could be said that mourning practices and rituals exist more (if not solely) for the sake of the living—those, in 
other words, who encounter death and must carry on in its wake—than for the good of the dead. 
23 Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), xiv. A similar 
conception of collective trauma as a symbolic and psychological rupture in need of meaning appears in E. Ann 
Kaplan, Trauma Culture: The Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univer-
sity Press, 2005). 
24 Stow, “Pericles at Gettysburg and Ground Zero,” 206. 
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funeral oration, the romantic type suppresses the divisions and inequities within the social 
field and reaffirms the polity’s established identity. By contrast, tragic (or Dionysian) mourn-
ing engages in critical self-reflection and confronts the community with challenging choices 
in the hope of transforming its political values and practices.25 Rather than supplying com-
fort to citizens, the tragic model generates ambivalence and sensitivity to the immutable 
tensions and partialities of democratic life.  
Stow’s analysis echoes the recent theoretical work of Judith Butler, particularly with 
respect to her critique of modes of mourning that propagate exclusionary and violent con-
ceptualizations of the nation-state. As Butler writes, “Whereas some forms of public 
mourning are protracted and ritualized, stoking nationalist fervor, reiterating the conditions 
of loss and victimization that come to justify a more or less permanent war, not all forms of 
mourning lead to that conclusion.”26 The manner by which a community processes a shared 
loss or trauma, including the rituals, practices and discourses involved, profoundly affects 
the way the community acts and understands itself. Moreover, the social practices of grief 
enact and engender conceptions of what lives are worth valuing, what actions are appropri-
ate or necessary in valuing those lives, and how communities should manage the fact of 
injury and vulnerability. Butler’s normative impulse is to recognize and nurture those mourn-
ing practices that facilitate the sense of human interdependence and thus mitigate the use of 
violence as a reaction to loss. Furthermore, Butler’s work identifies mourning rituals as em-
                                                
25 Ibid., 195-96; Simon Stow, “Agonistic Homegoing: Frederick Douglass, Joseph Lowery, and the Democratic 
Value of African American Public Mourning,” American Political Science Review 104:4 (2010): 682-83. Stow’s read-
ing of Lincoln’s “Gettysburg Address” casts it as an example of Dionysian mourning that challenges the 
“current practices” of the United States (“Pericles at Gettysburg,” 203).  
 It also bears mentioning that Stow’s typology of romantic and tragic mourning resembles the typology of 
civil religion constructed by historian Martin E. Marty. In his analysis of public religion in America, Marty iden-
tifies two modes of religion: the priestly and the prophetic. Marty explains these concepts as follows: “The 
priestly will normally be celebratory, affirmative, culture-building. The prophetic will tend to be dialectical 
about civil religion, but with a predisposition toward the judgmental…one comforts the afflicted; the other 
afflicts the comfortable.” See Marty, 82-83. 
26 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York: Verso, 2004), xix. 
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bedded in a social field of power that sets the contours of what (and whom) can be grieved 
and how.  
At the same time as they reflect the existing network of power, these sites also open 
up the space for reconfiguring the shape of power relations in a society. The theoretical 
work of Heather Pool underlines the transformative capacity of public mourning. In her 
analysis of the aftermath of traumatic losses in American history, such as the murder of 
Emmett Till and the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire, Pool depicts mourning as an instance 
in which social and political standing is at once manifested and thrown open to change. 
Quoting Rogers Smith, she describes public mourning as a crucible in “which conceptions of 
political membership, allegiance, and identity are formed and transformed.”27 Public mourn-
ing serves as a focusing event, which directs citizen attention to particular issues and imbues 
these questions with heightened urgency and significance. In the case of the Triangle Fire, 
for example, individuals who already enjoyed the status of full citizens were captivated by the 
horrific spectacle of the 146 workers who died as a result of the factory owners locking the 
exits, preventing escape from the fire. As a result of the publicity surrounding the event, ac-
tivist groups began pushing for reforms in industrial safety policies, leveraging the event for 
legal transformation. In addition to changes in policy, Pool points to how the fire altered the 
public perception of recent immigrants, such as those who perished in the blaze, so that they 
were now considered “insiders” belonging within the American people and capable of mak-
ing claims for state protections and consideration. Pool is careful to specify that while these 
moments are ripe with potential—specifically, the possibility of including new groups within 
                                                
27 Rogers Smith, “Identities, Interests, and the Future of Political Science,” Perspectives on Politics 2 (June 2004): 
301, quoted in Heather Pool, “The Politics of Mourning: The Triangle Fire and Political Belonging,” Polity 14:2 
(2012): 186. See also Heather Pool, “Mourning Emmett Till,” Law, Culture and the Humanities (2012): 1-31. 
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the civil body and further empowering those who are already nominally within “the peo-
ple”—this potential can be squandered, suppressed, and resisted. 
It is not incidental or mere hyperbole, then, that historian Nicole Loraux describes 
the ritual of Athenian funeral orations as “inventing” that city-state or that Garry Wills 
speaks of Lincoln’s “Gettysburg Address” as the speech that “remade” America.28 These 
theoretical and historical accounts of public mourning reveal that such moments exist as key 
sites for what I call political reformation. By this term I mean the process of reconstructing the 
dominant political culture, social mores, and social imaginary of a political community in the 
wake of a broadly felt misfortune or loss. While not immediately institutional in their effects, 
political reformations can establish the conditions that facilitate consent to be either granted 
or withheld to certain exercises of power or acts of the state.29 Using the Gramscian concep-
tual framework established in the introductory chapter, political reformations involve a 
reconfiguration of the hegemonic common sense within a community—that is, the taken-
for-granted ideas, ways of life, and modes of speech and practice.  
The language of reformation is purposefully ambivalent since the process of re-
sponding to crisis and recovering from public loss is open to the possibility of either a 
restoration of the polity’s former state or the development of new structures and mores. In-
deed, in reflecting on the vicissitudes of crises, Gramsci emphasizes the strong likelihood of 
an existing historical bloc—the entrenched ruling parties or interests in a political commu-
nity—retaining its place of power: 
                                                
28 See Nicole Loraux, The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City, translated by Alan Sheridan 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); and Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade Amer-
ica (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 
29 While using different descriptive terminology, both Linda Zerilli (who talks of “predicative moments of poli-
tics”) and Jason Frank (who prefers the phrase “constituent moments”) have recently investigated these 
moments. See Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 171; 
and Frank, Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2009), 8.  
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The traditional ruling class, which has numerous trained cadres, changes men and 
programmes and, with greater speed than is achieved by the subordinate classes, re-
absorbs the control that was slipping from its grasp. Perhaps it may take sacrifices, 
and expose itself to an uncertain future by demagogic promises; but it retains power, 
reinforces it for the time being, and uses it to crush its adversary and disperse his 
leading cadres.30 
 
Even in the re-imposition of the pre-existing order of power, however, there is an attendant 
demand for calibration and modulation of social mores in light of loss—a preservation of 
political rule, in other words, through the transformation, however subtle, of the habits of 
mind and body that inform a community’s foundational commitments, values, and identity.  
 Public mourning is also marked by both overt and subtle dynamics of contestation. 
In a word, public mourning is agonistic, with a multiplicity of interpretations and meanings 
of the event vying for a hold on the imaginaries of political subjects. Because of the irreduci-
ble dimensions of difference and division that mark the uneven terrain of American political 
culture, the responses to collective losses or traumas are never univocal or monotonic; 
rather, they are a multitude, with each response inflected by the particular interests, values, 
and traditions of the speaker and her primary audience. Each of these claims—as they 
should be understood since they are attempts to inscribe meaning to the event and so guide 
the polity in its self-understanding—is directed at becoming a ‘political truth,’ that is, an 
opinion that is acknowledged and assented to by the majority and thus becomes hegemonic. 
To become hegemonic these claims must first hail a constituency that takes them up as the 
proper or natural way to feel, think, and act politically in the wake of the disruptive event.  
 Yet even as scholars have begun to examine instances of public mourning as crucial 
junctures for democratic politics, this burgeoning body of theoretical work has so far failed 
to engage directly and systematically with how religious traditions are critically bound up 
                                                
30 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, translated by Quintin Hoare and Goeffrey Nowell Smith 
(New York: International Publishers, 1971), 210-11. 
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with these moments. This neglect is particularly curious given, on the one hand, the frequent 
connection made by scholars between religion and issues of existential security and mortality 
and, on the other, the political power and potency of the Christian tradition over the history 
of the American republic. 
 Death and crisis forms are, of course, key concerns of American Christianity as well 
as other religious traditions.31 Indeed, religious scholar Martin Riesebrodt recently claimed 
that the management of misfortune through the appeal to super-human forces is the defini-
tional core of religion. Accordingly, the liturgical components of a religious tradition’s cultus, 
including rituals, prayers, hymns, psalms, incantations and so on, are what Riesebrodt calls 
“interventionist practices” oriented towards hailing superhuman beings such as gods for the 
purposes of “warding off misfortune, coping with crises, and laying the foundation for salva-
tion.”32 In these passages Riesebrodt highlights the role of what Durkheim calls ‘piacular’ 
rites and practices in religious traditions. As Durkheim explains, “Any misfortune, anything 
that is a bad omen, anything that inspires feelings of anguish or fear necessitates a piaculum 
and is consequently called piacular. Therefore, the word seems appropriate to designate rites 
that are celebrated in worry or sadness.”33 Piacular rites are rituals and practices of repen-
tance and rededication where subjects are re-oriented to their identity as members belonging 
to a collective and the social bonds that may have been frayed through strife and stress are 
reformed. 
Speaking broadly, religious traditions provide ways of inhabiting grief, approaching 
mortality, and encountering suffering. In his classic article on religion as a cultural and sym-
                                                
31 As Stanley Hauerwas and Roman Coles write, “Christianity, at least Christianity not determined by Constan-
tinian or capitalist desires, is training for a dying that is good. Such good dying is named in the gospel as trial, 
cross, and resurrection.” Stanley Hauerwas and Roman Coles, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary: 
Conversations Between a Radical Democrat and a Christian (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2008), 3. 
32 Martin Riesebrodt, The Promise of Salvation: A Theory of Religion, translated by Steven Rendall (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2010), xii. 
33 Durkheim, 290. 
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bolic system, cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz argues that religions engage “the prob-
lem of suffering” not by diminishing it or offering a path that avoids pain and loss but rather 
by making it intelligible and therefore bearable. According to Geertz, religious traditions of-
fer materials that can be used “to cope with [the problem of suffering] by placing it in a 
meaningful context, providing a mode of action through which it can be expressed, being 
expressed understood, and being understood, endured.”34 To render Geertz’s description 
into a language he himself does not use, we can say that religion offers a praxis of grief. Relig-
ious traditions contain rituals, rhetorics, and gestures that are rooted in conceptions of the 
world and that, when enacted, place suffering and loss within that established framework. 
Religious language, practices, and rituals offer not only key ways of expressing or represent-
ing these feelings but also, importantly, of shaping, educating, and composing them. Put 
differently, the materials within the cultus also facilitate a poetics of grief in that they engender 
novel meanings and ways of sensing the world. 
In addition to the symbolic meanings they express and produce, religious rituals also 
foster arrays of sensibilities and disposition within subjects. Geertz captures this level of ac-
tivity in speaking of the “moods and motivations” that religious forms induce and sustain in 
practitioners. Although they differ sharply in many other regards, Geertz’s position here 
resonates with that of fellow religious scholar Talal Asad, who advances the notion of relig-
ion as performative, that is, as a matter of embodiment and enactment rather than simply a 
matter of creeds composed of propositional beliefs.35 According to Geertz, the materials of 
religious traditions induce  
                                                
34 Geertz, 105. To be clear, by referencing Geertz I do not mean to completely ally myself with his conception 
of religion (which I engage critically in the introductory chapter); rather, his statements should be understood 
as reflecting a broader camp of scholarship that identifies suffering, death, and existential security as key con-
cerns for religious traditions. 
35 See Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
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in the worshipper a certain distinctive set of dispositions (tendencies, capacities, pro-
pensities, skills, habits, liabilities, pronenesses) which lend a chronic character to the 
flow of his activity and the quality of his experience. A disposition describes not an 
activity or an occurrence but a probability of an activity being performed or an oc-
currence occurring in certain circumstances.36  
 
The liturgical apparatus of a tradition shapes the character and temperament of religious sub-
jects, disposing them towards certain activities and sensibilities and against others. Given the 
diverse repertoire of performative materials within each religious tradition—and Christian-
ity’s heterogeneous mix of sub-traditions—social actors involved in practices of mourning 
can cultivate a number of different dispositions within their audience. 
 Although Geertz recognizes the constructive capacities of religious traditions and 
how they can be put to the task of shaping subjectivities, his analysis does not consider the 
ways in which these traditions are implicated in fields of power and politics. In this respect 
political theorist William Connolly offers a helpful supplement to Geertz’s account of relig-
ious rituals with his concept of micropolitics. Micropolitics, Connolly explains: 
embodies a very important modality through which private–public lines are crossed 
on a regular basis and pluralist virtues are cultivated, neutralized, or demeaned… Mi-
cropolitics consists of multimodal practices, deploying mixtures of image, rhythm, 
words, gesture, and touch to help code the visceral registers of subjectivity and in-
tersubjectivity. Micropolitics thus finds ample expression in churches, families, 
universities, corporations, unions, film, the new media, and especially the resonances 
back and forth between all of these venues. It helps to code the visceral register of 
intersubjective life.37 
 
As Connolly makes explicit, liturgies and rituals are key sites of micropolitical activity that 
“code the visceral register of intersubjective life”—or, as Geertz says, induce the simultane-
ous formation (or consolidation) of “moods and motivations” and “general conceptions of 
order.” Echoing the positions of Geertz and Asad, Connolly insists that religious traditions 
encompass both creeds and what he refers to as a vertical dimension, which involves enact-
                                                
36 Geertz, 95. 
37 Ibid., 649-50. 
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ments that express and condition “embodied feelings, habits of judgment, an patterns of 
conduct below direct intellectual control.”38 As discussed earlier in the dissertation, Gram-
sci’s notion of common sense captures not only the accepted and appropriate ways of 
thinking and acting but also the aesthetic dimensions of public being that concern how sub-
jects sense, perceive, and feel. In this respect it tracks Connolly’s concept of the infra-
sensible or visceral level of social life, which operates below human consciousness and fea-
tures not ideas but rather “thought-imbued feelings.”39 This “fugitive circuit,” as Connolly 
describes the visceral-ideological connection, manifests in the play of rituals and technical 
practices of religious traditions, which “do not simply represent beliefs or desires already 
there; they also educate the senses in specific ways; they accentuate some modes of conduct 
as they dampen others; and they help to compose embodied public virtues.”40 
To better perceive how processes of religious mourning “educate” and “compose” 
subjectivities and can thus contribute to particular political projects, it is necessary to attend 
not just to presidential invocations of religious themes and language but also to how these 
modes of voice and practice work at the micropolitical level within particular religious net-
works and publics. In the next sections I explore two of these sites and examine how they 
feature conflicting mourning practices and bids for political action in the wake of September 
11. Moving beyond a singular focus on Bush, I interrogate two illustrative and divergent “re-
ligious virtuosos” (to use Riesebrodt’s phrase): Revs. Jerry Falwell and Jeremiah Wright. By 
means of distinct modes of Christian mourning and providing the traumatic loss with mean-
                                                
38 William E. Connolly, Pluralism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 25; see also Connolly, Why I Am 
Not a Secularist, especially Chapter 1. 
39 William E. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 13. To be 
clear, the visceral—and the affective depths that it indexes—is a perennial dimension of public life; during 
moments of intense stress and anxiety, however, this dimension takes on a substantially heightened political 
power and significance. 
40 William E. Connolly, “Some Theses on Secularism,” Cultural Anthropology 26:4 (2011): 649. 
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ing, Falwell (along with Pat Robertson) and Wright mobilize their constituencies towards 
sharply different models of penitent citizenship and pious action. 
§ 3. Robertson, Falwell,  
and the Antechamber to Terror 
 
 On September 13, 2001, Reverend Pat Robertson, host of the 700 Club, invited Rev-
erend Jerry Falwell onto the program to reflect on the recent attacks. As the figureheads of 
the modern wave of conservative Christian religiosity in America, Robertson and Falwell 
both made careers of calling for the intertwining of economic liberty, traditional familial and 
societal arrangements, and the governmental enactment of scriptural doctrines. Through the 
medium of television and the adoption of business-style advertising and distribution tech-
niques, the two men popularized a particular configuration of Christianity complete with a 
distinct repertoire of scriptural touchstones, rhetorical styles, and embodied practices. Since 
its first airing in 1966, Robertson’s the 700 Club has fostered and sustained a committed 
Christian viewership, drawing in an average audience of one million viewers for its daily 
showings on the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN).41 Through his founding of the 
Moral Majority and Liberty Baptist College (later rechristened Liberty University), Falwell 
helped catalyze the dramatic mobilization of fundamentalist Christians as a major political 
bloc within the Republican coalition in the late 1970s and 1980s.42 Yet despite their similarly 
conservative political bearing, Robertson and Falwell’s public responses to September 11 
differed strikingly from Bush in terms of content and form. 
 From the outset of the 700 Club segment with Falwell, Robertson established a pro-
phetic register of voice by reviewing the putative sins of the country, including greed, 
                                                
41 “About The 700 Club,” The 700 Club, http://www.cbn.com/700club/ShowInfo/About/about700club.aspx 
(accessed May 25, 2012). 
42 See Daniel K. Williams, God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012); and Matthew Avery Sutton, Jerry Falwell and the Rise of the Religious Right: A Brief History with Documents 
(New York: Bedford, 2012). 
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materialism, hedonistic sexuality, and secular humanism. After cataloging these various 
transgressions, Robertson declared,  
We have insulted God at the highest levels of our government. And, then we say 
‘why does this happen?’ Well, why it’s happening is that God Almighty is lifting his 
protection from us. And once that protection is gone, we all are vulnerable because 
we’re a free society, and we’re vulnerable… All over the Arab world, there is venom 
being poured into people’s ears and minds against America. And, the only thing 
that’s going to sustain us is the umbrella power of the Almighty God.43 
 
The relationship Robertson posits between the sins he identifies and the events of Septem-
ber 11 is not directly causal in the sense that the terrorist attacks are God’s punishment on a 
wayward nation, as if to say God directed or ordained the plane hijackers. Instead, according 
to Robertson, the errant policies, practices, and lifestyles in the United States drive God 
away, thus attenuating the protection God has historically offered the country. This aliena-
tion of God, in turn, creates the necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for the country 
to be injured and its citizens murdered. When he enters the conversation Falwell immedi-
ately advances a similar prophetic perspective on the attacks, arguing that September 11 was 
only a preview of the shape of things to come “if in fact God continues to lift the curtain 
and allow the enemies of America to give us probably what we deserve.”44 
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, prophetic modes of speech such as the 
jeremiad do not necessarily involve making predictions about the future but rather, per Mar-
tin Buber’s formulation, setting an “audience, to whom the words are addressed, before the 
choice and decision…The future is not already fixed in this present hour; it is dependent on 
the real decision…in which man takes part in this hour.”45 A prophet poses critical collective 
                                                
43 Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell, “Transcript of Pat Robertson’s Interview with Jerry Falwell Broadcast on 
the 700 Club, September 13, 2001,” in Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11 (Chi-
cago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 104. 
44 Ibid., 106. 
45 Martin Buber, The Prophetic Faith (New York: Harper and Row, 1949), 2-3, quoted in George Shulman, Ameri-
can Prophecy: Race and Redemption in American Political Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 
4. 
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decisions to an audience with the hope that the community will accept the proffered truth 
and act differently on the basis of this new sense of reality. As Falwell boldly puts it in an 
earlier work, “We the American people have to make a choice today. Will it be revival or 
ruin? There can be no other way… Abraham Lincoln declared, ‘If destruction be our lot, we 
ourselves will be its author and its finisher.’”46 Thus, Falwell and Robertson are prophets by 
bearing witness to what they perceive as the truth of American decadence and sinfulness. 
Working in this register, they identify the cause of the attacks and project diverging future 
paths based on how the community decides to respond to the present crisis. In one possible 
future, America works to purge its sins and God restores protection; alternatively, the coun-
try does nothing and, as Robertson describes it, the events of September 11 become but “the 
antechamber to terror,” with further, even more devastating, destruction inflicted on the 
United States. By bearing witness in this fashion, the two men seek to engender, on the one 
hand, a sense of existential vulnerability and separation from God and, on the other, the im-
perative to rectify these conditions through certain programmatic actions. 47 
Over the course of his evangelical career, Falwell regularly adopted the form of the 
jeremiad in his sermons and rhetorical performances. Through this particular mode of pro-
phetic address, Falwell offered a diagnosis of the ills of American society, including such 
recurring conservative bêtes noires as feminism, secular humanism, and the larger societal 
trend of diminishing male authority.48 By calling out these ideologies and realities as destruc-
tive of the moral fabric of the United States, Falwell also issued a call to action, hailing a 
constituency of concerned Christian citizens into being for the purposes of taking collective 
                                                
46 Jerry Falwell, Listen, America! (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980), 24. 
47 Susan Friend Harding captures this process particularly well when she writes, “Witnessing aims to separate 
novice listeners from their prior, given reality, to constitute a new, previously unperceived or indistinct reality, 
and to impress that reality upon them, make it felt, heard, seen, known, undeniably real.” Harding, The Book of 
Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 37. 
48 See ibid., especially chapter six. 
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action and resisting these social forces. Falwell’s call, it must be said, resembled in many 
ways his prophetic performances prior to the attacks, with the same jeremiad structure and 
the same principal villains (the federal judiciary and progressive groups who uproot and dis-
place religious traditions). Even as it was an exercise in repetition, however, Falwell’s 
narrative located the events of the attack within an extant conception of the social and po-
litical world with an attendant understanding of the event’s meaning and import. Whereas 
Falwell and Robertson had long positioned divine punishment as looming in ethereal depths 
of a possible future, September 11 advanced the plot in their jeremiad by marking, in their 
framing, an initial materialization of God’s anger over America’s sinful practices. The affec-
tive intensities unsettled and activated by the event, thus, were encoded (or rather, re-
encoded) so that elemental questions of public morality were endowed with existential sig-
nificance.  
As with experiences of dark times generally, moments of public loss give rise to in-
tense demands for meaning that narrative and ritual can provide.49 Narrative, as Claude 
Bremond points out, is a particular mode of constructing and articulating history. Specifi-
cally, it consists of “a discourse which integrates a sequence of events of human interest into 
the unity of a single plot.”50 Instead of a simple chronological account of events, such repre-
sentations of history impart a structure and forge meaning through the careful selection of 
                                                
49 Hannah Arendt highlights the particular salience of narrative in “dark times” marked by human suffering and 
anxiety by quoting Isak Dinesen: “‘All sorrows may be borne if you put them into a story or tell a story about 
them.’ The story reveals the meaning of what otherwise would remain an unbearable sequence of sheer hap-
penings.” Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1968), 104. In an 
examination of how Arendt places storytelling and narrative as the constitutive medium and material of politics, 
Annabel Herzog echoes the particular need for such practices during anxious periods, writing, “Political by 
nature, stories have a political role: to illuminate dark times.” Herzog, “The Poetical Nature of Political Disclo-
sure: Hannah Arendt’s Storytelling,” Clio 30 (2001): 189. For an extended examination of the jeremiad narrative 
from an Arendtian perspective, see David S. Gutterman, “Stories of Sinfulness: Narrative Identity in America,” 
in Religion, Politics, and American Identity: New Directions, New Controversies, edited by David S. Gutterman and An-
drew R. Murphy (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 73-94; as well as David S. Gutterman, Prophetic Politics: 
Christian Social Movements and American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
50 Claude Bremond, “The Logic of Narrative Possibilities,” in Narratology: An Introduction, edited by Susana 
Onega and Jose Angel Garcia Landa (London: Longman, 1996), 63. 
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what details are included and stressed (and, concomitantly, what is excluded and deempha-
sized). The narrative Falwell fashions with Robertson on the 700 Club threads together 
invocations of scriptural language in order to construct the logic of its plot. The biblical bed-
rock of Falwell’s prophetic performance is 2 Chronicles 7:14, a passage that reappears 
throughout Falwell’s decades-long career as well as the Christian conservative movement 
that he nurtured. He invokes the passage, for instance, in his 1980 political and spiritual 
manifesto, Listen, America!, presenting it as follows: “If my people, which are called by my 
name, shall humble themselves, and pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked 
ways; then will I hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin, and will heal their land.”51 
Along with this passage, Falwell also implicitly (and explicitly in his eventual, ostensible 
apology, which I discuss below) relies on Proverbs 14:34, which reads in the King James 
Version: “Righteousness exalteth a nation; but sin is a reproach to any people.” Falwell para-
phrases this passage, saying, “Living by God’s principles promotes a nation to greatness; 
violating those principles brings a nation to shame.”52 From these biblical passages, Falwell 
constructs an account by which the political fate of a community is bound up with and de-
termined by its moral constitution. While God rewards a righteous people, the unrighteous 
and sinful people are either denied the auspices of God’s protection or made the object of 
God’s wrath. 
 In translating these passages to the current moment, Falwell articulates a principle of 
shared responsibility where the fate of the whole is contingent upon the actions of all its 
constitutive parts. The notion of shared responsibility, of course, appears in earlier prophetic 
rhetoric and performance in the United States, including that of William Lloyd Garrison, as 
                                                
51 Quoted in Falwell, Listen, America!, 19. 
52 Jerry Falwell, “Why I Said What I Said,” Jerry Falwell Ministries, 17 September 2001, online at 
http://denbeste.nu/external/Falwell.html (accessed May 4 2012). 
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discussed in chapter one. Echoing Garrison, Falwell characterizes the precarious health and 
security of the polity as dependent on the moral righteousness of the community’s social ar-
rangements, political actions, and governmental policies. In order to retain its chosen status, 
American society must constantly demonstrate that it is morally deserving of such a station. 
The fragile covenantal ties Falwell rhetorically conjures up between the United States and the 
Christian God require constant vigilance and, in the event of any deviation, forceful con-
demnation and repentance. From this principle, Falwell extends responsibility for the 
September 11 attacks beyond the actual perpetrators and to those parties he sees as creating 
the immoral conditions that alienated and angered God. He vigorously proclaims this shared 
culpability, saying, 
And, I know I’ll hear from them for this. But, throwing God out successfully with 
the help of the federal court system, throwing God out of the public square, out of 
the schools. The abortionists have got to bear some burden for this because God will 
not be mocked. And when we destroy 40 million little innocent babies, we make 
God mad. I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, 
and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative life-
style, the ACLU, People For the American Way, all of them who have tried to 
secularize America. I point the finger in their face and say: “You helped this hap-
pen.” 
 
The indictment of the current state of American public life (and the associated explanation 
of September 11) allows Robertson and Falwell to formulate an agonistic frontier, wherein 
an “us” and a “them” are offered in order to mobilize a political constituency. The location 
of the line separating friend and enemy within the polity distinguishes them from Bush’s rhe-
torical framing of the event, which reifies the political community as a homogenous whole 
directed against an external other (namely, terrorists and all those who would aid and sup-
port them). Robertson and Falwell foreground the cleavages and divisions that traverse the 
political field and exist in tension with the claims to the unity and integrity of “we the peo-
ple.” To use Stow’s typology of public mourning practices, Robertson and Falwell enact, at 
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least in part, a tragic mode of public mourning. Rather than adopting a narrative of unity that 
suppresses conflict and overtly encourages national chauvinism, they act in accordance with 
the recognition that “conflict and disagreement…are central to democratic politics.”53 Yet, 
importantly, they deviate from Stow’s agonist paradigm by framing the condition of differ-
ence as something that can and must be overcome. Far from evincing respect or generosity 
towards their political adversaries (as variants of normative agonistic thought call for), Rob-
ertson and Falwell demonize and vilify the array of actors they see as challenging the social 
agenda of Christian conservatism. Progressives become effective traitors and threats to the 
survival of the country. 
 The explicit aim of Falwell and Robertson’s prophetic denunciations is a nationwide 
Christian revival, wherein the American social order is Christianized (or, by their lights, re-
Christianized). Such a course of action would restore the foundational place of the Bible to 
American values and the authority of religious officers in matters of public life. Packed into 
the call to revival is an imperative to return. On the one hand, individual citizens should 
come back to the church and reaffirm their personal commitment to Christianity and, on the 
other hand, the general public should take steps to once again harmonize the organization of 
society and the state with biblical dictates. As Falwell remarks, “When the nation is on its 
knees, the only normal and natural and spiritual thing to do is what we ought to be doing all 
the time—calling upon God.” According to Falwell, moments of mourning are extraordinary 
times that propel persons toward religious traditions and, in so doing, model what should be 
ordinary and normal practice. The foxhole tendency to turn to God during times of strife 
and threat should be the consistent practice of all Americans, making the bible the touch-
stone for all decisions, both personal and collective. Indeed, Falwell attempts to extend and 
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deepen the sense of existential precariousness incited by the September 11 attacks by invok-
ing the ever-present threat of God further retracting his grace from the United States. 
In order to mobilize citizen assent and energy for this revival, Robertson and Falwell 
craft a narrative that sutures together religious forms and American political history. Here, 
the history of the United States is grafted onto the familiar plot of the Garden of Eden, with 
the projection of the Founding as a prelapsarian America populated by steady Christian men 
who erected the governmental framework necessary for economic and political freedom. As 
with the story of Eden, however, the country fell from its idyllic origins with the erosion of 
the Christian hegemony and the gathering power of self-interest and the activist state. 
Through this default on its covenantal duties to protect liberty and uphold Christian moral-
ity, the United States thus set the conditions that led to its own injury. The religiously 
inflected narrative Falwell and Robertson offer operates to simultaneously make sense of the 
trauma of September 11 and establish a program for how the community should understand 
itself and go forward. The narrative harnesses the desire to vanquish vulnerability and subli-
mates the associated will to revenge into a fantasy of recovery and return where security is 
accomplished not just through punitive international action but also internal transformation 
and purification. Robertson and Falwell’s narrative is also remarkable insofar as it figuratively 
white washes the past in order to present the early republic as the halcyon days of robust 
liberty and rigorous morality; gone under the narrative erasure are the systems of exclusion, 
domination, and oppression experienced by, among others, blacks, women, immigrants, ho-
mosexuals, immigrants, and non-Protestants. The determinative (and ultimately normative) 
experience of American history becomes that of socio-economically well-positioned Chris-
tian white men, and so it is no accident that the decline of American righteousness in the 
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conservative jeremiad tracks the historical emergence and political mobilization of formerly 
marginalized groups. 
The response to Robertson and Falwell’s comments was immediate, unified, and 
unwaveringly disapproving. Some, like Lorri Jean of the National Gay and Lesbian Task 
Force, criticized the exchange for reproducing the same hateful and fanatical mentalities that 
inspired those individuals who took part in the attacks.54 Both Falwell and Robertson and 
Islamic fundamentalists, she argues, display shades of theocracy in their statements, with a 
corresponding hostility to anyone who rejects their particular faith or acts in opposition to 
its dictates. White House spokesman Ken Lisaius immediately set about distancing the Bush 
Administration from Falwell, saying, “The president believes that terrorists are responsible 
for these acts. He does not share those views [of Falwell and Robertson], and believes that 
those remarks are inappropriate.” Typical of the broad swath of critics are the sentiments of 
Americans United Executive Director Barry W. Lynn, who rejected the perspective of Fal-
well and Robertson, stating, “I call on all Americans to reject their divisive comments and 
continue to nurture a spirit of unity.”55 Whether overt or not, the critiques of the segment 
relied on a notion that cultivating internal divisions was inappropriate during a time of 
mourning (and eventually, during time of war).56 The implication is that such moments de-
                                                
54 “Falwell Apologizes to Gays, Feminists, Lesbians,” CNN, September 14, 2001, available online at: 
www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/14/Falwell.apology.index.html (accessed May 14, 2012). 
55 Steve Benen, “Backlash to Bigotry,” Americans United, October 2001, available online at: 
http://www.au.org/church-state/october-2001-church-state/featured/backlash-to-bigotry (accessed May 4, 
2012). 
56 Cf. Ted G. Jelen, “Political Esperanto: Rhetorical Resources and Limitations of The Christian Right in the 
United States,” Sociology of Religion 66:3 (2005): 303-21. My analysis differs from Jelen’s in two principal ways. 
First, he attributes the limitation of Falwell’s mode of speech to the “pervasive individualist political culture” of 
the United States and the resulting resistance to notions of collective responsibility; such an interpretation, 
however, ignores the substance of the criticism launched at Falwell’s comments (which presented him as a 
threat to collective unity, not individualism) as well as the other political traditions, including republicanism, 
that make up American political culture and elevate community as a primary good. Second, Jelen conceptual-
izes liberal individualism as a transcendent and trans-historical ideal, whereas I approach it as a historically 
variable and contingent principle whose meaning is shaped and determined by particular material and ideologi-
cal conditions; the idea of ‘individualism’ does not stand apart from (and against) hegemonic religious traditions 
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mand national solidarity, and that internecine skirmishes among fellow Americans, such as 
that pitched by Falwell and Robertson, are not only inappropriate but also illegitimate. 
 In response to the widespread criticism, Falwell issued a statement entitled “Why I 
Said What I Said.” As the name implies, the document offered more apologia than apology, 
with Falwell adamantly refusing to retract his statements on the 700 Club. What he offers 
instead is a sense of regret over the tactical presentation and form of his prophetic rhetoric: 
My statements on the “700 Club” on Thursday, September 14th, were called divisive 
by some whom I mentioned by name. I had no intention of being divisive. I was 
sharing my burden for revival in America on a Christian TV program, intending to 
speak to a Christian audience from a theological perspective about the need for na-
tional repentance. In retrospect, I should have mentioned the national sins without 
mentioning the organizations and persons by name.57 
 
Apart from his misstep of identifying particular groups and individuals he deems responsible 
for the fallen state of American society, Falwell chalks his frosty reception up to an error in 
timing and audience rather than the substance and style of what he said. “My mistake on the 
‘700 Club,’” he explains, “was doing this at the time I did it, on television, where secular me-
dia and audience were also listening.” Repeatedly he invokes his expectation of addressing a 
singularly Christian audience with a common body of idioms and scriptural interpretations, 
explaining his harsh tone by saying, “I was asking on a Christian audience on a Christian TV 
program to claim II Chronicles 7:14 and repent.” After making this argument, Falwell im-
mediately transitions into another recital of the nation’s collective sins, including abortion 
and the secularization of the public sphere, this time without identifying those guilty of these 
acts. However, the statement performs a critical shift in the valence and register of this in-
dictment of the United States, with Falwell extending responsibility not to discrete groups 
                                                                                                                                            
but rather obtains its meaning through and with, among other things, religious discourses and practices. See 
Karen Orren’s contributions to Karen Orren and Rogers Smith, “Structure, Sequence, and Subordination in 
American Political Culture: What’s Tradition Got to Do With It?,” Journal of Policy History 8:4 (1996): 470-84. 
57 Falwell, “Why I Said What I Said.” 
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but rather the American people as a whole: “We have expelled God from the public square 
and the public schools. We have normalized an immoral lifestyle God has condemned.”  
 Over the course of his post-September 11 appearances, Falwell blurs the line be-
tween agonism and antagonism, that is, between respectful disagreement and existential 
conflict.58 Indeed, numerous scholars have criticized Falwell and Robertson precisely for 
their tendency to demonize their opponents.59 Putting to one side these normative judg-
ments, though, it is clear that Falwell’s practice of demonization reflects his investiture of 
political contestation with existential stakes that diminish the possibility of moderation and 
accommodation and, instead, frame politics as a confrontation between moral absolutes. As 
evinced by his actions after September 11, Falwell’s actions are not geared towards conver-
sion or consensus—in other words, reaching across denominational and ideological divisions 
to reach agreement—but rather to the reaffirmation and intensification of a model of peni-
tent subjectivity. According to Falwell, the proper and necessary ethos of American 
                                                
58 See Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005); and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985). Agonistic relations, as 
Mouffe describes them, entail the assertion of difference and disagreement but with a shared background of 
norms and values uniting opponents and diminishing the need to resort to violence. Antagonistic relations, 
however, involve the ascription of an existential threat demands the use of violence. In their rhetorical presen-
tation, however, Falwell and Robertson reveal these positions to be points along a continuum—in other words: 
a matter of degrees—rather than a conceptual binary tracing a difference in kind. 
59 In George Shulman’s analysis, for instance, Falwell’s performance exemplifies the political risks of prophetic 
address. Falwell’s invocation of “a theodicy of divine justice,” Shulman writes, threatens to collapse politics into 
moral absolutes and divine commands and direct the community towards the retrieval of idealized origins and 
the exclusion/elimination of the corrupting influences of heterodox ideologies and actors (14). See also An-
thony E. Cook, “Encountering the Other: Evangelicalism and Terrorism in a Post 911 World,” Journal of Law 
and Religion 20:1 (2004-2005): 1-30. 
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tacking politically salient cultural differences, and (at times, literally) demonizing political dissent.” Andrew R. 
Murphy and Jennifer Miller, “The Enduring Power of the American Jeremiad,” in Religion, Politics, and American 
Identity: New Directions, New Controversies, edited by David S. Gutterman and Andrew R. Murphy (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2006), 51. 
 With respect to their call for the mutual imbrication of society and religion, Bruce Lincoln characterizes 
Falwell and Robertson as Christian analogues to the Islamic fundamentalists who orchestrated the September 
11 attacks. Both groups, Lincoln argues, are alike in seeking to maximize the role of religion in the public 
sphere and the state. He writes, “Less militant than al Qaeda, perhaps (given that the violence they employ in 
pursuit of their goals is rhetorical and not physical), the televangelists’ religious ideal is equally maximalist, if 
Christian rather than Muslim” (50). 
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citizenship is repentance and atonement. To be a properly constituted Christian American 
entails not only recognizing the immortality of certain acts of government but also feeling 
the weight of the nation’s sins and understand misfortunes as expressions of divine judg-
ment. This particular aesthetic configuration of religious faith disposes Christian subjects to 
political action in the struggle to bring government and society into alignment with biblical 
strictures. Importantly, this formation of religious faith also foregrounds the ever present 
tension in the practice of democratic politics between political commitment and the recogni-
tion and respect of difference. 
To further develop a framework that accommodates the diversity of political claims 
possible with and through religious rituals of mourning, I turn next to the case of Rev. 
Jeremiah Wright. In addition to my interest in treating Christianity as pluralistic, I examine 
the distinct repertoire Wright brings to bear on the events of September 11 and how these 
religious materials figure into the micropolitics of his performance.   
§ 4. Jeremiah Wright  
and the American Babylon 
Rev. Wright assumed his position as pastor of Trinity United Church of Christ 
(UCC) on the South Side of Chicago in 1972. Over the course of his 36-year career at Trinity 
UCC, Wright oversaw the expansion of the church’s congregation from an initial 87 mem-
bers to over 6,000 at the time of his retirement.60 Along with this substantial growth in 
membership, Wright brought an interest in social justice and political activism to his minis-
try. Wright’s active political stance reflected the tradition of Black Theology of Liberation, 
which was formally articulated by black ministers in the late 1960s and depicted the mission 
of Christ as entailing the critique and transformation of oppressive social and political struc-
                                                
60 “About Us: Pastor Emeritus Rev. Dr. Jeremiah A. Wright Jr.,” Trinity United Church of Christ, available online 
at: http://www.trinitychicago.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=23 (accessed May 20, 
2012). 
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tures.61 This strain of theological thought construes Christianity as a faith fundamentally al-
lied with the poor and powerless against those forces that would deny or abridge freedom, 
equality, and justice. As practiced in a country historically marked by institutionalized racial 
hierarchies and entrenched structural and ideological barriers to racial equality, American 
appropriations of liberation theology have primarily been performed by and centered on Af-
rican Americans, who are figured as modern analogues to the captive Israelites of the Old 
Testament. 
It was in his role as pastor for Trinity UCC that Wright first encountered Barack 
Obama, then working as a community organizer on the South Side of Chicago and soliciting 
the support of local churches and ministers. After meeting Wright and informally attending 
services at Trinity, Obama eventually joined the church and was baptized by Wright. Wright 
officiated at Obama’s marriage to Michelle Robinson, baptized the couple’s two daughters, 
and provided the title for Obama’s second book, The Audacity of Hope. This relationship rap-
idly deteriorated in 2008, when then Senator Obama campaigned for the Democratic 
presidential nomination. During the Democratic primary, inflammatory excerpts from 
Wright’s sermons appeared on websites such as YouTube. Political opponents and members 
of the news media widely (and repeatedly) criticized Wright’s harsh language. The most re-
peated of these criticisms included that Wright’s comments were “divisive,” “crazy,” “un-
American,” “bigoted,” “racist,” “destructive,” “backward thinking,” “rant and rave,” and the 
                                                
61 James Cone is often credited with formally founding this intellectual and religious movement in his texts 
Black Theology & Black Power (1969) and A Black Theology of Liberation (1970), though many of the tradition’s core 
principles and beliefs can be traced back to the eighteenth century. See Sarah Posner, “Wright’s theology not 
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“politics of the past.”62 Besides tarring Obama with charges of associating with militant radi-
cals, the publicity surrounding the controversy also served to, at least temporarily, racialize 
Obama by tying him to Wright’s brand of black liberation theology and the tradition of the 
black church.63 Buffeted by critical voices, Obama ultimately disavowed Wright and the sub-
stance of his sermons. 
For my analysis here, I focus my attention on the sermons that galvanized Wright’s 
public excoriation in 2008. Close readings of these two sermons—“The Day of Jerusalem’s 
Fall” (September 16, 2001) and “Confusing God and Government” (April 13, 2003)—
reveals them to, again, involve the religious coming-to-terms with the traumatic disposses-
sion felt on September 11 but through different modes and with a different political project 
than those of Falwell and Robertson. As I will describe, Wright cultivates an ethos of critical 
atonement through the practice of prophetic declarations and biblical narrative. 
In a way similar to Falwell and Robertson, Wright takes scripture as the structuring 
foundation for his performance. Yet rather than adopt the literalist biblical hermeneutics 
practiced by those self-avowed Christian fundamentalists (who figure the text as a body of 
direct, divine commands), Wright approaches scripture as an archive of metaphors and 
analogies. By invoking and exploring these resonant metaphors and analogies, he invites the 
audience to re-think the contemporary moment and its critical dilemmas. In his September 
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16 sermon, performed on the Sunday immediately following the attacks, Wright uses Psalm 
137 as the thematic basis for his oration. The psalm depicts the pained yearning and seething 
rage of the exiled Jewish people after the Babylonian conquest of Jerusalem and the subse-
quent displacement of the Jews from their homeland. With their poetic expression of the 
simultaneous undoing of a community and its reformation-in-exile through shared sorrow, 
the first six verses of Psalm 137 have long captivated the imagination of dislocated peoples 
and inspired numerous anthems and hymns. Since the days of chattel slavery African Ameri-
can religious figures have mobilized the image of a people by turns diasporic and in bondage 
that runs throughout the Old Testament to rhetorically frame the plight of African Ameri-
cans, who were similarly forcibly torn from the home of their ancestors and subjected to 
conditions of cruelty and servitude.64 Because of this conventional place in the black Chris-
tian idiom, Wright confidently opens his sermon by stating that his audience is familiar with 
these first lines of Psalm 137.  
Far less well-known and less thought about, he asserts, are the lines immediately after 
those initial six verses. Wright insists it is to the psalm’s latter verses that the congregation 
must turn in this current moment of loss and pain. In the King James Version, verses 7-9 are 
rendered as follows: 
Remember, O LORD, the children of Edom 
 in the day of Jerusalem; 
 who said, Rase it, rase it, 
 even to the foundation thereof. 
O daughter of Babylon, who art to be destroyed; 
 happy shall he be, that rewardeth thee as thou has served us. 
Happy shall he be, that taketh and dasheth 
                                                
64 The Old Testament narrative of Exodus in particular has, as Michael Walzer describes, been a source of “an 
idea of great presence and power in Western political thought, the idea of deliverance from suffering and op-
pression: this-worldly redemption, liberation, revolution.” Walzer, Exodus and Revolution (New York: Basic 
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in Early Nineteenth-Century Black America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
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thy little ones against the stones. 
 
These lines track a sharp and troubling shift from the earlier invocations of loss and lamenta-
tion. Here the emotional valence transforms to one of vengeful and violent desire against the 
Babylonians who have scourged the homeland of the Israelites. The wounded attachment to 
Jerusalem putrefies, giving rise to graphically violent fantasies that involve not only the 
physical leveling of Babylon but also the brutal murder of its children. Given the rawness of 
these emotions and the bloody intensity of the resulting demands on God, Wright admits 
that these are difficult lines to parse with a congregation, particularly in the wake of the Sep-
tember 11 attacks. “I was licensed to preach in May of 1959,” he says. “I was ordained in 
January of 1967, and I became a pastor in March of 1972, but in all of my years of preaching, 
I have never preached a sermon which dealt with these difficult verses, these last three verses 
in Psalm 137. These verses are brutally honest and express what the people of faith really 
feel after a day of devastation and senseless death.”65 Though difficult to work through, 
Wright insists that unpacking Psalm 137 will allow the audience to make sense—or at least a 
better, more nuanced sense—of their current condition and the decisions before them. 
Wright captures this aspect when he speaks of how this scriptural passage can be used in or-
der to “sort out what it is we are really feeling” at the moment.66 As we will see, Wright’s 
sermon is not directed at being narrowly therapeutic in the sense of alleviating and minimiz-
ing the emotional intensities aroused by the events of September 11; instead, his sermon 
performance works on these intensities, disciplining and directing them so that they do not 
                                                
65 Jeremiah Wright, “The Day of Jerusalem’s Fall,” in 9.11.01: African American Leaders Respond to an American 
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66 Ibid., 83. 
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give rise to an escalation of violence. Put another way, Wright’s performance simultaneously 
acts as an expression and cultivation of the powerful emotions inspired by the event.  
 After establishing the scriptural focus of his sermon, Wright develops the resonances 
between the experiences of the fifth century BCE Jewish people and those of Americans in 
September 2001. To do so, Wright directs the audience to 2 Kings 25, which depicts the ap-
palling cruelty involved in the Babylonian conquest. Both soldiers and civilians were 
slaughtered. Houses burned to the ground. The walls and towers of the city—the symbols of 
its military strength and economic power—destroyed. And the people who believed them-
selves and their city to be God’s chosen were figuratively torn asunder. By recounting the 
horrors of Jerusalem’s fall, Wright makes the sorrow, loss, and anxiety felt by the Israelites 
painfully vivid; the constructed proximity of these affective intensities grounds the sense of 
similarity to the audience’s experience of the recent terrorist attacks. For this reason, he 
places special emphasize on the destruction of the towers of Jerusalem: “The symbol of 
power was gone. The substance of their military and monetary power was gone. The towers 
of Jerusalem were gone.”67 The metaphoric relation plays on two levels by capturing the fac-
tual and symbolic parallels of the two events—namely, the loss of towers overlaid with social 
and economic import—as well as the emotional resonances of these events.  
The experience of such profound loss, Wright narrates, easily shifts to desire for rec-
ompense and retribution. By acting on these desires, however, the victims of loss can 
catalyze a cycle of violence, wherein “violence begets violence. Hatred begets hatred, and 
terrorism begets terrorism.”68 If acted upon the bloody fantasies captured in the closing lines 
of Psalm 137 become but the prelude to further injury. Yet if America is similar to the exiles 
of Jerusalem by being enmeshed in a cycle of violence, Wright clarifies that the September 
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68 Ibid., 87. 
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11 attacks were not the beginning of such a cycle. Indeed, adopting a prophetic register of 
voice, he declares that the attacks were, if anything, a judgment on and product of America’s 
past injustices. Far from the fragile city on a hill invoked by Falwell, Wright summons an 
image of the United States as always-already fallen; thus, while using similar prophetic regis-
ters of voice and narrative, Wright deviates from Falwell in not holding out a idyllic but gone 
away America as his goal.69 Rather, Wright construes American history as a parade of trans-
gressions violating the basic principles of political and spiritual justice. Taking the critical 
statements made by Ambassador Edward Peck on Fox News about American foreign policy 
as a point of departure, Wright leaps into a condemnation of the societal sins and violent 
actions of the United States, which is worth quoting at length: 
We took this country by terror, away from the Sioux, the Apache, the Comanche, 
and the Navaho. Terrorism. We took Africans from their country to build our way of 
ease and kept them enslaved and living in fear. Terrorism. We bombed Grenada, 
killed innocent civilians, babies, non-military personnel. We bombed the black civil-
ian community of Panama with stealth bombers, and killed unarmed teenagers and 
toddlers, pregnant mothers, and hard-working fathers. We bombed Khadafi’s home 
and killed his child. “Blessed are they who bash your children’s heads against the 
rock.” We bombed Iraq, we killed unarmed civilians trying to make a living. We 
bombed a plant in Sudan as payback for an attack on our embassy, killed hundreds 
of hard-working people, mothers and fathers who left home to go out that day, not 
knowing they’d never get back. We bombed Hiroshima. We bombed Nagasaki—and 
we “nuked” far more than the thousand who died in New York and the Pentagon, 
and we never batted an eye. Kids playing in the playground, mothers picking up chil-
dren after school—civilians not soldiers—people just trying to make it day by day. 
We have supported state terrorism against the Palestinians and black South Africans, 
and now we are indignant because the stuff we have done overseas is now brought 
right back into our own front yards. “America’s chickens are coming home to roost.” 
 
The density of allusions in Wright’s performance deserves analytical parsing. Wright weaves 
together his recitation of America’s variegated history of cruelty and violence with evoca-
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tions of the bloodthirstiness of Psalm 137 and the still controversial words of Malcolm X.70 
What results is a snowballing condemnation of the United States fashioned through repeti-
tion, cadence, and allusion that gestures, by turns, to scripture, black nationalism, and the 
recurrent sins of the American state at home and abroad over the course of its existence. 
Wright’s sermon attempts to implode this fantasy of national innocence and chosenness by 
confronting the historical amnesia that facilitates its existence. To recall not just the slaughter 
of the Native Americans—the founding crime and original sin of the nation—but also the 
sundry transgressions that followed and continue to haunt the collective, it recasts America 
as a nation from the virtuous injured party to the long standing perpetrator of violence and 
death. Indeed, Wright presents the country as repeatedly orchestrating terrorism and meting 
out suffering far in excess of that which it currently endures. Through his proclamation of 
the violent and unjust aspects of the American past (as well as its present), Wright problema-
tizes the clean line conjured by Bush that separates those cast as good/victim and 
evil/terrorist in the wake of September 11.  
 What Wright ultimately calls for in his sermon is an intense, critical process of collec-
tive atonement and critical political action. The goal of this invocation is explicitly to “get us 
to wake up and move away from the dangerous precipice upon which we are now poised.”71 
                                                
70 To explain briefly: Malcolm X’s December 4, 1963 remarks regarding “chickens coming home to roost” 
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“I must be supreme.” “Our nation must rule the world.” (Preach it) And I am sad to say that the nation 
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This precipice of violent reprisal—or rather, the extension and intensification of the violence 
already present in American practices of imperialism, militarism, and racism—can only be 
avoided by critically assessing the state of the United States and how well it and its constitu-
ents embody and carry out God’s justice. Wright explicitly includes himself in this self-
examination, saying it is “time for me to examine my own relationship with God.”72 Simple 
soul searching as an end in itself, however, is insufficient. The citizenry must not only shake 
itself from its willed blindness and recognize the truth of its conditions but also act in accor-
dance with this formerly denied knowledge. In conjunction with this invitation to self-
examination, Wright announces, “Now is the time for social transformation.” He elaborates 
on this, saying, 
We have got to change the way we have been doing things. We have got to change 
the way we have been doing things as a society. Social transformation. We have got 
to change the way we have been doing things as a country. Social transformation. We 
have got to change the way we have been doing things as an arrogant, racist, military 
superpower. Social transformation… And let me suggest to you that rather than fig-
ure out who we gonna declare war on, maybe we declare war on racism. Maybe we 
need to declare war on injustice. Maybe we need to declare war on greed.73 
 
As Wright makes clear, such political action requires, above all else, the reformation of the 
commitments, practices, and institutions of the political community rather than the exacting 
of revenge on an external enemy. 
Wright elaborates on these themes of imperialism, militarism, and racial discrimina-
tion in his April 13, 2003 sermon, “Confusing God and Government.” Inspired in this 
                                                                                                                                            
in which we live is the supreme culprit. And I'm going to continue to say it to America, because I love 
this country too much to see the drift that it has taken. God didn't call America to do what she's do-
ing in the world now. (Preach it, preach it) God didn't call America to engage in a senseless, unjust war 
as the war in Vietnam. And we are criminals in that war. We’ve committed more war crimes almost 
than any nation in the world, and I'm going to continue to say it. And we won't stop it because of our 
pride and our arrogance as a nation. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., “The Drum Major Instinct,” Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Global Freedom Struggle, 
http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/documentsentry/doc_the_drum_major_instinct (ac-
cessed June 13, 2012). 
72 Ibid., 88. 
73 Ibid., 90. 
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instance by the image of Jesus weeping in Luke 19:37-44, Wright again begins with a familiar 
image—namely, Christ crying at the news of Lazarus’ death—and then moves to the unfa-
miliar. In this particular passage from the Book of Luke, Wright explains, Christ is depicted 
weeping but not in the face of a personal loss. Rather, he weeps for the inability of an op-
pressed and wounded community to think beyond the logic of retribution and the horizon 
of its injury. Specifically, the people of Jerusalem, which was then under Roman occupation 
and control, suffer and bear the agonizing burden of foreign oppression. These emotional 
intensities blind them from perceiving any other course besides countering imperial cruelties 
and degradations with further violence and bloodshed. In his gospel, Luke narrates the arri-
val of Jesus at the outskirts of Jerusalem and his immediate, tearful response, where Christ 
announces, “If you, even you had only recognized on this day the things that make for 
peace! But now they are hidden from your eyes.” As Wright states in his gloss on the text, 
“he cried for his people because they were blinded by their culture, they were blinded by 
their condition, they were blinded by their circumstance, they were blinded by their oppres-
sion, they were blinded by being in a spot where they desired—deeply desired—revenge, and 
they could not see the things that make for peace.”74  
As in his “The Day of Jerusalem’s Fall” sermon, Wright uses the scriptural site to re-
fract the contemporary conditions of the United States and present the current moment in a 
way that engages the audience’s critical imagination and judgment. How, he implicitly asks, 
can a community, “blinded by the pain of their situation,” be compelled, against its willful 
claims of innocence and necessity, to acknowledge responsibility and seek justice rather than 
vengeance? The answer he offers involves, on the one hand, using the biblical text as a dis-
                                                
74 A transcript of Wright’s sermon can be found at: “God Damn America,” The Sluggite Zone, available online at: 
http://www.sluggy.net/forum/viewtopic.php?p=315691&sid=4b3e97ace4ee8cee02bd6850e52f50b7, March 
24, 2008 (accessed May 1, 2012). All references to this sermon are taken from this transcript. 
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tancing heuristic and, on the other, confronting the community with its problematic elisions 
and disavowals. In the first place, the biblical account becomes a heuristic to identify and 
work through a pressing dilemma facing the political community. In this instance, Christ 
mourns not just the past injuries of the city of Jerusalem but also the resulting closure of any 
potential for nonviolent action. The figure of Christ before Jerusalem poses, in a novel form, 
the predicament confronting the United States in the wake of September 11. For those in 
Roman-occupied Jerusalem (just as for the citizens of the United States), “payback is the 
only game in town.” Yet resorting to compensatory violence only sows the seeds of further 
bloodshed. According to Wright, “War does not make for peace, war only makes for escalat-
ing violence, and a mindset to pay the enemy back by any means necessary.” What Wright 
describes here is a disposition towards retributive violence that springs from the experience 
of dispossession. Together with the impetus to act in the wake of an injury, such a disposi-
tion orients citizen judgment away from critical self-reflection and to militaristic action. 
 Using biblical analogues as a foundation for thinking and feeling anew about the cur-
rent moment allows Wright to shift gears and confront the conditions that he claims occlude 
and distort the process of political judgment. Specifically, the move to violence as the ap-
propriate response to suffering is facilitated by a fundamental confusion and conflation of 
earthly and divine powers. According to Wright, “Y’all looking to the government for that 
which only God can give… The people under oppression were confusing God and Gov-
ernment.” Wright calls out the American people for endowing the apparatus of the state 
with a transcendent normative authority, a power to determine the truth and right of any 
situation without criticism and contestation. This vision of government merges together 
state power, national covenant, and divine authority, thus leading to the sanctification of the 
state and the worship of its power. These conditions of state and national idolatry engender 
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a dynamic of political demonization and the divestment of citizen judgment, wherein the 
state assumes the untroubled place of God’s agent—if not God itself—in order to realize a 
providential vocation. The myriad cruelties and systems of domination enabling such actions 
are rendered undetectable beneath these resounding overtures of divine purpose. 
 Like other American prophetic figures before him including Martin Luther King Jr. 
and John Brown, Wright vehemently proclaims the partiality of this vision of America and 
names the sins that covertly undergird its national endeavors. Wright declares: 
And the United States of America government, when it came to treating her citizens 
of Indian decent fairly, she failed. She put them on reservations. When it came to 
treating her citizens of Japanese decent fairly, she failed. She put them in internment 
prison camps. When it came to treating her citizens of African decent fairly, America 
failed.  She put them in chains. The government put them in slave quarters, put them 
on auction blocks, put them in cotton fields, put them in inferior schools, put them 
in substandard housing, put them in scientific experiments, put them in the lowest 
paying jobs, put them outside the equal protection of the law, kept them out of their 
racist bastions of higher education and locked them into position of hopelessness 
and helplessness. The government gives them the drugs, builds bigger prisons, passes 
a three-strike law, and then wants us to sing “God Bless America.” No, no, no. Not 
“God Bless America”; God Damn America! That’s in the Bible, for killing innocent 
people. God Damn America for treating her citizen as less than human. God Damn 
America as long as she keeps trying to act like she is God and she is supreme! 
 
The latter portion of this section became the incendiary sound byte that received significant 
publicity during the 2008 controversy over Wright’s association with then-candidate Obama. 
However, an examination of the utterance in its context offers a better sense of its meaning 
and significance. Speaking in an imperative voice and with a plainly provocative indictment 
of America, Wright fractures the ready alliance of God and the American government. As 
captured in the title of his sermon, Wright aims to pull apart God and the state and de-
nounce the rhetorical move made by Bush to sanctify the American government and clothe 
state policies in the will of the divine.  
 In a crucial move Wright not only separates the state and God but also differentiates 
both from the American people. Wright shifts his language in this sermon from that of a 
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generalized “we,” which marks the culpability of the whole political community, to that of a 
particularized “she,” which specifies an abstracted state apparatus as responsible for both 
past and present sins. Reminiscent of Falwell, Wright identifies an internal enemy to which 
he relocates the blame and hostility of his audience. The state becomes the locus of attention 
while the democratic community that ostensibly directs it is rendered invisible in terms of 
accountability for past injustices. By prying apart state, God, and the people, Wright seeks to 
induce a realignment of obligation so that Christian citizens elevate their religious sensibili-
ties above the claims of national interest. Thus, the materials of religion can be mobilized to 
critique and confront government while no individual or government can claim to fully 
know or embody the will of the divine. Indeed, in Wright’s figuration, the divine is a power 
that perpetually chastens and humbles human claims to power and knowledge. “God,” 
Wright remarks towards the close of his sermon, “has this way of bringing you short when 
you get too big for your cat-blazing britches.” The figure of the divine marks a horizon—a 
standing limit and challenge to acts of state and the fantasies of a nation. 
 In summary, Wright attempts to cultivate a sensibility of critical atonement. The 
practice of pious citizenship, at least as Wright invokes and models it in his performance, 
entails an awareness of historical culpability and a corresponding ethos of Christian circum-
spection. By contrast to Bush’s sweeping providentialist claims of American chosenness and 
duty that constitute September 11 as an injury that unifies the nation, Wright seizes upon 
that injury as a manifestation of national sin and corruption. If citizens seek salvation and 
security, Wright insists they must orient themselves not in response to the wound itself but 
the national hubris and past transgressions that made it possible. There are certain reso-
nances between Wright’s penitent orientation to loss and those proffered by Lincoln and 
Falwell. All three men situate misfortune in a larger divine order that not only makes it 
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meaningful but also traces the cause of that hardship to the actions and arrangements of the 
nation. The crucial differences between these three models of mourning come in the reper-
toires involved and, in turn, the precise forms of repentance and penitent subjectivities they 
work to create. 
Conclusion 
All varieties of loss, from the personal to the collective, invite explanation and mean-
ing—an accounting of why it happened and what were the conditions that allowed it to 
occur. When losses are public and shared these questions become more pronounced. What 
responsibility, if any, does the collective bear for those who are gone and those who are in-
jured? While questions of responsibility (or causality) can be answered in narrowly non-
religious terms,75 Bush, Falwell, and Wright illuminate how the entanglement of religious tra-
ditions and public loss in American political culture yokes together responsibility and 
redemption. The assignment of responsibility and meaning for the loss begs a second ques-
tion: is America to be the instrument of redemption, or is it the object to be redeemed? Bush 
locates responsibility external to the collective and thus casts America as the instrument to 
redeem the world through the imperial spread of “God’s gift” of liberalism. Falwell too posi-
tions the nation as God’s chosen instrument in the world, but simultaneously establishes it as 
the object of redemption. Chosenness, by this framing, is not a given status but rather a 
quality that must be earned through the fulfillment of certain obligations. By avowing the 
constitutive violence and exclusions of the nation and identifying with those persons outside 
                                                
75 And there certainly were (and continue to be) such accounts, including Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret His-
tory of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004); 
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Aqaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage, 2007); and The 9/11 
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 2004). 
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of and savaged by the idea of a chosen people, Wright traces the causal thread of September 
11 back to the foundational notion of America.  
Approaching the micropolitics of mourning clarifies the always-precarious process of 
constructing the self-understandings and dispositions that shape citizens’ political lives. Dis-
positions, to be clear, involve how people live their faith and commitments, and how these 
values subtly yet profoundly influence how they think, judge, and interact in political soci-
ety.76 The desires that these processes accentuate or diminish—the desire for revenge, 
justice, or the recovery of what was lost—necessarily set the stage and skew the political pos-
sibilities for the collective. At the same time, public mourning entails the reformation of 
worldviews that have been troubled and unsettled. What remains of this community, and to 
what do we commit ourselves? What are we as a people now? Where do we go from here? 
The religious rituals of mourning in the wake of September 11 and other public losses be-
come the scaffolding for such ideological reconstruction, proffering particular ways of 
construing and understanding both the cosmos and the collective.  
                                                
76 Through a reading of the works of Thomas Jefferson and Phillis Wheatley, Peter Coviello develops an ac-
count of how affective rather than rationalist bonds were instrumental in forging a united American republic 
just prior to (and during) the Revolutionary War. According to Coviello, the geographic and cultural divisions 
in the American colonies were overcome, at least in part, by “an intensity of bereavement” that was fashioned 
into a “peculiar kind of mutuality, an attachment to distant others.” Coviello, “Agonizing Affection: Affect and 










“A NECESSARY FORM”: 




“There is no well-constituted state in which practices are 
not to be found which are linked to the form of govern-
ment and which help to preserve it.” 
— Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
“The Letter to M. D’Alembert on the Theatre”1 
 
“Which therefore would be the real conception of the 
world: that logically affirmed as an intellectual choice? or 
that which emerges from the real activity of each man, 
which is implicit in his mode of action? And since all ac-
tion is political, can one not say that the real philosophy of 
each man is contained in its entirety in his political ac-
tion?” 
— Antonio Gramsci, 
“The Study of Philosophy”2 
 
§ 1. A Call To Renewal 
 
On June 28, 2006, then Senator Barack Obama spoke before the “Call to Renewal’s 
Building a Covenant for a New America” conference in Washington, D.C. Organized by 
public theologian Jim Wallis, the founder of Sojourners magazine, the event brought together 
elements of the so-called “religious left,” progressive religious groups drawn from various 
Christian denominations.3 In his keynote address, Obama focused on what he understood to 
be the inexorable “connection between religion and politics” in the United States: 
                                                
1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Letter to D’Alembert on the Theatre,” in Politics and the Arts, translated by Allan 
Bloom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), 98. 
2 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, translated by Quintin Hoare and Goeffrey Nowell Smith 
(New York: International Publishers, 1971), 326. 
3 There has been much discussion within political science regarding the “God gap” in American partisan poli-
tics. Robert Putnam and David Campbell provide a clear articulation of this notion: “The highly religious are 
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[W]e first need to understand that Americans are a religious people. 90 percent of us 
believe in God, 70 percent affiliate themselves with an organized religion, 38 percent 
call themselves committed Christians, and substantially more people in America be-
lieve in angels than they do in evolution. Each day, it seems, thousands of Americans 
are going about their daily rounds… and they’re coming to the realization that some-
thing is missing. They are deciding that their work, their possessions, their diversions, 
their sheer busyness, is not enough. They want a sense of purpose, a narrative arc to 
their lives.4 
 
Religion, Obama claims, persists as a powerful force in the public sphere of United States 
and individual lives of most Americans because it provides the interpretive and practical 
tools—the modes and manners of making meaning in the world—that can be put to the task 
of resolving the fundamental need for purpose and direction.  
Given the significance of religious faith in the lives of American citizens, Obama 
states, the rhetoric of those on the left must reorient itself so that it can speak to the lived 
faith and experience of these individuals. In pressing the case for a liberal-progressive rap-
prochement to religion, Obama repudiates the secularist mindset of some elements of the 
American left. The secularist framework identifies religious beliefs as ideological commit-
                                                                                                                                            
far more likely to be Republicans than Democrats, those who are low on our religiosity scale largely favor De-
mocrats over the GOP, and religiosity has no bearing on partisan independence” Robert D. Putnam and David 
F. Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012), 371. See 
also Laura R. Olson and John C. Green, “The Religion Gap,” PS: Political Science and Politics 39 (2006): 455-59; 
Geoffrey Layman, The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001); James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: Basic 
Books, 1991); and Warren Miller and Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1996). 
 There are, however, recent complications to the clean divide between conservative/religious and lib-
eral/non-religious. The 2008 Obama campaign, for instance, demonstrated that Democratic political actors are 
capable of using religious language and mobilizing religious voters, albeit still to less success than Republicans; 
see “A Look at Religious Voters in the 2008 Election,” Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life’s 
Faith Angle Conference, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1112/religion-vote-2008-election (accessed May 14, 2012). 
Additionally, scholars have begun questioning the conceptualization of ‘religiosity’ and, in turn, the methodo-
logical tools necessary for assessing the varieties of political and religious self-identification; an early entry in 
this re-thinking suggests that the “God gap” is an artifact of insufficient scholarship rather than an empirical 
reality. Stephen T. Mockabee, Kenneth D. Wald, and David C. Leege, “In Search of a Religious Left: Reexam-
ining Religiosity,” in Improving Public Opinion Surveys: Interdisciplinary Innovation and the American National Election 
Studies, edited by John H. Aldrich and Kathleen M. McGraw (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
4 Barack Obama, “Transcript: Call to Renewal Address on Faith and Politics,” God’s Politics, February 21, 
2012, http://sojo.net/blogs/2012/02/21/transcript-obamas-2006-sojournerscall-renewal-address-faith-and-
politics (accessed on September 3, 2012). The speech is reprinted in Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope (New 
York: Crown, 2006). 
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ments that are properly and exclusively expressed in the private sphere, so that attempts to 
bring religion into discussions regarding public policy are thus deemed illegitimate. Accord-
ing to Obama, 
[S]ecularists are wrong when they ask believers to leave their religion at the door be-
fore entering into the public square. Frederick Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, Williams 
Jennings Bryant, Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King—indeed, the majority of great 
reformers in American history—were not only motivated by faith, but repeatedly 
used religious language to argue for their cause. So to say that men and women 
should not inject their ‘personal morality’ into public policy debates is a practical ab-
surdity… If we scrub language of all religious content, we forfeit the imagery and 
terminology through which millions of Americans understand both their personal 
morality and social justice.5 
 
Obama here echoes one of the overarching arguments of my project. That is, religious tradi-
tions equip practitioners not just with a set of discrete beliefs but, above and beyond that, an 
array of sensibilities, affects, and actions that facilitate and shape their engagement with the 
worlds around them. As I have discussed in earlier chapters, the effects of religious traditions 
are deep and diffuse, shaping not just a practitioner’s beliefs but also her sensibilities, dispo-
sitions, and practices. Second, attempting to excise or otherwise refuse to engage religious 
traditions in the public sphere will only abandon materials that enrich and invigorate exactly 
the citizen participation and active engagement vital to democracy. 
 One way of framing the central argument of this dissertation is as a call for renewal. 
In contradistinction to the spirit of the 2006 conference at which Obama spoke, this is not a 
narrowly spiritual renewal—a renewal, if you will, of Christianity within American democ-
racy—but rather a renewal of how we as political theorists think about the on-going relation-
ship between religious traditions and democratic practices.6 Such a call for renewal and re-
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 On this theme of theorizing the new I cannot help but think of a passage from the work of Kristen Deede 
Johnson. She writes: 
political theory is nothing if not an exercise of imagination, offering new or different pictures of collective 
life in the hopes of remolding, refashioning, or altogether altering contemporary arrangements. Indeed, the 
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form is implicit within the intellectual project that Birgit Meyer refers to as ‘post-secularist.’ 
At its most basic level, the post-secularist project demands that scholars vigorously question 
the assumptions built into how we conceptualize ‘religion’ and its relationships with other 
(ostensibly separate) domains of contemporary social life. The motivating impulse behind 
my avowedly post-secularist project has been to reconfigure the terms in which political 
theorists encounter and engage religious traditions. Through such a questioning of inherited 
frameworks, I have sought to open up a space in which the democratic bearing and possibili-
ties of religious traditions can be more fruitfully thought and discussed. 
In this concluding chapter to the current formulation of the project I begin by first 
recapitulating some of the broader themes and arguments of the dissertation. The second 
section of the conclusion articulates some of the present project’s limits and possible areas 
for further elaboration, expansion, and development.  
§ 2. Religious Practices, Democratic Practices 
 
Religious traditions are part and parcel of American democracy. This is not to say, of 
course, that every American is a religious practitioner. Yet, as Obama points out, an over-
whelming majority of Americans claim to possess religious faith, even if a growing number 
of them rebuff formal institutions and established faith communities such as churches. One 
result of such widespread religiosity is that religion, particularly Christianity, has been entan-
gled with American politics in complicated and dynamic ways over the course of the repub-
lic. Through a triangulation of Tocqueville, Antonio Gramsci, and recent scholarship in the 
field of religious studies, I developed an account that de-centered both the singular concern 
with institutions, which is lodged in the juridical formulation of separation of church and 
                                                                                                                                            
success of a political theory could be said to depend upon the extent to which it offers a picture of political 
society and life that is more attractive and persuasive than that of the status quo.  
Kristen Deede Johnson, Theology, Political Theory, and Pluralism: Beyond Tolerance and Difference (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007), 22. 
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state, and the elevation of belief and doctrine implicit within the private-intellectualist ap-
proach to religion. Against these conceptualizations, my account attends to the flows of 
power and practice by which religious traditions compose subjectivities and mobilize politi-
cal activity and that otherwise escape the narrow institutional and cognitive frameworks.  
 My interest throughout the project has been on the level of practices, that is, the on-
the-ground ways in which the rhetorical and performative materials of religious traditions 
have been used as the formative elements of citizen claims making. As much as democracy 
entails a social order that surrounds and informs the formal institutions of governance, I un-
derstand religious traditions as offering vital techniques of democratic citizenship and sets of 
“vernacular rhetorical practices” (to use Gerard Hauser’s term).7 Gramsci similarly frames 
religious traditions as crucial modes for acting in the world, writing, “Over a certain period 
of history in certain specific historical conditions religion has been and continues to be a ‘ne-
cessity’, a necessary form taken by the will of the popular masses and a specific way of ra-
tionalizing the world and real life, which provided the general framework for real practical 
activity.”8 Speaking implicitly to Marxists who dismiss religion as an epiphenomenal occur-
rence that diverts critical energies from challenging extant systems of exploitation and domi-
nation, Gramsci recognizes religious traditions as a mode—“a necessary form”—by which 
individuals interpret events, formulate their identity, and perform action.9 Therefore, the 
claims citizens make about their collective lives together and the “will of the popular 
                                                
7 Gerard A. Hauser, Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres (Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1999). 
8 Gramsci, 337. 
9 These modes of inhabiting the world, it bears saying, are not merely domination in another form. As scholar-
ship in the fields of lived religion indicates, performances of religious traditions are complex sites of resistance 
and discipline. This point is underscored also by work in the religious history of the United States, which has 
brought attention to the “democratization” of Christianity and the shifting of power from church authority to 
religious practitioners. See, e.g., Nathan O. Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1991). For an alternative account to Hatch’s historical analysis of the First Great Awakening, 
see Amanda Porterfield, Conceived in Doubt: Religion and Politics in the New American Nation (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2012). 
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masses” that emanates from this interplay of claims occurs through and with the religious 
traditions within that society. 
 The statement by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the epigraph to this chapter points to the 
need to think political regimes in relation to the diffuse sets of mores and practices that con-
dition and enable them. Elsewhere in his letter to D’Alembert concerning the theatre, Rous-
seau remarks, “a revolution in our practices…will necessarily produce one in our morals.”10 
The implicit consequence of such a transformation in the web of practices and the moral 
order—or the common sense of the community, to use Gramsci’s terminology—is that, so 
too, the political order will change. Rousseau and Gramsci both point to the complex inter-
relation between the political, moral, and practical orders within a society. This point is ech-
oed in the words and deeds of religious Americans who perceive an inexorable connection 
between faith, social mores, and politics. As Walter Rauschenbusch writes, “Whoever un-
couples the religious and the social life has not understood Jesus. Whoever sets any bounds 
for the reconstructive power of the religious life over the social relations and institutions of 
men, to that extent denies the faith of the Master.”11 The argument of this dissertation 
adopts a different position, namely, that whoever uncouples the religious and the social life 
has not understood how American democratic politics works. Looking beyond Rauschen-
busch’s Social Gospel network, American history records the activity of similarly minded 
actors and movements such as, to name but a handful, evangelical abolitionists like William 
Lloyd Garrison, the populism of William Jennings Bryan, the civil rights mobilization of Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr., and the Christian conservatism of Pat Robertson. 
 The historical fact of these religious actors is, of course, not news to political science 
or political theory. Yet political theoretical work that has recognized the democratic value 
                                                
10 Rousseau, 323. 
11 Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis (New York: Macmillan, 1907), 48-49. 
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and potency of the Christian religious tradition has mainly focused on prophetic rhetoric and 
the narrative form of the jeremiad.12 Yet in addition to broadening analytical attention to the 
broader cultus, my argument goes beyond these works in illuminating how political claims-
making in the United States has persistently leveraged the imaginative, emotional, and aes-
thetic repertoire that emerges from Christian practices. The lived experiences of American 
Christianity and American democracy are entangled so that religious claims-making simulta-
neously draw from and fuel an American democratic imaginary. The rudiments of pious and 
penitent practice appear in different configurations in the practices of religious zealotry, re-
ligious mourning, and what I have referred to as the poetics of civil religion. The chapters of 
this dissertation examined each of these aspects in terms of how they worked politically to 
contest, disrupt, and transform the existing network of ideas, sensations, and practices. 
While of course the substance of specific claims can be challenged and critiqued, these 
modes of political claims making and advancing political projects have a hold on religious 
subjects/citizens and evince how religious traditions facilitate and shape political action in 
American democracy. 
§ 3. Future Movements 
 
My project challenges the preconceived notions of religion operative in the field of 
political theory by making a crucial analytical shift to the empirical-historical world of politi-
cal enactments. Adopting the level of lived experience as the place for analyzing religion and 
politics reflects a broader trend in contemporary political theory that foregrounds the aes-
thetic dimensions of social and political life. The implications of the analytical shift under-
                                                
12 See, e.g., Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); 
David S. Gutterman, Prophetic Politics: Christian Social Movements and American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005); Andrew R. Murphy, Prodigal Nation: Moral Decline and Divine Punishment from New England to 9/11 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); George Shulman, American Prophecy: Race and Redemption in American 
Political Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); and Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance!: An 
Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity, anniversary edition (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002). 
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taken by this dissertation include a profound change in the theoretical imagining of both the 
Christian religion and American democracy. With this framework now established, this dis-
sertation provides the foundation for further theoretical elaboration and development. Al-
though the particularities of religio-political configuration of the United States cannot be 
universalized to other democratic orders, I nonetheless believe that the focus on religious 
practices in civil society and the political power immanent within those practices is a produc-
tive framework that can be the starting point for similar work in different national contexts. 
There is also an opportunity for additional theorization in terms of thinking more 
elaborately on how the subjects of domination and exclusion use religious materials to stake 
out their claims and achieve political standing. There have, of course, been investigations 
into the Civil Rights Movement, including the role of the Exodus narrative, prophetic lan-
guage, and the organizational resources of African-American churches. The framework de-
veloped over the course of this dissertation, however, would complement and supplement 
these works by focusing on how religious practices were negotiated, downplayed, or recon-
figured in the struggle to alter and redistribute the terms of power and status in American 
society. For instance, there is the question of modulating practice in light of considerations 
of audience and context, and also how black religious figures cultivated particular forms of 
dissenting subjects through the use of liturgical and performative materials. Yet such a line 
of inquiry also opens up an investigation of how religious minorities—that is, those who fall 
outside the common sense boundaries of Judeo-Christianity as it operates in the United 
States—make themselves at home in the theatre of the public sphere in the United States. 
Another way of extending this dissertation’s analytical framework is through a con-
sideration of the contemporary conditions of religious and cultural pluralism. The prevailing 
philosophical approaches to religious pluralism involve devising frameworks for religious 
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containment, translation, and generosity. While my project does not invalidate the project of 
nurturing an ethos of openness and modesty, it more significantly suggests that political 
theorists might consider an alternative set of conceptual tools that reside at the level of prac-
tices and arise from an interest in how religious traditions are transformed through moments 
of interaction and mutual engagement. James Tully’s framing of modernity as marking a 
“strange multiplicity” speaks to this dynamic: 
cultures are continuously contested, imagined, and reimagined, transformed and ne-
gotiated, both by their members and through their interaction with others… Cultural 
diversity is a tangled labyrinth of intertwining cultural differences and similarities, not 
a panopticon of fixed, independent and incommensurable worldviews in which we 
are either prisoners or cosmopolitan spectators in the central tower.13 
 
I share Tully’s notion that the actual practice of pluralistic politics troubles the tendency to 
imagine religious traditions and different cultures as discrete and insular entities.  Framing 
pluralism as an on the ground phenomenon that involves members of many different com-
munities and traditions coming together invites not a philosophical edict to translate but 
rather an analysis of the always-in-motion dynamics of hybridity, solidarity, and encounter.14 
Only by first understanding these sites and moments of practical action and interaction, I 
mean to say, can we as political theorists begin to speak more fully to the future of America 
as not just a vigorously religious democracy but also a religiously plural one. 
                                                
13 James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 11. See also After Pluralism: Reimagining Religious Engagement, edited by Courtney Bender and Pamela E. 
Klassen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); and Robert Wuthnow, America and the Challenges of Relig-
ious Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
14 Romand Coles uses the language of “ecotones” or special sites of encounter and engagement that occur in 
the practice of radical democracy. See Stanley Hauerwas and Romand Coles, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radi-
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